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ABSTRACT
This Article focuses on the evolving role of boards of directors. It
charts the decline of the two leading, twentieth-century conceptual
frameworks shaping corporate boards’ roles: agency cost theory, which
produced the limited “monitoring board,” and “separate realms” theory,1
which ceded board responsibility for matters other than profit maximization
to government regulation. Hedge fund activism and wild stock market
swings have exposed the limits of the board’s role in agency cost theory.
The 2020 pandemic, economic crises, investors’ demands for socially
responsible stewardship, and corporations’ own political activism have
rendered separate realms thinking untenable.
Although much theorizing in corporate law remains constrained by
these two conceptual frameworks, technology, necessity, and law reform are
moving boards beyond them, as we demonstrate. For example, by spring
2020, the economic shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic had sent many public
company boards into high gear, forcing them to look beyond stock prices to
engage their firm’s full capacity for information gathering, knowledge
synthesis and communication. Yet, even before the global pandemic placed
heightened demands on boards, a two-decade trend toward “information
governance” was well underway. It has been catalyzed by new technology,
legal requirements, industry best practices, committee charters, fiduciary
duties, and investor demands. The trend is observable in the overhaul of
frameworks compelling audit committees’ increased participation in
financial reporting. It is evident in legal requirements compelling greater
board participation in risk management, legal compliance, and ESG
oversight. These changes foster boards’ capacities to collaborate in informed
strategy formation—a prerequisite to their responding adeptly to activists’
interventions and stock price gyrations.
We name this new model of board governance “information
governance” to capture the board’s agency in knowledge synthesis, reporting
1. The nomenclature “separate realms” is our own, but the concept is foundational,
dating back to the classical economic tradition of David Ricardo and Adam Smith.
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oversight, and institutional deliberation constitutive of the firm’s identity.
Information governance highlights a leadership role for boards in driving
communicative action in firms—the active framing, synthesis, and
deployment of the firm’s self-knowledge. In this respect, we discern and
emphasize an affirmative, value-creating role for boards that has been
suppressed by agency theory’s monitoring board conceit. We analyze areas
of ongoing legal flux supporting the new, technologically enhanced,
information-rich paradigm we identify.
INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic and stock market turmoil of 2020 have
heightened the urgency of national debate about corporate governance and
increased the demands placed on boards of directors.2 Amidst this tumult,
boards are seeking fresh guidance regarding their roles, but existing
governance paradigms are proving threadbare. In these uncharted waters,
agency cost board governance provides little guidance to directors. With
stock prices dependent on day traders, Federal Reserve activism, or other
exogenous factors, it is plainly insufficient for boards to rely on stock prices
as benchmarks of corporate success. In a pandemic and climate-stressed
world demanding greater corporate diversity and inclusion, boards are more
hard-pressed to rationalize fending off social welfare concerns to a separate
realm of state action. In sum, both the agency cost and separate realms
paradigms for board governance are outdated. Companies and boards are
facing unprecedented challenges within a framework of rising expectations
and heightened legal standards—standards which presume directors capable
of leveraging state of the art information and communication technologies.
Old governance dogmas warrant reconsideration.
This Article argues that we are witnessing a shift away from the
monitoring board and separate realms models, which masked the true scope
of board discretion and authority in corporate affairs. We propose
“information governance” to describe this new paradigm for board
governance in the Information Age. Information governance highlights the
board’s authoritative deployment of the firm’s knowledge and
communication systems to ground corporate collective action responsive to
2. For an account of the “seismic” changes creating an “urgent imperative” for board
leadership, see NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON
COMMISSION, FIT FOR THE FUTURE: AN URGENT IMPERATIVE FOR BOARD LEADERSHIP 8 (2019)
[hereinafter NACD, URGENT IMPERATIVE]. An open question presented is whether boards
will demand and obtain the information and leadership stature they rightly should have, which
is an imperative of our writing.

182

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:1

the competitive environment. This corporate self-knowledge, emerging
under the board’s leadership, is the basis for building the firm’s strategic,
organizational, and ethical identity.
In this Article, we present information governance both as a normative
theory about the role of boards in governance—an answer to the question:
“What should boards do in governing the twenty-first-century firm?”—and
as a descriptive framework for understanding professional and legal changes
already underway. That is, information governance offers a new and better
theory about what boards should be doing, and therefore how corporate
governance law should evolve, while describing more accurately what
boards are increasingly doing now, and how law has helped get us to this
place. For decades, the agency cost paradigm offered an economic
framework upon which corporate governance was built, producing the
“monitoring board.”3 Information governance offers a new, superior
framework for building corporate governance, one made possible–made
necessary—by advances in information technology, heightened business
challenges, and enhanced legal and stakeholder demands.
Hence,
information governance offers a better framework for understanding
corporate law as it presently evolves.
In the agency cost theory of board governance, the board served as the
actor at the top or center of the organizational chart—the “nexus” in a nexus
of contracts or “mediating hierarch” in a team production model.4 Its
principal job was to ensure that neither management nor shareholders
extracted private benefits at the expense of the other.5 Monitoring was
3. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65
STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2013) (describing agency cost analysis as “the dominant
framework of analysis for corporate law and corporate governance today”); Lyman Johnson
& David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 14 (2014) (describing
a “fixation on agency costs [having] taken root and flourished within the corporate law
academy”); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 870 (2013) (discussing the “laser-like focus of corporate governance
reformers on minimizing agency costs”).
4. For more information regarding the nexus of contracts, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Board of Directors as a Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); William W.
Bratton, The Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407,
453–56 (1989) (discussing the role of the board in the nexus-of-contracts firm). For
background about team production, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
5. See Thomas Clarke, The Impact of Financialization on International Corporate
Governance: The Role of Agency Theory and Maximizing Shareholder Value, 8 L. & FIN.
MKT. REV. 39, 42 (2014) (“In classical agency theory the central role of the board of directors
is to monitor managers (the agents) to ensure their interests do not diverge substantially from
those of the principals (the shareholders), and to devote the company to maximizing principals
return.”).
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accomplished through a finite set of board tasks: reviewing CEO
performance and pay, umpiring extraordinary transactions, and scrutinizing
any self-dealing. In order to be “efficient” (a key to agency cost reduction),
the mandates of board governance were trimmed to the bone. Limiting the
mandate and workload enabled individual directors to serve on multiple bigcompany boards. It also perpetuated an inner circle of directors constituted
principally from the ranks of current and recently retired CEOs.6 The
influence of agency cost thinking on corporate governance theory, law, and
practice is difficult to overstate. Even today, academic governance reform
proposals stay safely within the agency cost box, offering little more than
tweaks to a framework in which boards are presumed informationally
captured and largely passive.
Information governance recognizes that the political-economic
mandate for public company boards has moved beyond the reduction-ofagency costs model. It re-conceptualizes board governance for twenty-firstcentury firms as communicative action. As contemporary social science
elucidates, deciding what the firm will measure, value and communicate,
internally and publicly, catalyzes coordinated action in public companies and
other complex organizations.7 Board judgment about what will or will not
be measured, valued, and closely observed echoes throughout the
organizational life of the firm. The stakes are especially high in a world
where ESG concerns are compounding. Departing from recent polemics,
information governance doesn’t dictate an endgame for directors about
stakeholder versus shareholder governance, or any other endpoint of

6. On the persistence of corporate inner circles, see James Fanto, Whistleblowing and
the Public Director: Creating Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435 (2004). For a
sociological, behavioral and statistical analysis, see Bang Dang Nguyen, Does the Rolodex
Matter? Corporate Elite’s Small World and the Effects of Board of Directors, 58 MGMT. SCI.
236 (2012).
7. For discussion of the field of “communication constitutes organization,” see infra
notes 219 and 220. For discussion of firm knowledge from the perspective of the “resourcebased view of the firm,” see infra note 309. Our information governance concept draws on
the literature of organizational identity formation in management science and organizational
behavior. For the foundational text, see Stuart Albert & David A. Whetten, Organizational
Identity, 7 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 263, 265 (1985) (“When discussion of goals and
values become heated, when there is deep and enduring disagreement or confusion, someone
may well ask an identity question: ‘Who are we?’ ‘What kind of business are we in?’ or ‘What
do we want to be?’”). See also Joep P. Cornelissen, S. Alexander Haslam & John M. T.
Balmer, Social Identity, Organizational Identity and Corporate Identity: Towards an
Integrated Understanding of Processes, Patternings and Products, 18 BRITISH J. MGMT. 1, 3
(2007) (defining organizational as “relating to the identity of the organization as a whole”);
Dennis A. Gioia et al., Organizational Identity Formation and Change, 7 ACAD. MGMT.
ANNALS 123, 124–25 (2013) (reviewing the literature on organizational identity).
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corporate identity.8 Alternatively, it posits that boards create value by
marshaling the firm’s information and communication systems to foster
coherence and direction regarding the organizational, competitive and
strategic possibilities defining the enterprise.9
The meta-insight of our information governance theory is that board
investment in knowledge gathering and synthesis, deliberation and
reporting—followed by informed delegation of authority to act—generates
value for the firm. The board is not merely monitoring the value-creating
work of others to diminish agency costs. Rather, it is itself creating value by
participating in identifying the firm’s key sources of competitive advantage,
including its ESG capabilities.10 In documenting the foundations of our
information governance model, we validate the need for boards to shift to an
expansive value-creation mindset, rather than an ad hoc, passive,
compliance-based one.
Consistent with their Caremark duties,11 boards engage in information
governance in the deliberative construction of the firm’s internal data
gathering, reporting, and communications architecture—harnessing that
architecture to board level action.12 In this mode, we analyze four facets of
information governance at the board level. First, information governance is
8. There is considerable irony in corporate governance law’s fervent embrace of
corporate self-regulation and “enabling” law, on the one hand, while taking a monolithic
approach to profit maximization for shareholders being the (legal and economic) purpose of
business corporations.
9. For perhaps the most influential early treatment of organizational identity as it shapes
the choices of an enterprise’s leadership team, see Dennis A. Gioia et al., Organizational
Identity, Image and Adaptive Instability, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 63 (2000). For information
regarding the importance of disclosure in relation to theories of building corporate identity,
see, for example, Andrea J. S. Stanaland, May O. Lwin & Patrick E. Murphy, Consumer
Perceptions of the Antecedents and Consequences of Corporate Social Responsibility, 102 J.
BUS. ETHICS 47 (2011).
10. For information on the link between competitive strategy and corporate social
responsibility, see, for example, Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society:
The Link between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, 84 HARV.
BUS. REV. 78 (2006). See infra Part II.G for a discussion of Edith Penrose’s “resource-based”
view of the firm.
11. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
12. The empirical literature attesting to the link between effective internal auditing,
robust internal controls, and corporate performance is growing. See, e.g., Yahel Ma’ayan &
Abraham Carmeli, Internal Audits as a Source of Ethical Behavior, Efficiency and
Effectiveness in Work Units, 137 J. BUS. ETHICS 347 (2016) (presenting evidence that internal
audits are conducive to efficiency and effectiveness in organizations). Likewise, there is
evidence of link between ESG (environmental, social and governance) investing and positive
returns. See, e.g., Paul Sullivan, Investing in Social Good Is Finally Becoming Profitable,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2020, at B5 (presenting data demonstrating that during the coronavirus
crisis impact investing is outperforming traditional investing).
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graphically illustrated by heightened legal and professional standards for
audit committees’ leadership in financial reporting. Second, we highlight
enhanced expectations for boards effectuating better risk management and
legal compliance governance. Third, boards’ financial accounting and risk
and legal compliance oversight lay a basis for informed board decisions
regarding organizational culture, including the firm’s responses to ESG
shareholder proposals. (Indeed, the SEC has proposed that boards’ stated
opinions on them should be disclosed.13) Coherent corporate cultures,
including ESG policies, reinforce productive collective action and
stakeholder loyalty, both being potential sources of value for firms.
Finally, the financial, legal, operating, and ESG information garnered
through board and committee service furnish a basis for boards to understand
and advise upon strategy formation, evaluate the CEO, and set executive
compensation. The agency cost monitoring model failed to empower boards
to assume a robust role in vetting and advising on strategy–a serious
deficiency in our view.14 We argue that there is potential value, even, in
boards’ expecting the CEO to present—for discussion—a coherent, factintensive vision and plan for maximizing the firm’s competitive advantage.
We anticipate that our information governance nomenclature will be useful
to directors and commentators in its clarity. However, “information
governance” offers more than just a new piece of jargon. It represents a new
theory about how boards leverage information, communications and
knowledge to create value for their firms.
13. A common response is for the firm to “settle” the proposal before it comes to a vote.
See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public
Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 293–94 (2016) (“In a climate of rising shareholder
empowerment, managers may simply agree to accommodate shareholders’ desire for more
transparency if they can do so at a minimal cost to the firm.”). The evolving mandate for
boards to take a public position on shareholder proposals is discussed infra Part II.F.
14. The monitoring paradigm of board service has been so pervasive that empirical
analysis of boards’ contribution to strategic advising and strategic outcomes is still emerging.
For recent examples of empirical studies examining boards’ strategic advisory role, see, for
example, Felix von Meyernick, David Oesch & Markus Schmid, Is Board Industry
Experience Valuable? 45 FIN. MGMT. 207, 208 (2016) (citations omitted) (finding that surveys
conducted among directors suggest they consider the advisory role, including their duty to
review the firm’s major plans and actions, to be of greater importance than the monitoring
role); Chamu Sundaramurthy, Kuntara Pukthuanthong & Yasemin Kor, Positive and Negative
Synergies Between the CEO’s and the Board’s Human and Social Capital, 35 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 845, 849 (2014) (showing how the interaction between the human and social capital
of the CEO and the board has positive effects on IPO success). Analysis of the friction
between monitoring and advising exists in both the legal academic and finance research
literature. See e.g. Chamu Sundaramurthy & Marianne Lewis, Control and Collaboration:
Paradoxes of Governance, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 397 (analyzing tradeoffs between the
control and collaboration approaches to board leadership).
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Moreover, as legal academics, we validate the need for corporate
governance law to provide a supportive scaffolding for boards’ investment
in information governance. In this regard, we build on existing legal and
quasi-contractual requirements—for example committee charter
requirements imposed by stock exchanges— in elaborating the board’s role
in overseeing the firm’s informational infrastructure and communications
functions. The board’s treatment of the full range of mandatory and
discretionary corporate communications—for example, the chosen methods
of financial reporting, the release (or not) of ESG reports and reports on the
firm’s philanthropic and political activities15—shapes the firm’s
organizational identity and culture, hence its prospects.16
This Article is organized into two parts. Part I describes the demise of
the twin paradigms of twentieth-century corporate governance. It argues that
agency cost governance has fallen short on its own profit-maximization
terms, and that separate realms thinking has become an ideological iron cage.
Part II presents the core of the information governance thesis,
expanding on the brief sketch presented above. The impetus for this Article
is the shared instinct that exceptional events since the 2000s have given rise
to a new corporate governance reality (though others have not described it
as breakdown of agency cost and separate realms paradigms).17 This new
15. To this day, no body of U.S. law or regulation requires public disclosure of corporate
donations to politically active nonprofits, including think tanks. See Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44
UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997) (exploring practices and substantive rules). Disclosure laws have
not altered despite the rise of nonprofits like the Olin Foundation and the Federalist Society,
which have proven extraordinarily influential in altering policy and the political complexion
of the U.S. judiciary—which can receive unlimited corporate funds without transparency.
16. There is an expansive empirical literature exploring the practical effect of
organizational identity. See, e.g., Susanne Scott & Vicki Lane, A Stakeholder Approach to
Organizational Identity, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 43, 47 (2000) (“Managers choose
organizational images for presentation to stakeholders for strategic reasons. Corporate
reputation building is principally concerned with promoting attractive organizational images
for purposes of goal attainment, and it is the primary job of leadership to manage
organizational identity toward that end.”).
17. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Is There Hope for Change? The Evolution of Conceptions
of “Good” Corporate Governance, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 552 (2017) (concluding that
there is “considerable support for the emergence of a new conception of corporate
governance”); THE BRITISH ACAD., REFORMING BUSINESS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A
FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION 9 (2018) (describing how the weakening
of the bond between a corporation and its public purpose due to socio-economic and
geopolitical shifts calls for the redefinition of the corporation); MARTIN LIPTON, INT’L BUS.
COUNCIL OF THE WORLD ECON. F., THE NEW PARADIGM, A ROADMAP FOR AN IMPLICIT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS TO
ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 1 (2016),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf
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phase in corporate governance more candidly acknowledges the power and
discretion of corporate boards, and the power and discretion of global
corporations, rather than portraying them as narrowly reactive and hemmed
in by markets. The concept of information governance, and board leadership
as communicative action, emphasize the freedom and also new
responsibilities that corporations possess in the Information Age.
I.

THE FALL OF THE TWIN PARADIGMS OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

A. Agency Theory’s Market-Based Governance
Though Berle and Means raised alarm about efficiency losses in
widely-held firms back in the 1930s,18 it was only in the late 1970s and ‘80s
that agency cost corporate governance began its hegemonic reign in
corporate theory, law, and governance practice.19 Although agency cost
theory formatively influenced corporate governance, the focus shifted away
from governance in the usual sense of human judgment and behavior in
organizations. It emphasized modalities for enabling market forces to
accomplish most of the “governance” work. Most pertinently, market forces
were intended to incentivize and discipline chief executives who might
otherwise appropriate or squander corporate and shareholder wealth.20
Incentive compensation and hostile takeovers were accepted as the crucial
tonics, with boards being tasked principally with unleashing them.21
The doctrines of fiduciary care and loyalty remained formally intact.
[https://perma.cc/2MP6-HAVS] (explaining the need for changes in corporate governance in
response to short-term financial activists impeding long-term economic prosperity).
18. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–25 (1932) (empirically documenting and examining the
repercussions of “the divergence of interest between ownership and control”) [hereinafter
BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION].
19. For information about the hegemonic embrace of agency cost governance, see Melvin
A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1279 (1999)
(“Today, the monitoring model of the board has been almost universally accepted and adopted
in large publicly held corporations.”). To understand this use of “hegemony,” see Duncan
Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32, 32 (1982) (“Hegemony is
very close to our concept of ideology. It is the notion of the exercise of domination through
political legitimacy, rather than through force.”).
20. See generally MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976)
(describing the roles of boards and shareholders in the governance of a corporation).
21. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002)
(reviewing large body of empirical work on executive compensation and finding labor market
failures in the design of executive incentive compensation plans).
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But apart from M&A, the operation of the demand requirement largely
curtailed derivative litigation alleging fiduciary breach.22 Even when
concern for proper information stewardship emerged in inchoate form in
corporate fiduciary law, it remained largely toothless. With state law’s
oversight role in abeyance, federal legal requirements and quasi-contractual
governance standards saw an uptick after the 2000s, catalyzed by more
frequent and virulent boom-and-bust stock market cycles. The busts yielded
the Sarbanes Oxley and Dodd Frank Acts, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), and a sea of regulatory and stock exchange
governance reforms.
Yet, agency cost theory prevailed—the new
requirements were mostly derided as dead-weight make-work, rather than
board governance for value.23
As we show, boards who absorbed the agency cost, monitoring board
paradigm were disincentivized to become deeply informed about their firms.
Nor could they presume support from their CEOs, other board professionals,
or even their firms’ support staff to this end. In the most recent, extreme
version of shareholder value contestation, board under-investment in rich
informedness is in play where activist hedge funds present strategic
alternatives to the corporate status quo. In this limelight, since board assent
to fundamental transactions and restructurings remains legally mandatory,
boards are finding that agency cost theory has ill-prepared them to execute
the strategic judgments requisite to their office. Reliance on stock prices is
not sufficient. Activists’ interventions nearly always drive a concurrent
uptick in price (sometimes reflecting a liquidation of greater long-term
value), and Main Street and Wall Street valuations are increasingly
unhinged. A new theory of board value creation is needed—in our view, one
that leverages the board’s role in stewarding the firm’s enterprise-salient
information and communications.

22. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (documenting the
paucity of duty of care and loyalty derivative suits outside of the M&A context).
23. Ironically, a more theoretically eclectic approach survived in management science,
where an enormous stream of empirical research, under the rubric of “in-put/out-put studies,”
sought to discern linkages between board composition (gender, age, educational background)
governance for value, and firm characteristics (diversification, size, structure, levels of
monitoring, etc.). See, e.g., James D. Westphal & Ithai Stern, Flattery Will Get You
Everywhere (Especially If You Are A Male Caucasian): How Ingratiation, Boardroom
Behavior, And Demographic Minority Status Affect Additional Board Appointments at U.S.
Companies, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 267 (2007) (studying the factors influencing the likelihood
that directors of U.S. corporations will get other board appointments).
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The Agency Cost Paradigm of Board Monitoring

From the publication of the Modern Corporation and Private Property
in 1932, American academic corporate law focused on the implications for
firms and shareholders of the “separation of ownership and control.”24
Adolph Berle, Jr., a Columbia Law professor, and Gardiner Means, an
economist, observed the growing remoteness of shareholding from hands-on
management in large, U.S. industrial corporations. Reflecting this
orientation, for four generations, corporations continued to be conceived of
in such shareholder-property terms. This perspective jibed with the
orientation of law professors in the law-and-economics tradition—critical
influencers in building the late twentieth-century field of corporate
governance.25
Before the late 1970s, the gulf separating dispersed shareholders from
managerial decision-making was conceived of as a fundamental harm—an
economic vulnerability arising from the “explosion of the atom of
[shareholder] property.”26 The defining concern, in simplified form, has
been that shareholders’ property value would succumb to the agency costs
of managers’ self-dealing or indolence. Nevertheless, in what some regarded
as a “race to the bottom,” corporate law allowed directors to remain in a
mostly clubby relationship with CEOs, who retained almost complete
influence in their selection.27
From the 1980s onward, the writings of financial economists Fama and
Jensen28 and Jensen and Meckling29 proved formative in reshaping the
24. See BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 18 (discussing the politicaleconomic consequences of separating ownership from control); Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise
and Fall (?) of the Berle-Means Corporation, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 445, 445–46 (2019)
(discussing the tenacity and legacy of the concept).
25. For a brief history of the law and economics movement’s influence on legal thought,
see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY’S END (1995).
26. See BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 18, at 9 (arguing that
stockholders are not motivated to a more efficient use of corporate property due to the
separation of ownership).
27. For the classic objection, see generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (suggesting a reconsideration
favoring a federal role in corporate law).
28. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 301–02 (1983) (rebutting Berle and Means’ analysis by arguing that
organizations where ownership and control are separated survive because they benefit from
specialization of these roles and are able to control agency problems by separating “the
ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and implementation of the decisions”).
29. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976)
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orientation of modern corporate law. The separation between the financing
function and the managerial/control function was reconceived as an
“efficient,” positive specialization.30 Monitoring by independent directors
became the tip of the corporate-accountability-to-shareholders spear. Boards
engaged in “ratification and monitoring of [corporate] decisions” to promote
shareholder value.31 The C-Suite acquired the hands-on, executive
function—the “initiation and implementation of [corporate] decisions” to
promote shareholder value.32 Courts declined to review corporate
transactions approved by even nominally independent boards, a fortiori to
apply legal sanctions after the fact if their good faith decisions resulted in
losses. Market forces and incentives, rather than legal rules and judicial
enforcement, were conceived of as exerting the optimal, efficient form of
discipline on corporate managers.
Reliance on stock prices, as well as consultation with outside bankers
and lawyers, shielded directors from having to do “too much” work.33 It also
thinned the baseline standard of what directors were expected to learn about
their firms—hence what “monitoring” meant. Lost was the value that might
have accrued if experienced directors had commanded robust systems of
information-gathering and reporting within the firm, and then invested
themselves in deliberating over, discussing, and following up on the
information that was produced.
Curiously, the agency cost paradigm was not a natural fit for corporate
law and governance. Under U.S. law, neither directors nor officers are
agents of shareholder-owners. Boards’ authority is statutory and plenary,
and officers’ authority is delegated from the board.34 Nor can shareholders
(developing a theory of ownership structure based on the theory of property rights, agency
and finance).
30. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (explaining the rules and practices of corporate
law as efficient mechanisms for governing relations between multiples stakeholders); Daniel
R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 918 (1982) (analyzing the separation
of ownership and control as a praiseworthy form of economic organization).
31. FAMA & JENSEN, supra note 28, at 302.
32. Id.
33. As just one example, before the agency cost paradigm took hold, the typical public
company board met much more frequently than has become the norm. A transcript of
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey’s 1945 annual meeting reveals that the company’s
board met “every week” with “committee meetings practically every day.” STANDARD OIL
CO. OF NEW JERSEY, STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING 8 (1945). Mainstream
commentators have claimed there are insufficient numbers of talented and experienced
outside director candidates who would devote such meaningful time to board service, but they
lack evidence for this long-standing supposition.
34. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141–42 (listing the powers and duties of directors and
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rightly be conceived of as legal owners of corporate property, as opposed to
residual risk bearers, since the corporation itself owns its property.35
Nevertheless, consistent with the conceit of directors being their agents,
profit maximization for shareholders became the nearly exclusive focus of
directors’ and officers’ duties in modern corporate governance.36
Influenced by the law-and-economics focus, corporate legal academics
validated officers’ and boards’ laser-focused attentiveness to stock prices as
the principal signal of corporate performance.37 Their research mirrored this
orientation. Focusing on event studies, commentators attempted to resolve
what “worked” in corporate governance through recourse to stock price
changes.38 With stock prices serving as surrogates for deeper investments in
officers); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 16 (2012) (discussing the legal and
economic fallacies embedded in the shareholder profit maximization framework); Faith
Stevelman, Myths about Shareholder Value, 3 ACCT. ECON. & LAW 1, 7 (2013) (extending the
political-economic analysis of corporate power established by the profit maximization
framework of contemporary corporate governance).
35. See STOUT, supra note 34, at 29–30 (exploring the mistaken assumption that
shareholders own the corporation). For a recent treatment of the reformulated shareholder
ownership concept, proposing the establishment of a “shareholder trustee,” see Kelli A. Alces,
Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787 (2010).
36. There were exceptions to the law and economics focus in corporate law scholarship.
Many of the exemplary avenues of critique are represented in LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL,
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995) (reflecting on the nature of modern corporation law
and its limits). See also Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate
Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LABOR L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000) (exploring the lack of
corporate governance rights for American workers); David Millon, New Directions In
Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993) (discussing the friction between shareholder primacy and
broader, stakeholder-regarding views of corporate purpose). For forty years, moreover,
shareholder profit maximization was conflated with broad economic social welfare. See, e.g.,
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 489 (2013) (addressing the intellectual evolution of conflating shareholder wealth
maximization with the enhancement of social welfare); William W. Bratton, The Separation
of Corporate Law and Social Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2017) (analyzing the
intellectual evolution of thinking about corporations’ role in society over six decades).
37. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465
(2007) (tracking outside directors’ growing preeminence on boards and describing the trend
as being enabled by reliance on increasing transparency and reliance on stock prices).
38. As stated in a review essay by Jill Fisch, “Event studies use sophisticated econometric
techniques to factor out general market and industry-specific price fluctuations in an attempt
to determine if a particular event has a statistically significant impact on stock price.” Jill E.
Fisch, Picking a Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 452 (2015). See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (examining the evidence and concluding that
the market for corporate charters works to promote regulatory structures which enhance firm
value). But see Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L.
REV 1049 (2015) (using empirical analysis to demonstrate that Delaware corporate law neither

192

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:1

firm knowledge, a nearly universal presumption arose that outside directors
would come to know and understand relatively little about their firms.39
Favoring directors who could impartially judge conflicted transactions (even
if they possessed thin knowledge of the firm’s internal affairs) remained a
plausible accommodation, especially because directors were largely shielded
from liability for errors in judgment.40
Armed with solid faith in markets as the determinants of corporate
survival and success, the deregulation of state corporate law continued for
decades.41 Calls for federal incorporation to ensure minimum fiduciary
standards had been beaten back already in the 1970s, criticized as rigid and
ill-conceived.42 A 1989 symposium edition of the Columbia Law Review
questioned, even, whether any corporate law rules should be mandatory,
rather than optional (“enabling”).43
Portfolio diversification was vaunted as another market-based
governance proxy, a principal mode of shareholder self-protection.
Leveraged buyouts and restructurings were lauded as efficient solutions to
eliminating excess free cash flow otherwise subject to managerial waste.
The legal favor shown stock-based, incentive compensation, and the
emphasis on boards having discretion in crafting executive incentiveadds nor subtracts substantial economic value for firms). A recent empirical study
demonstrates the weak or nonexistent link between choice of Delaware incorporation and
corporate advantage. See Robert Anderson IV, The Delaware Trap: An Empirical Analysis
of Incorporation Decisions, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (2018) (suggesting that the strongest
factors in incorporation choice are unrelated to the quality of the state law).
39. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Corporate Governance: Taking Boards Seriously, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997) (concluding that the monitoring versus advising tradeoff is real
and mandates against mandatory board composition rules).
40. The statutory validation of good faith reliance on experts helped enormously in this
regard, too. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (allowing directors to rely in good faith on
expert opinion).
41. Former Stanford Law School dean Bayless Manning described corporate law as
having “nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes–towering skyscrapers of rusted
girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.” Bayless Manning, The
Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37
(1962). For a historical account of the early development of corporate law, see Harwell Wells,
The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920-1940, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573 (2009).
42. For discussion of such a potential federal initiative, see, for example, Richard W.
Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991
(1976) (arguing that the reform of corporations can only be accomplished at the federal level);
Donald E. Schwartz, Symposium-Federal Chartering of Corporations, An Introduction, 61
GEO. L.J. 71 (1972) (proposing a federal corporation statute).
43. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (presenting the volume's conclusions for and
against allowing corporations to opt out of all mandatory corporate law terms through their
charter provisions).
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compensation packages, illustrates how directors were validated in
deploying market forces, rather than being organizational leaders.44 As
mentioned above, thanks to the legal validation and liberal use of
independent director ratification, self-dealing transactions ran aground the
duty of loyalty almost exclusively in the context of high stakes mergers and
acquisitions, where personal director liability is almost never in play.45
Outside of M&A deals, few shareholder derivative lawsuits against
executives or directors survived motions to dismiss.46 Duty of care lawsuits
against directors had disappeared after the rise of charter exculpation clauses
in the mid-1980s.47 Beginning in 2000, Delaware even validated charter
waivers of the fiduciary corporate opportunity doctrine.48 In short, the field
of corporate governance stubbornly avoided looking inside the “black box”
of corporate affairs where actual governance occurred.49 The path through
the fiduciary maze had been cleared by faith in market forces.
Deference to the market did not mean simplicity in deal practice,
however. Agency theory’s market orientation fostered lucrative work for
investment bankers and transactional lawyers advising boards, thus enabling
thinly informed boards to avoid governance disasters. M&A deals involve
intensive board advising about alternative structures, debt and equity
financing options, comparative bid values, auction modalities, poison pill
44. For a review of the phenomenon and extant literature, see Susan J. Stabile, Motivating
Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation Positively Affect Managerial
Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227 (1999) (surveying the social science literature
and the legal framework of performance-based executive compensation, and arriving at
skepticism about the accepted link with executive motivation).
45. The apex of this validation of private ordering was reached when the Delaware
Supreme Court allowed for deferential business judgment rule review of controlling
shareholders' going private transactions (so long as they’re conditioned on preapproval by a
majority of disinterested directors and shareholders). See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.,
88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). For opposition to this degree of judicial laissez-faire based on faith
in parties' capacity for beneficial and fair self-ordering, see Faith Stevelman, Going Private
at the Intersection of the Market and the Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 775 (2007). But see Guhan
Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2 (2005) (validating the move to deferential
business judgment review).
46. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
47. For a rare proposal favoring using fiduciary care to elevate board informedness, see
Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Fixing Delaware’s Broken Duty of Care, 2010
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 319 (2010).
48. But see Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., CIV. A. NO. 9477, 1989 WL 48746, at
*7–*9 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1989) (finding a conflict between the fiduciary, corporate opportunity
doctrine and the scope of charter waivers under Section 102(b)(7)).
49. See Thomas Clarke, The Impact of Financialization on International Corporate
Governance: The Role of Agency Theory and Maximizing Shareholder Value, 8 L. & FIN.
MKT. REV. 39, 42 (2014) (agency theory “does not dare to enter the ‘black box’ of the firm
itself”).
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mechanics, and so forth. Executive stock option compensation plans and
corporate stock buybacks, similarly, involve extraordinary transactional
complexity subject to board authority, upon reliance on bankers’, lawyers’
and consultants’ expert advice. Thus, the industry of board advising
remained vital, even if the theory and law surrounding boards’ roles and
discretion remained oversimplified.50 In sum, beyond the mandate to
leverage and attend to market signals, agency cost governance had little to
offer individual boards making choices in governing individual firms.
2.

Expanded Board Informational Tasks under Federal Law

In contrast to the laissez-faire focus in state corporate law and corporate
legal theory, federal legal reforms and so-called “soft law” standards sought
to raise the level of board oversight in the wake of large and too common
corporate frauds and attendant stock price losses. Beginning in the late
1990s, stock exchange listing requirements and various industry compendia
of best board practices demanded that public companies establish audit,
compensation, and nominating committees composed predominantly of
independent directors.51 The committee reformulations mandated some
stepped-up mastery of firm-specific information by directors.52 Increased
director attentiveness was galvanized further by the enactment of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002.53 Unfortunately, again, many professional
advisers and legal commentators derided the new board oversight
requirements, viewing them as supernumerary compliance tasks, rather than
as a predicate for value creation by boards.54 Indeed, the changes were often
50. We are not the first scholars to suggest that the agency cost paradigm has lost its
luster. See, e.g., GERALD DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE
HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2016) (tracking the decline of the
large American corporation).
51. For a comprehensive treatment of the New York Stock Exchange amendments and
new standards, see Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, NYSE Board of Directors Approves New
Corporate Governance and Disclosure Standards, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AMS. 63 (2003)
(enumerating all the new requirements for listing on the NYSE, including the requirement for
a majority of independent directors to be on the board).
52. See discussion infra Part II.D (discussing the significance of stock exchange listing
requirements for committee charters).
53. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 107(c), 116 Stat. 745, 766 (2002)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7217(c) (2012)). For a detailed treatment of Sarbanes Oxley’s
codification of enhanced director oversight in areas relevant to accurate reporting and fraud
prevention, see J. Robert Brown, The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance
of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 359 (2004) (“In the area of disclosure,
Sarbanes-Oxley . . . mandated a more systematic and enhanced review of corporate filings by
the SEC.”).
54. For a striking example, see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
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condemned as rigid drags on efficiency.55 The monitoring board model
simply did not require functional board committees. Preferring loose,
equitable standards to rules and requirements, most academic thought leaders
condemned the new law reforms.
The changes were indeed substantial. Until 2002, the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) hands were mostly tied, its mandate
confined essentially to enhancing transparency.56 Thereafter, with the series
of large-scale accounting scandals which emerged in 2001-02, the
importance of board stewardship of critical corporate information rose.
These accounting scandals lead to the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley,
followed by SEC regulations compelling greater board attentiveness to and
stewardship of sound corporate accounting, auditing, and financial reporting
practices, especially by board audit committees. Notably however, even
with Sarbanes Oxley and the ensuing SEC regulations and listing standard
requirements, the emphasis remained on particular tasks directors performed
for the benefit of capital markets investors—not on committees’ immersion
in firm-specific knowledge, or management of the firm’s knowledge and
communications to benefit the enterprise in a broad sense. In this respect,
the new securities laws, including the new audit committee provisions,
reinforced the constraints and conventions of agency cost governance to
support market forces.
The same orientation and limitations are manifest in Congress’
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.57 The Act’s governance
provisions emphasize the role of independent directors in reducing
managerial conflicts, excessive executive compensation, and incipient

Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (concluding that
Sarbanes Oxley’s governance provisions are ill-conceived and likely to accomplish little
good). But see Lawrence Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Might Just Work), 36 U. CONN. L. REV. 915, 919 (2003) (“Despite its
weaknesses, the Sarbanes Oxley Act is not trivial. Though mostly patchwork and codifying,
there are a couple of provisions amounting to legislative silver bullets-still not sweeping
reform, but potentially profound.”).
55. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 3 N.Z. L. REV. 365,
376 (2005) (arguing that the empirical literature does not support SOX); Robert Charles Clark,
Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for
Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 259 (2005) (noting the deficiencies in the Act’s
governance provisions).
56. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (“The federal regime had until then consisted
primarily of disclosure requirements rather than substantive corporate governance
mandates . . .”).
57. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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corruption (e.g., by prohibiting retaliation against whistle-blowers).58 In an
era where fiduciary enforcement had become tissue-thin, in essence, they
codify features of state corporate law’s proscription against self-dealing, the
paradigmatic agency cost.
In sum, soft law, SEC requirements, and even federal legislation after
2000 expanded the agency cost paradigm by using board committees to
foster market transparency and reign in corruption. Unfortunately, myopia
about board committees’ potential to elevate broad governance objectives,
and governance elites’ disdain for federal rulemaking meant another lost
opportunity. Nowhere in these soft law mandates or federal securities laws
and regulations is there anything approaching recognition of the possibilities
inherent in information governance—that is, a role for boards in curating
their firms’ knowledge and communications to define what the enterprise is
and how it might thrive.
3.

New Information Technologies and Emergent Fiduciary Duties

Two developments in the final years of the twentieth century—one
technological, the other legal—brought pressure to bear on agency cost
governance. First, vastly enhanced computing power and communications
technology expanded boards’ practical ability to learn about corporate
affairs.59 Second, the law of fiduciary duty began to reappraise the
importance of board stewardship of corporate information, though it did so
tentatively, and without expanding the scope of director personal liability.
In 1985, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court
admonished boards to “inform[] themselves . . . of all material information
reasonably available to them.”60 But the import of the decision was limited
by the practical limitations of the information and communications
technology of the day. Cumbersome centralized computing had only
recently given way to user-friendly personal computers. As relevant to
58. See Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Regulating Culture: Improving
Corporate Governance with Anti-Arbitration Provisions For Whistleblowers, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. ONLINE 41, 46 (2016-2017) (arguing that Dodd-Frank created a distinct,
heightened basis for exempting corporate and financial whistleblowers from mandatory
arbitration that courts should respect despite lack of total clarity in the statutory language).
59. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION
EMPIRES (2011) (surveying the invention and development of the internet); Rani Molla, How
Apple’s iPhone Changed the World: 10 Years in 10 Charts, VOX (June 26, 2017, 11:24 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2017/6/26/15821652/iphone-apple-10-year-anniversary-launch-mobil
e-stats-smart-phone-steve-jobs [https://perma.cc/YJ8L-M8HQ] (highlighting how the
information available on an iPhone changed the business world, inter alia).
60. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
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directors’ knowledge about their firms, the average standard of executives’
computer literacy was (understandably) low. A decade later, by the mid1990s, the internet had had a revolutionary impact on corporate affairs. The
new technological development enabled near-instant communication via
electronic mail, instant messaging, voice phone calls over Internet Protocol
(VoIP), and two-way interactive video calls. Moreover, the communications
of that era, as made possible by 1990s “flip phones” and early laptops, look
primitive compared to the smartphones and tablets which became pervasive
a decade later. At the company-side, the new technologies massively spurred
companies’ investments in improved operational software and internal
controls. Virtually every facet of large companies’ affairs became
automated, monitored, and remotely visible via software. State of the art
corporate web pages displaying detailed data and narrative disclosures
became ubiquitous. Corporate governance practices were evolving to reflect
the Information Age.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, electronic filing of corporate quarterly,
annual and transactional reports (rather than in hard copy) was at first
optional, and then was made mandatory by the SEC. These data-rich
corporate autobiographies soon became easily accessible to the public,
including investors, both on the internet and via corporate webpages. As
instantaneous communication of sophisticated data became normalized, the
on-the-ground practice of boards’ fiduciary duty of care (i.e., to become
apprised of “all material information reasonably available”) also evolved
upward.61 With vast amounts of information about their firm readily
available to them, directors were challenged to up their game. Surely, they
would be expected to know their company better than outside investors and
analysts could from publicly available reports? If they did not, the problem
was not “executive capture,” i.e. a lack of practical ability or legal authority
to obtain any material corporate information they desired.
Ironically however, after the watershed of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the
legal evolution of the fiduciary duty of care stalled. After the mid-1980s, the
nearly universal adoption of charter exculpation provisions by public
companies precluded most judicial inquiry into the duty of care, stunting the
judicial development of the duty’s informational governance mandate vis a
vis boards. Moreover, an artificial legal convention walled off directors’
fiduciary care obligation to be well informed about corporate affairs, from
their obligation to become fluent in the substance of the SEC reports the firm
published to shareholders. The former was recognized as “corporate
governance,” the latter as an ad hoc facet of “market regulation.” It was only
61. Id. at 893.
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in 1998, in Malone v. Brincat, that the Delaware Supreme Court reversed
this supposition (and the Court of Chancery’s decision), holding that
directors owed a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty in overseeing disclosures
to investors.62 Nevertheless, a host of predicates and qualifications in the
Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion, once again, thwarted the expansion of
board informational governance, as recognized in Malone. In corporate law,
board oversight over public disclosures remained a priority nearly
exclusively in the M&A context.63
Boards’ information-based fiduciary duties took a tentative step
forward in In re Caremark, in 1996. The Delaware Court of Chancery veered
away from the established, narrow confines of the duty of care and loyalty
doctrines to recognize a new duty for boards to oversee the establishment of
efficacious corporate internal controls (i.e., internal corporate information
gathering and reporting systems).64 Once again, however, the new doctrinal
development was stunted. For two decades, Caremark’s take-away for
boards’ informational duties remained ambiguous. First, its precedential
authority was uncertain because it was merely a review of a settlement of
shareholder derivative claims. Even more unpropitious was the opinion’s
uncertain jurisprudential foundation. Caremark grounded its new,
systematic, board internal control oversight duties in fiduciary care doctrine.

62. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 10 (Del. 1998). For discussion of the place of
truthfulness and candor in the framework of boards’ basic duties of fiduciary care and loyalty,
see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Fiduciary Law’s
Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505 (2000) (arguing that directors’ candor
and truthfulness in dealings with shareholders is of the essence in state corporate fiduciary
duty law, apart from its relevance to federal disclosure mandates).
63. The state fiduciary (corporate) law focus on disclosure in M&A settings remains
vivid to the present. See, e.g., Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2017) (reversing the New York Supreme Court’s rejection of a disclosure-based
settlement of litigation challenging Verizon’s purchase of Vodafone Group PLC assets at an
allegedly excessive price). But see In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 10020-CB 898
(Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016) (announcing a new rule for evaluating disclosure-based settlements
in deal litigation—the “plainly material” standard—and expressing a preference for disclosure
claims either to be litigated or mooted, rather than settled).
64. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding
that the duty of care extended beyond directors merely informing themselves in an ad hoc
manner, and expanding it to requiring boards to be proactive, and install and oversee the
general effectiveness of their firms’ internal controls—controls capable of fostering
information germane to accurate public reporting and internal reporting relevant to the
assessment of legal compliance and risk-management). The court observed, too, that
efficacious internal controls yield the information requisite to a board’s fulfilling its basic,
state statutory monitoring and managing responsibilities. Id. The decision was a provisional
bridge to a new way of seeing board governance, consistent with our information governance
proposal, and yet the path forward remained.
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But it called for directors to make a good faith effort to promote efficacious
internal controls at their firms. As stated therein, only “an utter failure to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists——
will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to [director]
liability.”65 Which would furnish the basis of Caremark’s new board
oversight obligation: the fiduciary duty of care or duty of good faith?
Immensely high stakes lay in the distinction. Duty of good faith
jurisprudence was opaque, providing little guidance for directors ex ante.66
Moreover, unlike duty of care shortfalls, shortfalls in the duty of good faith
(i.e., bad faith), were not (and are not) susceptible to statutory charter
exculpation.67
The scope and application of Caremark duties created ongoing concern
within the legal and governance fields, especially given the ambiguous
application of charter exculpation. Only in 2006, a decade after the Court of
Chancery’s decision, did the Delaware Supreme Court affirm the existence
of Caremark internal control oversight duties for boards, rooting them in the
duty of loyalty. By that time, improved information technology and elevated
best practices—reflecting the intervening federal securities and stock
exchange rules—had substantially elevated the norms of board stewardship
of corporate information and communications, as discussed in Part II.68
4.

Passive Institutional Investors

Agency cost governance follows two conceptual master tracks, both
aimed at maximizing shareholder wealth. Above, we described the principle
of board primacy, where boards operate as surveilling surrogates for
vulnerable, dispersed shareholders. Its counterpoint is the school of
shareholder primacy, where shareholders seek to intervene more directly in
corporate affairs in their own interest. From a capital market perspective,
the forty-year arc described herein saw a radical shift to concentrated
institutional equity ownership:69 mutual funds, public and private pension
65. Id. at 971.
66. For a review of the development of the case law on good faith, emphasizing the stakes
of the scope of director liability, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin
Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (detailing the doctrinal development of the good
faith obligation as a core fiduciary duty of directors).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (allowing exculpation of directors, but not for bad
faith, self-dealing or approval of wrongful shareholder distributions).
68. See infra Part II.B (discussing the role of advancements in technology in board
governance).
69. For a quantitative profile of the types of institutional owners and assets under

200

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:1

funds, trusts and endowments, insurance firms, and most salient recently,
hedge funds. Legal commentators had wondered aloud whether institutional
investors might take up an active role in corporate affairs, especially via the
proxy process. Perhaps institutions would marshal their collective clout to
overcome the agency cost problems arising from the separation of ownership
from control?70
By the mid-1990s, however, legal scholars concluded that free-rider
problems and other incentive-conflicts limited institutional asset managers’
propensity to use the proxy process (a fortiori expensive hostile tender offer
bids) to replace directors and wrest control from incumbent managers.71
Activist institutional investors almost entirely failed to materialize, at least
prior to the 2000s. Many factors drove this: the chilling structure of proxy
regulation (including non-reimbursement of expenses), the in terrorem effect
of SEC Rule 13D, costs of collective action (i.e., sharing gains while bearing
all costs), fund managers’ compensation structure, and asset managers’
incentives not to alienate incumbent managers. The agency costs of agency
management (including projections of future trends), see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ASSET
MANAGEMENT 2020: A BRAVE NEW WORLD 13 (2020), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/assetmanagement/publications/pdfs/pwc-asset-management-2020-a-brave-new-world-final.pdf [h
ttps://perma.cc/S99M-PE22] (charting trends in institutions and volume of investable assets
pre-COVID-19). For analysis of the U.S. legal and regulatory framework accompanying
intensive capital market concentration, see Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2016) (observing that the largest institutional investors
collectively own eighty percent of all stock in S&P 500 corporations, and arguing that such
concentration reduces competition, causes higher prices, and should be illegal).
70. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The
Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 899 (1992) (arguing that although not conclusive,
empirical data suggests that institutional oversight can add significant value); Bernard S.
Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 811, 814–15 (1992) (concluding that changes in the legal rules would have allowed large
institutions better to monitor the actions of corporate managers, were political preferences
different in the U.S.); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 449–51 (1991) (analyzing the
intersection of collective action problems with agency cost analysis to predict that institutional
investor voice would not prove robust). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1281
(1991) (“Put simply, the agents controlling institutional investors have considerable reason to
remain ‘rationally apathetic’ about corporate governance, and little reason to become active
participants”).
71. For discussion of the factors influencing passivity, see, for example, John C. Coffee,
Jr. Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor., 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1277, 1283 (“[T]he primary explanation for institutional passivity is not overregulation,
but the insufficiency of existing incentives to motivate institutional money managers to
monitor.”); ROCK, supra note 70, at 472 (noting that institutional investors replicate the
agency cost problem at their own managerial level, and that dispersed shareholders lack
sufficient incentives to discipline fund managers).
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capitalism produced inertia in this period.72
This pattern of passive institutional ownership began to change in the
mid-2000s and accelerated after the 2008 financial crisis. With increased
calls for greater corporate accountability, shareholder primacy was
ascendant. The SEC initiated a project of shareholder proxy access in the
years after Sarbanes Oxley.73 The basic concept was to enable certain
holders of large blocks of stock to propose short slates of director nominees
in a unitary, company proxy statement.74 But intense controversies and
roadblocks ensued from the SEC’s proxy access proposals, and shareholder
nominees in the company proxy did not become a meaningful possibility
until quite recently, and via a different regulatory route.75 Prior to activist
hedge funds’ leveraging proxy access and otherwise mobilizing the proxy
process, institutional owners remained mostly passive actors in governance.
5.

The Mobilization of Activist Hedge Funds

Back in the 1980s, hostile takeovers raised bedrock corporate
governance issues about board primacy.76 Would boards remain free, under
72. In the Private Securities Litigation Act, Congress sought to leverage the clout of the
largest institutional investors to monitor the agency costs implicit in private securities
lawsuits. Nevertheless, the institution did not welcome vigorous participation as lead
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its
Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1529
(2006) (“question[ing] whether the lead plaintiff provision really encourages greater
monitoring of plaintiff law firms.”).
73. Congress did not specifically mandate proxy access, but rather authorized the SEC to
adopt a proxy access rule. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg.
29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, and
274). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated SEC Rule 14a11 as arbitrary and capricious, finding that the SEC had inadequately documented the tradeoff
of costs and benefits. The SEC subsequently resolved not to appeal the ruling. Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
74. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1347, 1352 (2011) (“[A]rgu[ing] that, contrary to the views expressed by the
commentators, [the chamber of commerce, the Corporate Board Member magazine, and many
others] proxy access would have little impact on corporate governance.”).
75. Instead of following the path of Rule 14a-11 (which was invalidated), the SEC’s
amended Rule 14a-8 provisions enable shareholders to submit for inclusion in a corporation’s
proxy materials a proposal to amend the company’s governance documents to provide for
proxy access or request the board of directors of the company implement proxy access. The
proxy access rules were adopted by the SEC at the same time. Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, and 274).
76. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 439 (1988) (arguing for
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the business judgment rule, to fend off in-the-money tender offers for
control—just to continue pursuing the strategy they had set ex ante?
Regulation (especially control share acquisition statutes) and private
ordering (especially poison pills and staggered boards) evolved quickly to
dampen the then-immediate threat of shareholder primacy via hostile tender
offers.77 Agency cost governance did not evolve to undermine board
primacy in this period.
By the mid-2000s, however, capital market conditions and legal and
institutional arrangements had once again changed to favor an insurgent
shareholder primacy movement, with so-called “activist,” hedge funds in the
vanguard. Eschewing the costs and risks of tender offers, activist hedge
funds typically mount a proxy-based threat that compels management to
consider their demands. Again, the proxy access movement and 2008
financial crisis destabilized the governance status quo, escalating the
platforms for shareholders to voice their demands, and placing boards under
enormous pressure to be responsive. In their attempts to alter corporate
financial or operating affairs in order to capture a greater, immediate surplus,
activist hedge funds represent a trenchant, destabilizing force in
contemporary governance.78 As was true with hostile bids, even the mere
consideration of stakeholder interests when boards evaluate takeover proposals). For the
bedrock governance issues raised by takeovers see, BRATTON & WACHTER, supra note 36
(providing intellectual history of the issues in play amidst the market and institutional changes
of the time).
77. For discussion of the market and regulatory milieu, see Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Corporations, Markets and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931 (1991) (noting that the high level
of deference to management’s business judgment in the face of a hostile takeover bid
“reduce[s] not only the number of hostile bids (and successful bids), but also the number of
corporate restructurings . . . in fear of a hostile bid.”). See generally David Millon, New
Directions In Corporate Law Communitarians, Contractarians, And The Crisis In Corporate
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1375 (1993) (demonstrating that the perceived problems
arising from hostile takeovers indicate a growing sensibility that shareholder primacy is on
shaky ground).
78. There is less opposition to activist hedge funds' interventions than, say, was targeted
at 1980s-style corporate “raiders” and leveraged buyouts, but the commentary is mixed on
their impact on firms’ long-term welfare. For discussion of the likely deleterious effects of
activist campaigns, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: the Impact
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 550 (2016) (arguing
that an impact of this activism is “shortening investment horizons and discouraging
investment in [research and development.]”); Leo E. Strine Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves
Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate
Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1939 (2017) (“For human investors, the overall
trends as to the factors relevant to the question of if activism harms or helps them are, at the
least, worrying. American public corporations seem to be spending much more of their free
cash flow on stock buybacks, increasing dividends, and other tactics to guarantee immediate
payoffs than on research and development and other forms of long-term investment.”). But
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threat of an activist campaign stands to influence, to constrain the strategies
and operating plans firms can aspire to undertake.
As was true in the heyday of hostile bids, the academic camps favoring
board primacy and shareholder primacy are clashing loudly.79 A vocal
shareholder rights project at Harvard Law School succeeded in pressing the
case against board primacy, and facilitated widespread gains for shareholder
primacy.80 In the past decade, many public companies repealed their poison
see Bernard S. Scharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board Independence: Creators
or Destroyers of Long-Term Value? 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 813 (2015) (arguing activist
hedge funds generate long-term value by encouraging efficiencies and contributing positively
to the decision-making process).
79. While there are powerful dissents, there is a burgeoning literature attesting to positive
shareholder wealth effects from activist campaigns. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav &
Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1100
(2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577 [https://perma.cc/NT28
-AQWA] (finding that evidence does not substantiate the claim that activists are focused on
short-term growth at the expense of long-term growth); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy
& Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (revealing that unlike other forms of activism, such as that of
mutual funds and pension funds, hedge fund activism leads to shareholder gain because hedge
funds are in a better position to serve as informed monitors); Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M.
Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 REV. DERIVATIVES RES.
169, 170 (2011) (showing that in the time period from 1994 to 2005, hedge funds successfully
made valuable changes to corporate governance which benefit both the hedge fund and the
shareholders); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as
Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323, 323–24 (2008) (finding that firms targeted by
activist hedge funds tend to see an increase in operating efficiency, tend to be well positioned
to “mitigate liquidity constraints in their investment portfolio,” and tend to “earn larger
holding period returns on their active blocks than their passive blocks.”); Robin M.
Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362 (2009)
(concluding that because activist hedge funds can force a takeover, they can yield “large
positive abnormal returns”); C. N. V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The
Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise,
40 J. CORP. FIN. 296 (2016) (establishing that hedge funds with previous large dollar
investments tended to generate positive returns in subsequent interventions); April Klein &
Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private
Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 213 (2009) (finding that in the period surrounding the initial
Schedule 13D and for the subsequent one year period, hedge funds create positive abnormal
stock returns); see also Shane Goodwin, Myopic Investor Myth Debunked: The Long-term
Efficacy of Shareholder Advocacy in the Boardroom 11–12 (June 24, 2014) (working paper),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2450214 [https://perma.cc/TG23-UNSB
] (finding “statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional
wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and
their long term shareholders”).
80. Although it was highly successful, the program was a lightning rod for governance
controversy. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, An Unusual Boardroom Battle, in Academia,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015) (noting the impact of the Shareholder Rights Project, along with
the questionable value of the staggered board); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating
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pill and staggered board defenses.81 Proxy advisory firms are helping to
catalyze shareholder voting in public companies, so that it is a far more
meaningful force in governance, even apart from hedge fund activism.82 As
stated above, the 2008 financial crisis increased investors’ mistrust in the
corporate governance status quo’s beneficial effects on the economy,83
creating support for law reforms promoting greater shareholder influence on
corporate decisions.84 In this milieu, hedge fund activists have been
exceptionally well positioned to press their claims, making headway,
especially, in groups (so-called “wolf packs”), and even with support from
traditional, institutional investors, at times.85
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1638–42 (2013) (discussing his
work, the success of his program (the Shareholder Rights Project) in its representation of
institutional investors, and opposition to his work).
81. Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
20, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-case-against-staggered-boards/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/6RFL-6B5E]; Taub Stephen, More Companies Going Off The (Poison) Pill,
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Feb. 6, 2006), https://www.complianceweek.com/more-companies-goin
g-off-the-poison-pill/6733.article [https://perma.cc/FRN5-S5EW]. With the effect of
COVID-19 on the economy, many firms are evaluating reinstalling shareholder rights plans.
Mark D. Gerstein, Tiffany F. Campion & Joshua C. Resiman, Proactively Adopting a Poison
Pill in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 8,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/08/proactively-adopting-a-poison-pill-in-res
ponse-to-the-covid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/7S3X-QBSV].
82. Because they are roiling the governance status quo, the advisory firms are
encountering strong criticism. The SEC has recently unveiled rules that would burden the
advisory firms’ operation, with mixed reviews. Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy
Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-89372, at 46 (July 22, 2020) (codified as
amended 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2020)).
83. For a candid scholarly treatment facing the fundamental macro-level economic
questions, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Is Corporate Governance a First-Order Cause of the
Current Malaise?, 6 J. BRIT. ACAD. 405 (2018) (noting corporate governance’s complicity
with excessive executive compensation, but focusing on the role of the state, not corporate
governance, in supporting the development of human capital).
84. Elisse B. Walter, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the Master Class
on Corporate Governance: “Restoring Investor Trust through Corporate Governance” —
Remarks Before the Practicing Law Institute (Feb. 18, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/spe
ech/2009/spch021809ebw.htm [https://perma.cc/NF6T-ENYJ].
For a comprehensive
treatment, see generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 202 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (analyzing the conceptual and economic
tradeoffs in corporate governance and advocating “that director primacy—not shareholder
primacy—ought to be the future of corporate governance”).
85. Bernard S. Sharfman, What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tells Us About Proxy
Access, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2017). In most circumstances, to succeed via the proxy
route (rather than through informal pressure and board capitulation), the activists require
traditional institutional owners' support for their proposals. For a treatment of activists’
synergy with traditionally more passive institutional investors, see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation
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Facing Activists, Boards Cannot Defer to Stock Prices

Activists cannot go around boards, because corporate law prevents
shareholders—even activist hedge funds—from forcing fundamental
corporate change without their assent. Thus, activists’ rising influence in
corporate affairs has set the stage for confrontation. How will boards know
when to assent to activists presenting an alternative, purportedly a more
profitable business plan? Even accepting the embrace of shareholder wealth
maximization as the goal, reliance on stock market signals cannot resolve the
directors’ dilemma. The common uptick in stock price attendant to the
arrival of activists may reflect a costly sacrifice of otherwise realizable, if
later, larger wealth gains.86 Given the potential presence of confidential
strategic information (nontransparent to stock trading), the price uptick
might be less than the gains which would materialize if the board stayed the
course. The price uptick might reflect merely a liquidation and discount to
greater long-term corporate wealth creation. Moreover, shareholders differ
in their preferences for risk and investment time horizons, ones which might
not align with the activists’.87 Further, even believers in efficient market
pricing concede that certain kinds of information (perhaps information
crucial to understanding the likely payoff from the firm’s longer-term
strategy) confound “efficient” stock pricing.88 Activists’ restructuring or
payout demands are likely to be harder to evaluate than would be an all-cash
acquisition offer, because the latter at least presents an objective number for
comparison to the firm’s own projections. In sum, activists’ demands require
of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 895–98 (2013) (arguing that institutional
investors have undervalued governance rights, so that activist hedge funds provide salutary
balance in questioning the corporate status quo when they launch campaigns).
86. The proposition has been squarely rejected by Harvard Law School’s Lucian
Bebchuck and his co-authors, yet it remains plausible. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The
Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2015)
(concluding that no evidence supports claims of activists driving short-term gains relative to
a five-year baseline of corporate performance). For citation to the conflicting academic
literature, see supra notes 78 and 79.
87. For an early treatment intra-shareholder conflicts, see Iman Anabtawi, Some
Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 563 (2006)
(documenting the likely conflicting priorities among different classes and types of
shareholders).
88. Brad Jones, Asset Bubbles: Re-thinking Policy for the Age of Asset Management 7
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/27, 2015) (concluding that the financial
incentives of asset managers contribute to “bubble-riding” and investor herding); Ferhat
Akbas, Will J. Armstrong, Sorin M. Sorescu & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Capital Market
Efficiency and Arbitrage Efficacy, 51 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 387, 387 (2016)
(concluding that availability of arbitrage capital influences the degree of stock market price
reactivity).
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boards to evaluate the merits of their proposal, to make choices between
alternative futures for the firm, with all the concomitant uncertainties implied
therein.
Most germane to this Article, given the problems associated with boards
deferring to stock prices in formulating responses to activists, will boards
have the strategic information necessary to make a wise choice at the crucial
juncture? Agency cost governance has not supported boards in obtaining,
analyzing and deliberating over the kind of thick, strategy-related corporate
information they would be required to know. No reliable market-based
measure or other handy heuristic exists to short cut boards’ need to bring indepth knowledge of the firm to bear on this judgment. Nor do the extant
research studies resolve the issue of whether activists’ campaigns are
commonly “opportunistic”. Alongside a sophisticated empirical literature
attesting to genuine wealth creation from embracing activists’ plans, exists
an equally sophisticated literature demonstrating value destruction
therefrom.89
89. For legal commentary and analysis skeptical of activists’ value-creation claims, see,
for example, Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 268–69 (2012) (discussing incentives for short-termism and
how law could respond to mitigate activists’ harmful impacts); Martijn Cremers, Saura
Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Activist Hedge Funds and the Corporation, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 261, 264 (2016) (presenting analysis and empirical evidence that the substantial private
gains activists realize come at the expense of long term value, as opposed to being salutary
disciplining forces on managerial waste); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the
Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 IOWA J. CORP. L.
545, 548–50 (2016) (surveying the relevant institutional and regulatory developments and
concluding that the rise of hedge fund activism is driving a serious, concerning cut back in
corporations' investment in long-term capital investments, including in research and
development.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126
YALE L.J. 1870, 1968–70 (2017) (surveying the legal and financial features of hedge fund
activism to conclude that the system isn't advantageous to most natural persons, even those
who own equity); YVAN ALLAIRE, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE PRIV. & PUB. ORGS., HEDGE FUND
ACTIVISM: PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND SOME NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (2015) (finding
investors in activist hedge funds would achieve equal gains from investment in a diversified
public stock portfolio once fees are taken into account). For scholarship embracing the netvalue creation version of activists’ interventions, and rejecting the expropriation or shorttermism thesis, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1155 (2015) (citing evidence contrary to
the theory that initial positive gains from activism are tied to longer-term corporate
underperformance); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2007) (advising against
further regulation on grounds that “it is unclear whether and to what extent hedge fund
activism is driven by excessive short-termism”); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 893 (2013) (concluding that activists provide positive value
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If a board is under-informed about the firm’s resources, competitive
position and strategic plans, it may too easily capitulate to the activist's
proposal, not wanting to appear unresponsive or risk averse. Alternatively,
an unprepared board may too readily succumb to status quo bias, rejecting
the activist’s proposal out of false confidence in the existing plans, or on
account of groupthink. Being thinly informed, boards will lack ballast to
make a collective, informed judgment—which is precisely their job. This is
the crucible that boards face when confronting activist hedge funds bearing
glossy proposals. Easy reliance on stock prices is untenable, and the stakes
for firms, shareholders and other constituencies are high.90
In 2020, a huge rift has emerged between the real, pandemic economy
(showing signs of tremendous losses and disarray) and stock prices (setting
new highs after cratering months before).91 This is deepening the challenges
facing boards. Many firms have encountered serious financial hardships,
and most are facing financial reforms, and/or serious operational and staffing
changes necessary to adjust to the disruptions.92 Comparisons to the
economic woes of the Great Recession are rife.93 Companies are adjusting
to supply chain disruptions, a sudden migration to remote work, vastly
altered consumer behavior, employees testing positive for COVID-19 or
juggling child care, the cessation of most recreational dining, travel, and instore shopping, and a burgeoning, nation-wide civil rights movement. For
by complementing institutional investors' shortcomings, since activists engage in intensive
evaluation of portfolio companies’ strategies, thus selecting for possible underperformers).
See also Bernard S. Sharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board Independence:
Creators or Destroyers of Long-Term Value?, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 813, 821–22 (2015)
(supporting this paper’s thesis that if boards can act as informed, impartial arbiters, then
activists’ proposals will be adopted when they are most likely to generate long-term value).
90. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Boards 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS. L. 351
(2019) (conceding the problem of agency cost boards’ relative ignorance about strategy and
calling for the establishment of board strategy committees).
91. Matt Phillips, ‘This Market Is Nuts’: S&P 500 Hits Record, Defying Economic
Devastation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2020); Eric Morath, Theo Francis & Justin Baer, The
Covid Economy Carves Deep Divide Between Haves and Have-Nots, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-covid-economy-carves-deep-divide-between-havesand-have-nots-11601910595 [https://perma.cc/KU8H-CGAD].
92. See, e.g., Christopher M. Matthews, Big Oil Companies Lose Billions, Prepare for
Prolonged Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2020) (explaining that corporate leaders of the
largest oil and gas companies do not have clear expectations for economic or energy market
recovery because of the uncertainties inherent in the pandemic, as well as the uncertain policy
environment).
93. Sifan Liu & Joseph Parilla, What the Great Recession Can Tell Us About the COVID19 Small Business Crisis, BROOKINGS (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2020/03/25/what-the-great-recession-can-tell-us-about-the-covid-19-small-businesscrisis/ [https://perma.cc/NBK4-KH3Z].
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many established technology firms and large enterprises especially, stock
prices in the summer and fall of 2020 reached new records, after suffering a
thirty-plus percent drop in early spring. The stock price volatility itself is a
challenge for boards and CEOs. While bullish stock prices appear to portend
the widespread and relatively rapid dissemination of an efficacious vaccine,
most scientists remain cautious about the timing of a return to normal.94
Companies' stock prices may be elevated due to factors unrelated to their
performance. The empirical case for aberrancies and inefficiencies in stock
market prices—”short-termism” and “bubbles,” for example—has become
more compelling after the 2008 financial crisis.95 The shocking drop and
then stunning climb of stock market prices after the spring of 2020 has not
enhanced faith in stock market efficiency.96 With the market’s buoyancy
attributed variously to day traders’ enthusiasm, an activist Federal Reserve
and Treasury, and low interest rates (driving investors to equity), stock
prices—the lodestar of agency cost governance—are increasingly suspect as
benchmarks for board decision-making. Old fashioned agency cost boards
that are confidently relying on current high stock prices are likely underinvesting in governance.
This is the Achilles’ heel of the agency cost monitoring board. If
directors cannot securely rely on stock prices to evaluate corporate
performance, the monitoring board fails on its own profit-maximization
terms. Agency cost theory’s narrow mandate for boards (to rely on stock
prices as signals and limit managerial waste) makes it too limited a medium,
even, for optimally fostering profit maximization for shareholders. The
monitoring model has under-prepared boards to invest in the high-level,
firm-specific information requisite to engaging in strategic analysis.
Change in this direction is occurring, as we document in Part II, but it
has not cohered into a new board governance paradigm.97 Even if they serve
on the audit committee, it’s most likely that directors have not been

94. Ayoub Ammy-Driss & Matthieu Garcin, Efficiency of the Financial Markets during
the Covid-19 Crisis: Time-Varying Parameters of Fractional Stable Dynamics 14-15 (July
22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), ResearchGate.net/publication/343124591 [https://perma
.cc/8LWQ-TBJX].
95. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 705 (2010). See, e.g., id.
96. Researchers are only beginning to come to terms with the ways stock prices were
impacted by the pandemic. See, e.g., HaiYue Liu et al., The COVID-19 Outbreak and Affected
Countries Stock Markets Response, 17 INT’L J. ENVTL. RESEARCH & PUB. HEALTH 1, 16 (2020)
(evaluating the “short-term impact of the coronavirus outbreak on 21 leading stock market
indices in major affected countries including Japan, Korea, Singapore, the USA, Germany,
Italy, and the UK etc.”).
97. See infra Part II.B.
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encouraged to leverage the financial, risk, and legal compliance information
they would have garnered thereby, in order to analyze the firm’s strategic
prospects. It’s likely that boards influenced by decades of agency theory
would avoid raising cutting-edge, possible controversial questions, such as
whether the firm’s resources, culture, and reputation are being cultivated to
create employee and customer loyalty. Stock price surges can vanish
suddenly, leaving monitoring boards unmoored. The monitoring board
model insufficiently counsels boards to demand a three-dimensional
informational inventory of the firm in order to build long-term value. Our
information governance model is intended to help boards identify and
capitalize on their firm’s resources, capabilities, and comparative
advantages.
B. The End of Separate Realms Thinking
For decades most corporations downplayed their impact on the
environment, the wellbeing of their employees and communities, and other
matters that traditionally escape quarterly financial statements.
Alternatively, this section of the Article documents the extraordinary,
growing salience of investors’ demand for corporate governance of social,
environmental, and political risks, and the challenges it poses for boards.
Because these areas are increasingly influential to firms’ success, they merit
serious board attention. Agency theory pushed boards and CEOs to ignore
all matters other than shareholder wealth, to leave such matters to action by
the state—an approach we denominate as “separate realms” thinking.
Separate realms and agency cost governance are distinct but intertwined
concepts, recapitulating the public/private dichotomy in classical liberal
thought. From this perspective, markets (the private sphere) are salutary,
natural domains of self-interest, but states (the public sphere) are belated,
unnatural, and tinged with coercion.98 Twentieth century agency cost and
separate realms governance told business leaders they could create value by
ignoring everything that did not immediately and materially influence
revenue and profit figures. Instead, they should focus on maximizing
shareholder wealth as measured by stock prices.99 Unsurprisingly, this
98. For a discussion of the crucial legal authorities in this tradition, as relevant to modern
law, see, for example, Derek McKee, The Public/Private Distinction in Roncarelli v.
Duplessis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 461, 472 n.47–97 and accompanying text (2010) (explaining how
the public/private distinction maintains relevant in modern legal thought).
99. For a treatment of the intellectual substructures of separate realms concepts as they
influenced law in this period, see generally, Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion Of Law:
The Legitimating Schemas Of Modern Policy And Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3
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outlook better suited a simpler, older, more manufacturing-based economy,
where unions attended to labor rights, and concerns about environmental
damage remained marginalized. That economy and consciousness no longer
predominates.100 The concerns which were then deferred are now aired
loudly through the internet, and especially social media, to widespread,
attentive audiences. Even more so in the pandemic (while we are tethered to
our smart devices), and with the repercussions of the November 2020
election looming—the social, environmental and political dimensions of
corporate action are in the limelight. The outdated nature of the separate
realms construct is dramatically apparent. Information governance offers
boards a new model to capture the emerging challenges.
The foundational text of modern, academic corporate governance—The
Modern Corporation and Private Property—itself mused over the fallacy of
separate realms thinking, suggesting that corporate law could be construed
as a form of constitutional law in the economic sphere.101 But this facet of
the opus was overshadowed; it fit uneasily with the rise of neoliberalism in
the later twentieth century, the period in which corporate law and governance
matured as modern fields.102 Nevertheless, more recently—especially since
the 2008 financial crisis and even more so amidst the pandemic (which has
necessitated more Treasury and Federal Reserve bailouts),—separate realms
thinking has come under vocal criticism, both from shareholders and the
public.103 Growing, extreme income and wealth inequality have exposed the
(2004) (describing the ideas that influence our lives, thinking, public policies and the law);
Linda Weiss, The State in the Economy: Neoliberal or Neoactivist?, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 183 (Glenn Morgan, John L.
Campbell, Colin Crouch, Ove Kaj Pedersen & Richard Whitley eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2010) (drawing on the literature of comparative capitalism and international political
economy to analyze key approaches to the state’s role in the contemporary economy).
100. Greg Ip, Pandemic Hastens Shift to Asset-Light Economy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pandemic-hastens-shift-to-asset-light-economy-11602087201
[https://perma.cc/5AMS-73QA].
101. BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 18, at 124–25.
102. In the years after the financial crisis several excellent accounts of the conceptual
structure and influence of neoliberalism have emerged. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF
HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (surveying the values neoliberalism
attaches to market exchange and its influence on international policy, globally); COLIN
CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM vii (2011) (encapsulating
neoliberalism as having “one dominant theme: that free markets in which individuals
maximize their material interests provide the best means for satisfying human aspirations, and
that markets are in particular to be preferred over states and politics, which are at best
inefficient and at worst threats to freedom.”).
103. Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV.
137, 160 (2019). For a recent overview of cutting-edge heterodox economic research, see
generally HEATHER BOUSHEY, UNBOUND: HOW INEQUALITY CONSTRICTS OUR ECONOMY AND
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fallacy of a shared nirvana built on growth,104 as have the radically
accelerated effects of industry-led climate change and natural resource
devastation.105
Significantly for our theory of expanded board governance, it has
become clear that investors, and other constituencies companies depend
upon, care immensely about firms’ ESG performance and risks, and are
unwilling to buy into separate realms beliefs.106 At the same time, the
Citizens United decision and greater media attention to corporate political
action have made more salient corporations’ own adventuring beyond the
commercial sphere.107 Corporate political and philanthropic action is both
more controversial and less avoidable amidst the pandemic’s social and
public health effects, the Black Lives Matter movement, and rising economic
insecurity; these have radically unsettled the business landscape, exposing a
range of polarizing divisions. There is an upsurge in demands for boards
better to understand and manage ESG risks, to supervise reliable ESG
disclosures, and to take responsibility for fostering ethical firm cultures
encompassing ESG concerns.108 Firms and boards cannot credibly or
profitably persist in separate realms thinking.
Many commentators, and the Business Roundtable itself, are resorting
to preexisting conceptual frameworks of “stakeholder governance,” or
“corporate social responsibility.” In contrast, we believe “information
governance” is a superior conceptual framework. It emphasizes the freedom
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2019) (surveying the institutional, statistical and conceptual
shifts demonstrating inequality’s threat to the U.S. economy).
104. For discussion of the widespread, heightened awareness of the effects of income and
wealth inequality, as spurred by the writing of pathbreaking French economist Thomas
Piketty, see Idrees Kahloom, Thomas Piketty Goes Global in “Capital and Ideology”, THE
NEW YORKER (Mar. 2, 2020) (“His book perfectly fit the post-Occupy Wall Street ethos,
providing empirical rigor for the upswell in anger.”).
105. Thomas M. Lenton et al., Climate Tipping Points—Too Risky to Bet Against, 575
NATURE 592 (2019) (“The growing threat of abrupt and irreversible climate changes must
compel political and economic action on emissions.”).
106. See infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
107. For an unabashed treatment of firms’ strategic imperative to engage the legal and
regulatory process proactively, see Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to do with It?:
Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 639 (2010) (arguing that firms can
benefit financially from “legal astuteness” when the law is properly integrated into their
overall framework).
108. For example, in July 2020, the Government Accountability Office published a 62page report. (U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-530, PUBLIC COMPANIES:
DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO
ENHANCE THEM (2020), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-530 [https://perma.cc/368U374E]. See also, Donald C. Langevoort, The Effects of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, and
Privateness on Corporate Cultures, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 386 (2020).
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well-informed boards possess to direct enterprise resources—and, hence, the
stakes of directors being well-informed about their firms. It also captures
the fact that information (intra-firm knowledge and know-how) is often a
twenty-first-century corporation's most valuable resource.109 “Information
governance” captures the medium through which boards themselves can
create value (stewarding knowledge management) and highlights the
modality through which they will evaluate their executive team’s success (on
the basis of corporate information and communications). Consistent with
the enabling nature of corporate law, “information governance” affirms that
boards in individual companies should (in a condition of robust
transparency) determine where along the “shareholders versus stakeholders”
spectrum their firm will live.
1. The Rise and Demise of Technocratic Governance
Separate realms thought, as applied to modern U.S. business, dates from
the 1970s. It arose, first, from fears catalyzed by President Johnson’s
progressive, Great Society political reforms, and against a backdrop of
lingering anxieties from America’s mid-century “red scare.”110 Social
unrest, too, stirred corporate elites, who became aghast at vocal anti-war and
civil rights protests in the U.S.111 Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay in The New
York Times famously stated what became the separate realms thesis and
guiding principle of corporate governance for forty years: “there is one and
only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage
in activities designed to increase its profits. . . .”112 The admonition was
thrilling, an easy sell, on account of the permission it gave businesses to
ignore worrisome complexities. Technocratic governance won the day.
Around the same time, business schools in the U.S. became enmeshed
with university economic departments, where experts in neoclassical

109. See infra Part II.G for a discussion of the resource-based view of the firm.
110. See generally ZACHARY D. CARTER, THE PRICE OF PEACE: MONEY, DEMOCRACY, AND
THE LIFE OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (Random House 2020).
111. For an account of the social and political clashes in this period, see generally Sarah
C. Haan, Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism: SEC v. Medical Committee for Human
Rights, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1167 (2019) (describing a civil society organization’s nearly
successful attempt to expand the limits of corporate democracy).
112. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine - The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33. Friedman’s essay was so notorious
that the New York Times published a special Dealbook section, fifty years later, to revisit its
influence. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jason Karaian, Greed is Good. Except When It’s Bad.,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/business/dealbook/milto
n-friedman-essay-anniversary.html [https://perma.cc/N9LJ-GQME].
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economics pursued abstruse, quantitative modelling untethered to “social”
consequences.113 The collaboration, and co-constitutive focus on economic
theory, helped foster the legitimacy of focusing businesses and business
leaders exclusively on profit maximization.114 Falling in line, legal
academics pilloried commentators working outside the agency cost
paradigm—especially those concerned with businesses’ “social
responsibilities.”115 Silos in university research and education—especially
those separating business and economics departments from history,
international relations, and programs in public policy—thwarted deeper
awareness on the part of future business leaders of the social and
environmental impacts of corporate-based globalization (at least beyond the
reductionist concept of “externalities”).
Analogously, the SEC’s shareholder proposal rules reflected the view
that business affairs are inherently apolitical, and rightly should remain so.
The SEC’s staff rationalized issuing no action letters permitting corporations
to exclude most pro-social shareholder proposals in order to limit exogenous,
“political” incursions by corporate “gadflies.”116 Despite its increased
financial sophistication, corporate law clung stubbornly to the anachronistic,
property-based view of the corporation.117 Moreover, the narrowly
113. For the historical development of this academic enmeshment see Marion Fourcade &
Rakesh Khurana, From Social Control to Financial Economics: The Linked Ecologies of
Economics and Business in Twentieth Century America, 42 THEORY & SOC’Y 121 (2013)
(providing historical detail and analytical insight into the connections between neoclassical
economic thought in economic departments and business schools’ faculty, research and
curricula).
114. The shareholder profit maximization focus was buoyed, in large measure, by the
publication of Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). For a recent
history of the extraordinary influence of economists, including Milton Friedman and Michael
Jensen, on MBA programs and public policy, see BINYAMIN APPELBAUM, THE ECONOMISTS’
HOUR: FALSE PROPHETS, FREE MARKETS, AND THE FRACTURE OF SOCIETY (2019) (tracing four
decades of economists’ outsized influence shaping public policy).
115. Corporate law professor Henry Manne was among the earliest academics to write
condescendingly of corporate social responsibility. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, The Social
Responsibility of Regulated Utilities, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 995, 995 (1972) (“The concept of
corporate social responsibility, for all of its popularity today, has not had a distinguished
intellectual career.”).
116. This view was predominant as far back as 1952, when the SEC amended the
shareholder proposal rule to clarify that companies could exclude shareholder proposals
“primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social
or similar causes.” Amendment of Proxy Rules, SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Release No. 4775 (Dec. 11, 1952), 1952 SEC LEXIS 121, at *2.
117. For the classic early judicial enunciation of the property view of the corporation, see,
e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”). For a contemporary
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commercial range of Regulation S-K corporate disclosures (hence the
narrow range of mandated corporate transparency), in combination with the
business judgment rule, kept courts and most commentators from focusing
on firms’ specific handling of their “social responsibilities.” What wasn't
before them largely fell out of view.
Nothing in statutory or judge-made corporate law, however, narrowly
limited the broad scope of discretion boards possessed to pursue long-term
business goals, including investing in employees, communities, or
technologies that would limit environmental damage. But such lawful board
discretion was downplayed. For example, shortly after the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed boards’ discretion to take account of multistakeholder interests in sales of corporate control, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., it downplayed that discretion in Revlon v. McAndrews and
Forbes Holding.118 Similarly, when many states (excluding New York and
Delaware) enacted so-called “constituency statutes” (following the Unocal
view), the laws were derided as political sops.119 Nevertheless, outside the
narrow context of sales of corporate control, the management of employees’
concerns, treatment of the environment, fair commercial practices, enhanced
product safety, supply chain management issues, and even shareholders’
actual preferences other than immediate profit maximization—these all fell
well within boards’ lawful business discretion. Again, the discretion
remained largely out of sight—courts were saved from having to weigh in
on the propriety of particular board judgment calls by virtue of the business
judgment rule’s deferential posture. Separate realms thinking made boards'
jobs easier, because the mandate was simpler, but this facile simplicity has
been shattered.
defense of shareholders as owners, see, for example, Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership
and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (2010) (dismissing critiques of the shareholders-asowners principle). But cf. Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best
World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1116 (2000) (“This view of shareholders as owners of the
corporation and bondholders as outside the corporation is, however, based in part on an
individualistic view of debtor-creditor relations that was in vogue at the turn of the century
but is outmoded today.”).
118. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (validating
boards’ discretion to consider many variables, while upholding the board’s decision to selftender, in response to a hostile tender offer, as within the board’s fiduciary duties), with
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that
the board breached its fiduciary duties when it failed to obtain the best price for shareholders
upon approving the sale of the company).
119. For a recent research paper declaring the failure of such statutes, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, (Aug.
19, 2020) (working draft), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155 [ht
tps://perma.cc/3SVL-BCNB].
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As pressing macro-social problems are becoming highly visible in
firms’ operating choices, a critical transformation is occurring in corporate
affairs. Gone is the neutral trope of technocratic business management as a
bulwark of corporate capitalism and social prospering.120 Ironically, the
business-led push to deregulate has itself put greater pressure on individual
companies, and hence their boards, to decide where they will draw the line
on exploiting their bargaining power, informational advantages, and capacity
for regulatory arbitrage. Simultaneously, vastly enhanced sharing of
information about corporate abuses, via social media, has created immense
reputational risks for firms, boards, and CEOs. For example, publicity over
gruesome conditions in supply chains has reached back to tarnish the
reputations of even legally distinct corporate parents and vendors.121
As investors and other stakeholders become more informed, especially
thanks to social media, contemporary thinking about corporate governance
is increasingly exposing the fallacy of rigid “financial” versus “nonfinancial” risk categories for business management and investor concern.122
Media outlets, investors and other corporate stakeholders are rightly
indifferent to ascribing reputation-destroying conduct to one formalistic
category or the other.
CEOs and boards are taking note. A new global governance regime is
emerging in which corporate stakeholders and broader publics expect
120. Even leaders in mainstream governance are reckoning with the obvious shortcomings
of the traditional model. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism:
A Comprehensive Proposal to Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing between
Employees and Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our
Corporate Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging
Investments in America’s Future, (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No.
39, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924 [https://perma.cc/8
TBN-EGHT] (outlining proposals to restore fairness and sustainability in corporate
investing).
121. See id. Consulting firms have geared up to help companies and boards prepare for
such reputational disasters. See, e.g., DELOITTE, A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE (2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-aers-global-cm-surv
ey-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH45-QYQH] (surveying 300 board members regarding their
preparedness).
122. See, e.g., Mathew Nelson, The Importance of Nonfinancial Performance to Investors,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 25, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20
17/04/25/the-importance-of-nonfinancial-performance-to-investors/ [https://perma.cc/PDX4
-T84E] (“a dwindling percentage of investors believe that it is unclear whether nonfinancial
disclosures are material, down substantially from surveys in 2015 and 2013”); Amir AmelZadeh & George Serafeim, Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: Evidence from a
Global Survey (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 17-079, 2017), http://nrs.harvard.e
du/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30838135 [https://perma.cc/AXW8-63CN] (concluding that
investors use ESG metrics to analyze risk).
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businesses to cultivate and observe ethical values and standards as part of
their social license to operate. These expectations are taking hold
irrespective of whether they are mandatory under traditional, hard law
regimes.123 In regard to substance, these values and standards include
diversity and inclusion, honesty and transparency, respect for human rights,
dedication to product safety, and consideration of environmental
sustainability. In regard to process, the “G” in ESG (governance) presumes
that some established, reliable and responsive office in the firm, operating
under the board’s authority, will be exercising conscientious and coherent
leadership in these areas. Accordingly, the discourse has shifted from
“ensuring (minimal) legal compliance,”124 to firms’ engaging proactively in
managing the corporation’s reputation as a resource vital to its future.125 In
response to these pressures, the role of boards continues to expand, their
informational and leadership responsibilities deepen.126
2. Stakeholders Care About ESG
The global ESG movement now firmly encompasses the U.S.
investment scene. An avalanche of evidence suggests that both institutional
and retail investors, along with other stakeholders, care greatly about
environmental, social, and governance policies at U.S. firms. Moreover,
especially with the support of proxy advisory firms,127 investors are
123. For a rigorous examination of governance issues pertaining to firms' networks of
supply chains, see Virginia Harper Ho, Team Production and the Multinational Enterprise,
38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 499 (2015). See also Larry Cata Backer, Unpacking Accountability in
Business and Human Rights: The Multinational Enterprise, the State, and the International
Community, in -ACCOUNTABILITY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS AND THE LAW:
PROVIDING JUSTICE FOR CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
60–85 (Liesbeth Enneking et al. eds., Routledge, 2019) (detailing the concept of
accountability as deployed in business governance).
124. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265 (1998) (analyzing the legal context surrounding cost-benefit
analysis of whether to conform to legal requirements, without regard for social welfare).
125. See Mohammed Benlemlih, Amama Shaukat, Yan Qiu & Grzegorz Trojanowski,
Environmental and Social Disclosures and Firm Risk, 152 J. BUS. ETHICS 613, 613 (2018)
(“[C]onsistent with the predictions of stakeholder theory and the resource-based view of the
firm, . . . firms which make extensive and objective E and S disclosures promote corporate
transparency that can help them build a positive reputation and trust with their stakeholders.”).
126. For a scholarly treatment of corporate boards’ responsibilities and opportunities in
promoting diversity, from the perspective of Canadian corporate governance, see Aaron A.
Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm: Canadian Corporate
Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 569 (2010) (considering the intersection of
race and gender with corporate law and governance).
127. GLASS LEWIS, 2018 PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS
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becoming increasingly adept at bringing their interest in ESG to the attention
of boards and corporate executives.128 This rise in ESG investor-activism is
well-documented. Once dismissed as eccentrics, ESG investors presently
hold trillions of dollars of invested capital, while a growing proportion of
new investor funds are also being directed toward ESG investments.129 In
2016, roughly a quarter of assets under management in Asia, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, Europe, and the U.S. were ESG investments.130 In the first
five months of 2018, sustainable investment funds averaged $924 million in
monthly inflows, nearly double the monthly average in 2017.131
Even though the numbers reveal enormous investor interest in
sustainable investment funds, they tell only part of the story. Again, ESG
concerns are influencing not only equity,132 but also debt investment.133
Since 2017, Moody’s has been increasing the incorporation of ESG metrics
APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE: UNITED STATES (2018), https://www.glasslewis.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/US_Guidelines_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP29-QR4R].
128. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-20-530, PUBLIC COMPANIES:
DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO
ENHANCE THEM (2020), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-530 [https://perma.cc/HG3NHNZ5] (“Investors are increasingly asking public companies to disclose information on
[ESG] factors to help them understand risks to the company’s financial performance or other
issues, such as the impact of the company’s business on communities.”)
129. See Georg Kell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (July 11, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg/#2791d7021
695 [https://perma.cc/9DWY-B3GM] (discussing the steady growth of ESG investing).
130. Sara Bernow, From ‘Why’ to ‘Why Not’: Sustainable Investing as the New Normal,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-andprincipal-investors/our-insights/from-why-to-why-not-sustainable-investing-as-the-new-nor
mal [https://perma.cc/5JNK-7UT8] (labeling integrating the ESG factors as the key to
effective investing). The percentage in the U.S. was slightly lower, at 21.6%. See id. Even
Goldman Sachs has put its professional capital behind ESG investing as a form of longer-term
value investing. See, e.g., STEVE STRONGIN & DEBORAH MIRABAL, GOLDMAN SACHS,
SUSTAINABLE ESG INVESTING, TURNING PROMISES INTO PERFORMANCE 3 (2020), https://www
.goldmansachs.com/insights/pages/gs-research/sustainable-esg-investing-f/report.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/3DAS-APLP].
131. See Jon Hale, 5 Things About Sustainable Investing in the First Half of 2018, MEDIUM
(July 6, 2018), https://medium.com/the-esg-advisor/5-things-about-sustainable-investing-inthe-first-half-of-2018-4f8230709a58 [https://perma.cc/CL7H-VNR2] (discussing Larry
Fink’s letter to CEOs and how social purpose is an investment in long-term profitability).
132. Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May-June 2019, https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution [https://perma.cc/GD2J-JBV
U].
133. See, e.g., Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the
Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 4
(2018) (noting that the green bond market “has grown dramatically since 2013); Matt Wirz,
Social Investing Has New Message: Bond Managers See It As a Crucial Ingredient of Risk,
WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2018) (describing a “frenzy to adopt ESG” in the bond markets).
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into its credit ratings, as are its competitors.134 In the last few years, even
traditional, seemingly conventional institutional investors have stepped up
their focus on ESG. As just one example, BlackRock, the largest U.S.-based
asset manager, has created new index products allowing ESG tailoring of
index investments.135 Also, as particularly relevant to this Article, it is
demanding more ESG engagement by boards.136 As proxy advisory services
are becoming ESG advocates, they too are increasing the voting power and
visibility of ESG investor activism.137 Institutional Shareholder Services
now includes environmental and social scores alongside governance scores
in the company-specific reports it sends to subscribers.138 The major
business consulting firm Glass Lewis, and even the Business Roundtable
itself, are becoming similarly committed to enhanced ESG stewardship.139
134. See, e.g., Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Hires Carbon and
Corporate Governance Experts to Join its ESG Team (Feb. 28, 2018) (hiring researchers to
assess ESG factors); Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Appoints Rahul
Ghosh to Deepen Work on Impact of ESG Factors in Credit Ratings (Nov. 1, 2017) (detailing
how Moody’s is “seeking to deepen its commitment to assessing the impact of Environmental,
Social and Governance (ESG) considerations in its credit ratings”); Press Release, Moody’s
Investors Service, Moody’s Ratings Incorporate ESG Considerations with Material Credit
Implications (Oct. 25, 2017) (“Moody’s Investors Service continues to strengthen its
commitment to its assessment of [ESG] considerations and how they impact different sectors
and debt issuers”).
135. See, e.g., Rob Cox, Why BlackRock’s Move to Disarm Some Funds Is Good
Business, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/business/dealboo
k/blackrock-guns.html [https://perma.cc/AK67-RBJA] (describing how BlackRock has
created new index funds that exclude firearms manufacturers and sellers).
136. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs (2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/4BLH-27MX] (requesting that “directors assume deeper involvement with
a firm’s long-term strategy”). See also OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M.
STRINGER, “BEST PRACTICES” IN BOARD MATRICES (Aug. 2018), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYC-Comptrollers-Office-Matrices-Compendium-8-2018FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YVJ-5ACB] (advocating on behalf of N.Y.C. pension funds’
Boardroom Accountability Project that corporations publish board matrices with information
about directors’ race, gender, and sexual orientation).
137. For example, Glass Lewis has announced that, beginning in 2019, it will recommend
voting against the chair of a company’s nominating committee if the company’s board has no
female members. GLASS LEWIS, supra note 127, at 22–3.
138. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, ISS QUALITYSCORE: ENVIRONMENTAL
& SOCIAL DISCLOSURE QUALITYSCORE FAQ 4 (2018), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/f
aq/Environmental-Social-QualityScore-FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/A83L-Z2NH] (listing
three “Environmental Pillar” categories: Management of Environmental Risks and
Opportunities—Carbon & Climate; Waste & Toxicity; and Natural Resources; and four
“Social Pillar” categories: Product Safety, Quality & Brand; Stakeholders & Society; Labor
Health & Safety; and Human Rights).
139. On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable announced a new statement of
corporate purpose (rejecting the old shareholder primacy view of corporate purpose) signed

2020]

BOARDS IN INFORMATION GOVERNANCE

219

In response, a small but growing ESG ratings industry has emerged to
measure companies’ success in managing the pressing moral, social, and
operational challenges scrutinized by shareholders, employees,140 and
consumers141 under the ESG rubric. Increased interest in ESG is being
expressed through activists’ public relations campaigns, stakeholders’
contacts with companies’ Investor Relations departments, shareholder
proposals, industry surveys, institutional investor mission statements and
reports, and companies’ own websites and publications. With commentators
pressing the SEC to embrace mandatory corporate ESG disclosures, it is
likely that the ESG ratings industry will continue to grow, which itself will
feed additional investor interest.142 The phenomenon is well past the stage
where it can reasonably be ignored by corporate leaders.
As investors track the ESG conduct of firms, they are tracking risks that
may, perhaps instantaneously, become pressing financial problems.
Missteps in these domains influence investors’, employees’, and consumers’
choices, and in real time.143 From this vantage, ESG metrics provide a lens
by 180 CEOs of major corporations. The signatories committed to lead their companies for
the benefit of all stakeholders – customers, employees, suppliers, communities and
shareholders. Although the statement is merely aspirational (and has been criticized ex post
amidst the pandemic), it essentially represents an embrace of using ESG as an important
metric for longer-term value creation. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
(Aug. 19, 2019).
140. There is an increasing body of sociological data documenting the connection between
worker morale, productivity, and firm value—and morale’s relation to ethical and missiondriven cultures. Marion G. Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95
IOWA L. REV. 1179, 1184 (2010) (“By managing employees’ identities and aligning them with
the firm’s brand, employers can nurture an emotional attachment to the firm that yields a
significant payoff in employee loyalty and productivity, and, ultimately, in customer
satisfaction and loyalty.”).
141. For an overview of the many CSR/ESG rating outfits, see Client Memorandum, Davis
Polk, ESG Reports and Ratings: What they Are, Why they Matter? 1 (July 12, 2017),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2017-07-12_esg_reports_ratings_what_they_are_why_the
y_matter_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2HB-XJBY] (“Most international and domestic public
(and many private) companies are being evaluated and rated on their environmental, social
and governance (ESG) performance by various third-party providers of reports and ratings.”).
For commentary on improving the ratings system, see, for example, Thuy-Nga T. Vo, Rating
Management Behavior and Ethics: A Proposal to Upgrade the Corporate Governance Rating
Criteria, 34 J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (2008) (arguing that periodic assessments of managerial behavior
and ethics would provide insight into whether the company’s directors and officers are
performing their responsibilities to advance shareholder interests).
142. See Letter from Cynthia Williams and Jill Fisch to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y of Sec. and
Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https
://perma.cc/KQD6-6FT9].
143. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for
Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016) (showing that accounting for both
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through which to assess the quality of a board’s leadership in creating the
informational and institutional infrastructure of long-term corporate value
creation.144 For boards, attending to the ESG risks investors care about has
become an increasingly salient part of the job.
In this vein, the scope of material risks facing companies and boards
has broadened significantly in just the last decade. Recent examples of
expanded and intensified risk categories include employee exposures to
COVID-19, fallout from claims of racial bias (especially damaging in light
of Black Lives Matter protests), cybersecurity risks,145 the opioid crisis,146
lawsuits and negative publicity from alleged workplace sexual harassment
(especially in light of the #MeToo movement),147 and stakeholders’ calls for
financial and nonfinancial risk can drive firm and portfolio performance, while advancing
market transparency and stability); Why Companies Must Manage Environmental, Social and
Governance Risks, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Oct. 17, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upe
nn.edu/article/companies-need-manage-environmental-social-governance-risks/ [https://per
ma.cc/92UW-ZQ9X] (using the term “non-traditional risks” to describe risks that emanate
from the social sector and from the external stakeholders).
144. For a review of the fiduciary (i.e., legal) underpinning of such board duties, see, for
example, Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717 (2009).
145. See MAYER BROWN, 2019 PROXY AND ANNUAL REPORTING SEASON: LET THE
PREPARATIONS BEGIN 12 (2018), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/e6cedd0bc795-49ab-bd0b-4bdb7930d157/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9175842f-d8c1-4046a23e-5fb8c1d62c82/proxy-reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT7M-J2JP] (“cybersecurity is
recognized as a pervasive issue that impacts companies of all types, generating risks from
both an economic and security perspective”); Commission Statement and Guidance on Public
Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) (codified as amended
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229 and 249) (providing guidance to public companies about disclosing risks
associated with cybersecurity), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2018/33-10459.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3U4X-79K4].
146. Several institutional investors banded together in 2017 to create Investors for Opioid
Accountability, which has focused on activism at opioid manufacturers and distributors, and
at companies that manufacture treatments for opioid abuse. See AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW
48–49 (2018) [hereinafter PROXY PREVIEW 2018]. During the 2018 proxy season,
AmerisourceBergen published two shareholder proposals related to its opioid crisis risk in its
Proxy Statement; both major proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass Lewis, supported the
proposals. See Press Release, Investors for Opioid Accountability, ISS, Glass Lewis Support
Investors for Three Opioid Accountability Shareholder Proposals at AmerisourceBergen,
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://iccr.org/sites/default/files/blog_attachments/ioa_statement_on_iss_a
nd_glass_lewis_support_for_amerisourcebergen_shareholder_proposals_final_2-14-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D5MR-BEUF]. Both proposals won a majority of independent shareholder
votes, though neither met the threshold for shareholder approval. See AmerisourceBergen
Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 71-77 (Jan. 19, 2018) (reciting Proposals 7 and 8
related to opioid distribution); AmerisourceBergen Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 8-K) (Mar.
1, 2018) (reporting voting results).
147. See, e.g., David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Shareholder Activism Is the Next
Phase of #MeToo, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 26, 2018) (describing the role shareholders have played in
companies adopting socially progressive policies). The Council of Institutional Investors has
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or complaints about firms’ and CEOs’ political activities. In addition, some
ESG matters which once were regarded as “social”—climate change being
the most salient—now squarely present ongoing material financial risks to
companies’ strategic direction and operational performance. The separate
realms concept is being debunked by the erasure of a clear demarcation of
social and financial risks for firms. A remarkable set of events in 2020—a
global pandemic, a nationwide racial justice crisis, operational turmoil in
most major U.S. industries, and an extraordinarily polarizing Presidential
election—has forced corporate America to confront ESG risks on a new
scale. Even just one of these events would have demanded heightened board
engagement at big companies across the economy. The coincidence of all
them simultaneously has likely permanently elevated expectations for
corporate leadership, hence improved board governance. Empirical
evidence is emerging to attest to the shift. In one survey of corporate
directors, from summer 2020, thirty percent reported that the time they spent
on board service had at least doubled.148
Many companies have responded to the escalated 2020 Black Lives
Matter protests with urgency, for example, producing value statements,
social media communications, pledges, corporate donations, and political
mobilization.149 Yum! Brands, which owns chain restaurants KFC, Pizza
Hut, and Taco Bell, issued a “call for unity” in May 2020,150 and pledged

sought to communicate to boards the necessity of tone at the top and having a board level plan
to deal with serious claims of sexual harassment in the work environment. See ROSEMARY
LALLY & BRANDON WHITEHILL, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., HOW CORPORATE BOARDS
CAN COMBAT SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3 (2018), https://www.cii.org/files/publications/misc/03
_01_18_corporate_boards_sexual_harassment.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AGR-DYPH].
148. Paula Loop, Facing the COVID-19 Challenge in Corporate Boardrooms, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/11/facingthe-covid-19-challenge-in-corporate-boardrooms/ [https://perma.cc/ZC4P-RN3B] (reporting
that 76% of directors spent more time on their director duties according to a
PricewaterhouseCoopers director survey).
149. See Corporate America Agrees Black Lives Matter. What Comes Next?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/23/insider/business-racism.html?action=
click&module=Well&pgtype=Homepage&section=Reader%20Center [https://perma.cc/5Q8
Q-7PCZ]; Shan Li, Major Companies Commit to Hiring 100,000 Low-Income New Yorkers
by 2030, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/major-companies-comm
it-to-hiring-100-000-low-income-new-yorkers-by-2030-11597158094 [https://perma.cc/E73
6-4N66]; Tiffany Hsu, Corporate Voices Get Behind ‘Black Lives Matter’ Cause, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/business/media/companies-marketing
-black-lives-matter-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/5Z3W-EWXX].
150. A call for unity, YUM! (May 31, 2020), https://www.yum.com/wps/portal/yumbrand
s/Yumbrands/news/company-stories-article/A+call+for+unity [https://perma.cc/V3U8-KKB
Z].
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$100 million to “fight inequality” in June.151 In August, it created the role of
Chief Equity Officer at Pizza Hut, and launched an initiative to bring antiracist education resources to schools.152 Presumably with the assent of their
boards, scores of corporate CEOs spoke out in favor of racial equality and
pledged their firms would take concrete actions to improve their record.153
Institutional Shareholder Services has put out for comment a proposal that,
beginning in February 2022, it would recommend a vote against a
nominating committee chair where no ethnic or racially-diverse board
candidate has been put forward.154
Consistent with the separate realms paradigm, corporate social
responsibility (an antecedent to ESG) operated largely as a form of
marketing. Accordingly, corporations commonly made social commitments
mostly in their communications to consumers.155 But companies are
presently going further, making social commitments responsive to the
interests and activism of their investors and employees, as well as consumers
and other publics.156 Given the salience of these commitments, and the stakes

151. See Yum! Invests $200 Million to Fight Inequality by Unlocking Opportunity for
Employees and Communities, YUM! (June 25, 2020), https://www.yum.com/wps/portal/yum
brands/Yumbrands/news/company-stories-article/Yum+invests+100+million+to+fight+ineq
uality+by+unlocking+opportunity+for+employees+and+communities [https://perma.cc/8ZC
F-LM2W]; Yum! Brands pledges $3 million to advance equality and social justice, YUM!
(June 5, 2020), https://www.yum.com/wps/portal/yumbrands/Yumbrands/news/company-sto
ries-article/Yum%21+Brands+pledges+3+million+to+advance+equality+and+social+justice
[https://perma.cc/B26F-VKNL].
152. PIZZA HUT, Pizza Hut and First Book Launch Collection Of Antiracism Resources
For Educators, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
pizza-hut-and-first-book-launch-collection-of-antiracism-resources-for-educators-30111455
9.html [https://perma.cc/N8MH-LZTZ].
153. Sherrell Dorsey, Twilio, Box, Spotify, and Other Tech CEOs Speak Out Against
Racism and Police Brutality; Others Stay Silent, THE PLUG (May 31, 2020), https://tpinsights
.com/2020/05/31/twilio-box-spotify-and-other-tech-ceos-speak-out-against-racism-and-poli
ce-brutality-others-stay-silent/ [https://perma.cc/8ZAY-VVVA].
154. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, PROPOSED ISS BENCHMARK POLICY
CHANGES FOR 2021 6–7 (2020), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/proposed-bench
mark-policy-changes-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBT2-39XH].
155. For a recent, critical appraisal of consumer-facing corporate commitments to social
justice, see Marcia Narine Weldon, Wokewashing and the Board, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (AUG.
14, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/consulting/ [https://perma.cc/B9J
4-TLFQ].
156. See, e.g., Loren Appin, Majority of Tech Workers Expect Company Solidarity With
Black Lives Matter, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 6, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/06/79-oftech-workers-expect-company-solidarity-with-black-lives-matter/ [https://perma.cc/9769-PL
T4]; Kimberly Chin, Twitter, Square to make Juneteenth a Company Holiday, WALL ST. J.
(June 9, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/twitter-square-to-make-juneteenth-a-corporateholiday-11591745358 [https://perma.cc/NUG9-AXX3].
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if things go wrong, or if the statements are unheeded by corporate actors,
there will be increasing pressure for boards routinely to review and approve
them—not doing so will be regarded as irresponsible.
A seemingly amorphous matter like the cultivation of an ethical
corporate culture (conventionally described as “tone at the top”), might have
seemed exogeneous to the essential commercial work to be done by the board
and senior management. But disasters of the kind that have occurred at and
damaged too many name-brand firms demonstrate otherwise—including the
corporate frauds at Enron, WorldCom, and AIG,157 the emissions scandal at
Volkswagen, failed safety protocols at Boeing and BP (formerly British
Petroleum), and sexual harassment allegations at CBS.158 These corporate
disasters attest to the challenges and urgency of establishing ethical
infrastructures and superstructures atop sprawling, decentralized business
enterprises.159 As discussed further in Part II, this is not a responsibility
which can be managed appropriately at a level below the upper echelons of
an enterprise. In this regard, ESG can be seen, in part, as a kind of “soft law”
modality for addressing the trenchant risks inherent in international business
firms and globalized supply chains.160 The magnitude of these problems, and
their impact on companies, perforce enlists boards—as, by law, the most
senior authorities in corporations—in creating new ESG policies and

157. Am. Int’l Group, Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009) (describing AIG
as a “criminal organization”).
158. Rachel Abrams, CBS Inquiry Into What Went Wrong in Les Moonves Era Hits Snags
as It Advances, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018) (“The #MeToo movement may have affected CBS
Corporation more than any other media company over the past year.”). For discussion of the
board’s role in establishing and implementing an ethical culture in business firms, see Lynne
L. Dallas, Enron and Ethical Corporate Climates, in ENRON CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
159. David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and
Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS.
317 (2016) (employing recent research in behavioral and organizational ethics to present a
model of organizations’ ethical infrastructures that integrates the ideas of compliance and the
fostering of ethical corporate cultures).
160. The pandemic has emphasized the operational risks attendant to firm’s reliance on
far-flung supply chains. But before the pandemic, new risks associated with business models
deeply reliant on distant supply chains—including those highlighted under ESG metrics—
were becoming more salient, and hence the subject of consulting firms’ advisory practices.
See, e.g., Susan Lund et al., Risk, Resilience, and Rebalancing in Global Value Chains,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functi
ons/operations/our-insights/risk-resilience-and-rebalancing-in-global-value-chains# [https://
perma.cc/Q6QP-MM4G] (“New research from the McKinsey Global Institute explores the
rebalancing act facing many companies in goods-producing value chains as they seek to get
a handle on risk—not ongoing business challenges but more profound shocks such as financial
crises, terrorism, extreme weather, and, yes, pandemics.”).
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vehicles for leadership.
At the time of this Article’s publication, special criticism is being
directed at technology companies, both in regard to their overall power,161
social and political impacts,162 and failures to safeguard customers’ private
personal information.163 These failures are materially affecting tech giants’
stock prices and commanding board-level concern.164 As an example, after
the 2016 election, the audit committee at Facebook was belatedly informed
by the company’s head of security about Russian-linked activity on the social
media company’s network. The tardy revelation “prompted a humiliating
boardroom interrogation” of the company’s CEO and controlling
shareholder, Mark Zuckerberg, and its COO, Sheryl Sandberg, along the
lines of ‘what do you know and when did you know it?’165 The Facebook
161. Ryan Tracy, Big Tech’s Power Comes Under Fire at Congressional Antitrust
Hearing, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-ceos-defend-operat
ions-ahead-of-congressional-hearing-11596027626 [https://perma.cc/M9HS-YNGZ].
162. Micah Maidenberg, Facebook Sees Growing Ad Boycott in Protest Against Handling
of Speech, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/clorox-to-halt-faceboo
k-ads-through-year-end-joining-advertiser-push-on-content-11593459934 [https://perma.cc/
Q8GU-WNTE].
163. Sam Schechner, Twitter Data Case Sparks Dispute, Delay Among EU Privacy
Regulators, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/twitter-data-case-spar
ks-dispute-delay-among-eu-privacy-regulators-11597921201 [https://perma.cc/BUP4-JX7
L].
164. Nevertheless, pandemic-driven isolation is boosting many technology companies’
value. For a summary of data privacy scandals that affected Facebook’s stock price in 2018,
including a $36 billion loss of market capitalization after the Cambridge Analytica scandal
became public in March, see Salvador Rodriguez, Here Are the Scandals and Other Incidents
That Have Sent Facebook’s Share Price Tanking in 2018, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/20/facebooks-scandals-in-2018-effect-on-stock.html [https:/
/perma.cc/ACZ9-6AJF]. Giant fines levied by European authorities under the GDPR have
also caught boards’ attention. See, e.g., Adam Satariano, After a Data Breach, British Airways
Faces a Record Fine, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2019) (discussing the context behind British
Airways’ $230 million fine); Adam Satariano, Google Is Fined $57 Million Under Europe’s
Data Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019). See generally James Grimmelman, Saving
Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009) (explaining how Facebook users socialize on the
site, why they misunderstood the risks involved, and how their privacy suffers as a result).
165. According to an investigation by the New York Times, the disclosures “set off
[Erskine] Bowles,” the Committee’s chair, who “pelted questions” at Zuckerberg and
Sandberg at a full board meeting later in the same day. See Sheera Frenkel, Nicholas
Confessore, Cecilia Kang, Matthew Rosenberg & Jack Nicas, Delay, Deny and Deflect: How
Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018). According to the
N.Y. Times’ investigation, Alex Stamos, Facebook’s head of security, “acting on his own,”
led an investigation to uncover the scope of Russian activity on Facebook, then met with top
officers of the company, including COO Sheryl Sandberg and Zuckerberg to report his
findings. Publicly, company officials played down the role of Russian-linked groups before
the 2016 election. “By August 2017, Facebook executives concluded that the situation had
become what one called a ‘five-alarm fire.’” Id.
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story underscores that boards increasingly expect to be pro-actively informed
about threats to corporate reputation—to the point of challenging the
company’s controlling shareholder in the above instance. Put simply, boards
cannot afford to be and should not accept being blindsided by reputational
risks and scandals. Instead of passive monitors surveilling managerial
agency costs, boards are commanding upgrades in internal control systems
and elevated standards of candor in reporting up the chain of leadership, even
if they make for difficult conversations in the boardroom.
3. Demands for ESG Information
The SEC is presently enabling certain social matters to enter the public
domain and investor consciousness via the shareholder proposal system and
traditional securities calendar reporting (e.g., Form 10-K, Form 10-Q, and
the Annual Report to shareholders).166 As mentioned above, ESG
shareholder proposals were excludable from the corporate proxy if they
covered matters not within the scope of shareholder power, or matters
touching on the firm’s ordinary business affairs.167 In the 1970s,
furthermore, the SEC changed the rules to exclude proposals not
“significantly related” to a company’s business.168 These mind-numbingly
opaque provisions shut down many shareholder-initiated proposals relevant
to ESG, since they could neither be too central to nor too extraneous to a
company’s business. The disfavor shown ESG shareholder proposals also
helped keep them at the margins of boards’ awareness,169 unlike today
166. In August 2020, the SEC announced amendments to several provisions of Regulation
S-K, including amendments to modernize the description of business (Item 101), legal
proceedings (Item 103), and risk factor disclosures (Item 105). See Modernization of
Regulation S—K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358 (proposed Aug. 23, 2019) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, and 240. Significantly, the amendments accomplished
so little in raising the standard of mandatory, comparable ESG disclosure that two of the five
SEC Commissioners published a dissent to the final rule. See Public Statement, Caroline
Crenshaw, Comm’r, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Statement on the “Modernization” of
Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105 (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/crenshaw-statement-modernization-regulation-s-k [https://perma.cc/8WAC-Q7Y
A].
167. The ordinary business exclusion was codified by the SEC in January 1954. See
Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4979 (Jan. 6, 1954), 19
Fed. Reg. 246, 247 (1954).
168. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 1972
SEC LEXIS 155 (Sept. 22, 1972).
169. For an example of the older, intensive condemnation of there being a legitimate,
existing legal basis for, or proper use of shareholder proposals to influence corporate
governance, see George W. Dent, Proxy Regulation in Search of a Purpose, 23 GA. L. REV.
815 (1989).
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(especially with the SEC’s having flagged the propriety of boards’ properly
attending to them).
The annual number of ESG shareholder proposals submitted to U.S.
public companies has been on a slow upward climb.170 Each proxy season
in the U.S., shareholders now ordinarily submit more ESG proposals than
traditional agency cost governance proposals.171 Moreover, total shares
voted in support of ESG proposals have increased steadily for two decades.
In 2000, ESG proposals that reached a vote averaged 7.6% shareholder
support,172 whereas in 2018, the shareholder support averaged as high as
32.8%.173 In a record high, in 2018, ten ESG shareholder proposals won a
majority of independent shareholder support.174
170. Though reliable numbers are hard to come by, Proxy Preview, published annually by
As You Sow, The Sustainable Investments Institute, and Proxy Impact, provides an annual
count of ESG shareholder proposals submitted to U.S. public companies by February of proxy
season. It counted 429 shareholder resolutions for the 2018 proxy season. See PROXY
PREVIEW 2018, supra note 146, at 13 (noting that “a dozen or so more [proposals] are likely
to be filed for meetings that occur after June”). Compare this to 2006, when Proxy Preview
counted 357 ESG shareholder proposals. See AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 11 (2015). The
Gibson Dunn law firm has also published ESG proposal numbers: for 2018, it counted 202
“social” proposals, 139 environmental proposals, and 92 proposals related to corporate
political engagement, totaling 433.
See GIBSON DUNN, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 2018 PROXY SEASON 3–4 (2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/
wp-content/uploads/2018/07/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2018-proxy-se
ason.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H7J-9DYL]. Gibson Dunn also identified 20 proposals that
requested using social or environmental performance metrics to set executive compensation.
Id. Including these in the count would bring the total to 453 for 2018. In its 2020 study, the
GAO estimated that 5% of the S&P Composite 1500 received ESG-related proposals in the
2020 proxy season. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-20-530, DISCLOSURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THEM 14
(2020). Of these, 28% received shareholder support and no ESG proposal won more than
50% of the vote. Id. The GAO’s data likely relates to proposals published in companies’
proxy statements, not proposals “received” by companies.
171. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 170, at 3 (showing that in 2018, ESG proposals were
the “most frequently submitted” type of proposal); see also HAAN, supra note 13, at 301
(noting the submission of more ESG than governance proposals in 2014 and 2015).
172. For a discussion of the evolution of shareholder support for ESG proposals, see
HAAN, supra note 13, at 294.
173. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 170 (providing an overview of shareholder proposals
submitted to public companies during the 2018 proxy season). But see ISS ANALYTICS, A
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE 2018 US PROXY SEASON 6 (2018) (presenting evidence that
overall shareholder support for ESG proposals was 24% in the 2018 proxy season).
174. See INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESPONSIBILITY, CATALYZING CORPORATE CHANGE 1
(2018), https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/iccr_-_catalyzing_corporate_change_2018_0
73018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWC7-8F4Z] (showing that successful shareholder proposals
included the following: Sturm Ruger (gun violence), AmerisourceBergen (two proposals
related to opioids) (majority of independent votes), Tyson (water) (majority of independent
votes), Kinder Morgan (climate change), Genessee & Wyoming (climate change), Middleby
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ESG awareness is being pressed not only from within the investor
and stakeholder community but also from the top of government. In the
Dodd-Frank Act, Congress pushed the SEC to require enhanced sociallyrelevant disclosures, particularly in relation to U.S. companies’ use of
conflict minerals,175 and regarding recordkeeping payments by U.S.
companies to foreign governments for natural resources.176 More generally,
the SEC seems no longer wedded to the view that socially significant matters
are discretely separable from traditional business ones. In 2013, the
Commission published its “Disclosure Effectiveness” initiative, which
sought to evaluate and potentially reform corporate disclosures.177 When in
2016 the SEC issued the Concept Release on Business and Financial
Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, it sought public comment regarding

(climate change), Anadarko Petroleum (climate change), Ameren (water/coal ash), and Range
Resources (methane)). See also ISS ANALYTICS, supra note 173, at 6 (“The number of
majority-supported E&S resolutions rose over 2017 levels, from six to 10, tying the 2016
season for most majority-supported E&S proposals.”); EY CENTER FOR BOARD MATTERS,
2018 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 4 (2018) (showing that 6% of ESG shareholder proposals that
went to a vote won a majority of the vote).
175. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p), 78m note
(Conflict Minerals). For the SEC’s overview of the (ill-fated) conflict minerals disclosure
rule, see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, No. 13-CF-000635 (D.D.C. 2017)
(explaining, inter alia, how the rule ran into first amendment problems).
176. The SEC’s codification of the U.S. legislative counterpart to the international
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was quashed by the Trump Administration
through executive action. The international initiative, however, remains in force. See, e.g.,
Kelsey Landau & Victoria Bassetti, The Evolution of The EITI And Next Steps For Tackling
Extractive Industries Corruption, BROOKINGS (July 30, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/bl
og/up-front/2020/07/30/the-evolution-of-the-eiti-and-next-steps-for-tackling-extractive-indu
stries-corruption/ [https://perma.cc/YS85-S9YN] (analyzing the effectiveness of EITI and
ways in which it can further improve). One of the authors of this Article testified before the
House Financial Services Committee in favor of the Rule’s adoption. See Faith Stevelman,
Professor, New York Law School, Prepared Testimony before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Financial Services (June 26, 2008), http://archives-financialse
rvices.house.gov/hearing110/stevelman.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H37-KUSQ].
177. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K (2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-skdisclosure-requirements-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WCV-FMEH] (describing the
proposed amendments that would change the disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K). In
fall 2020 the SEC issued its revisions to S-K, altering only human capital disclosure—and in
small measure—to expand ESG disclosure. The conservative tack produced a dissent from
two of the three commissioners. See Public Statement, Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, Sec.
and Exch. Comm’n, Regulation S-K and ESG Disclosures: An Unsustainable Silence (Aug.
26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-regulation-s-k-2020-08-26 [https:/
/perma.cc/YQZ9-RMDB].
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expanded ESG reporting.178 In the face of an outpouring of comment letters
received by the SEC, on October 1, 2018, law professors Cynthia Williams
and Jill Fisch submitted a rulemaking petition to the SEC in favor of
expanded ESG disclosure.179 Their petition was signed by investors and
associated organizations representing more than five trillion dollars in assets
under management—capital that many boards would like their firms to
attract. In late 2017, the SEC issued guidance that encouraged a company
seeking to exclude an ESG shareholder proposal to include in its request for
permission to do so, the board’s analysis of the substance and significance
of the ESG policy issues raised.180 Although a second staff bulletin in 2018
noted that the board’s analysis is voluntary in this setting,181 the clear
implication is that board review of corporate ESG exclusionary efforts is an
important feature of governance.182
4. Corporations in the Political Sphere
On the ground, large corporations themselves did not respect the
separate realms notion. Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay conceded that
business had to observe “the rules of the game,” but corporations were
mobilizing, behind the scenes, to alter laws, regulations, and judicial
standards of review in favor of unrestrained capital acquisition.183 This
tactical mobilization was captured in Louis F. Powell, Jr.’s 1971
memorandum, which asserted that an “attack” on the American economic
system required businesses to mobilize for political combat.184 This
178. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CONCEPT RELEASE ON BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIRED BY REGULATION S-K (2016).
179. Letter from Cynthia Williams and Jill Fisch to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y of Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/JZ4E-D544].
180. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, LEGAL BULLETIN NO. 141 (CF) (2017), https://www
.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14i.htm [https://perma.cc/4GVS-2JDT] (listing that for
exemptions under the “ordinary business” exception, Rule 14a-8(i)(7), “going forward, we
would expect a company’s no-action request to include a discussion that reflects the board’s
analysis of the particular policy issue raised and its significance”; for exemptions under the
“economic relevance” exception, Rule 14a-8(i)(5), “we would expect a company’s Rule 14a8(i)(5) no-action request to include a discussion that reflects the board’s analysis of the
proposal’s significance to the company,” and the “explanation would be most helpful if it
detailed the specific processes employed by the board to ensure that its conclusions are wellinformed and well-reasoned”).
181. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, LEGAL BULLETIN NO. 14J (CF) (2018), https://www.
sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14j-shareholder-proposals [https://perma.cc/N46L-86JJ].
182. For further discussion, see discussion infra Part II.F.
183. FRIEDMAN, supra note 112.
184. LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM: ATTACK ON AMERICAN FREE
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mobilization occurs, then and now, not only through corporate-funded
PACs, but also corporate-funded think tanks and politically-active
foundations (the Federalist Society being a salient example).185 National
lobbying efforts by businesses also radically expanded in this period.186 The
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), one of the most adept,
pro-business lobbyists, soon went on the offense, rather than remaining
reactive in responding to law and regulations. Most pertinent here,
commentators rarely, if ever, asked who within firms was charged with
overseeing these political initiatives, or whether shareholders supported
them.
Corporate political mobilization has become increasingly controversial
in the public sphere as it has grown in visibility. Corporate political spending
and CEOs’ public political statements have therefore become serious
reputational concerns, attracting attention not only from politicians but also
from journalists, watchdog organizations, investors, customers, and
employees.187 Concern about corporate political activity is now so salient
ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 25–6 (1971), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/powellmemo/1/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/3YRH-PENF] (“Business must learn the lesson . . . that political power is
necessary; that such power must be assiduously cultivated; and that when necessary, it must
be used aggressively and with determination—without embarrassment and without the
reluctance which has been so characteristic of American business.”). The history of such
mobilization is still being written. See, e.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (Ira Katznelson, Martin Shefter & Theda Skocpol eds.,
2008) (describing the conservative legal movement’s tremendous organizational strength,
endurance, and success in influencing policy).
185. A notable recent example is the Global Antitrust Institute which receives (but doesn’t
disclose) substantial funding from Google, Amazon and Qualcomm. See Daisuke
Wakabayashi, Big Tech Funds a Think Tank Pushing for Fewer Rules. For Big Tech, N.Y.
TIMES (July 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/technology/global-antitrustinstitute-google-amazon-qualcomm.html [https://perma.cc/2QEM-3A2M]. See also Faith
Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate
Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 653–57 (1997) (describing the legal basis for think
tanks, foundations, and other politicized nonprofit organizations to receive corporate funds
without the corporations having to make any disclosures).
186. The pharmaceutical industry spent more than $280 million on lobbying in 2018, more
than any other industry. In every year since 2000, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was the
top spender, laying out $95 million in 2018. See Karl Evers-Haillstrom, Lobbying Spending
Reaches $3.4 Billion in 2018, Highest in Eight Years, OPENSECRETS (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/01/lobbying-spending-reaches-3-4-billion-in-18/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/6ECS-3SU9]. For an in-depth look at the inefficiencies if not corrupting
effects of lobbying, see Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64
STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012).
187. See Letter from Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2011); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides? 124 HARV. L.
REV. 83 (2010); John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data,
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that, in one recent example, major companies rushed to claw back donations
they had made to an incumbent U.S. Senate candidate from Mississippi after
she was accused of making racist remarks.188
This Article’s embrace of information governance does not condemn or
support corporate political activity, but rather affirms its inherent materiality
and hence relevance to governance at the board level. Especially after the
Citizens United v. FEC decision in 2010, there has been increasing
recognition that corporate political activity requires oversight at the highest
level of governance. Investor groups have waged successful campaigns
demanding that boards of directors increase their supervision of political
spending.189 In 2016, the Business Roundtable formally endorsed board
oversight of political spending.190 Last year, forty-seven percent of S&P 500
companies were on record as employing some form of board oversight of
political spending, with thirty-five percent assigning the review of trade
association expenditures to a board-level committee.191 Citizens United
helped catalyze this change by significantly raising interest in corporate
political spending—a development that made political spending qualitatively
material and therefore “worthy of the board’s attention.”192 Investor activism
on corporate political spending is among the strongest categories of ESG
and Implications, 30 CONST. COMM. 223 (2015). For a basic explanation of how businesses
spend money to influence elections, illustrated with data from the 2012 federal election, see
Sarah C. Haan, Opaque Transparency: Outside Spending and Disclosure by Privately-Held
Business Entities in 2012 and Beyond, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1158–71 (2014).
188. See, e.g., Rachel Siegel, Walmart Wants Campaign Donation Back from Sen. HydeSmith After Her Support of Public Hangings, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.was
hingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/20/walmart-wants-campaign-donation-back-sen-hyde-s
mith-after-her-support-public-hangings/ [https://perma.cc/K39H-YDYV] (expanding on
Walmart, Boston Scientific, and Union Pacific demanding the return of their donations).
189. For example, the nonprofit Center for Political Accountability (“CPA”) made board
oversight a core principle of a campaign it launched shortly after Citizens United came down.
SEE CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE CPA INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE: HOW LEADING COMPANIES NAVIGATE POLITICAL
SPENDING IN THE WAKE OF CITIZENS UNITED 7–9 (2011) (describing the increased need for
board oversight in regard to political spending and duties to shareholders); see also Haan,
supra note 13, at 275–76 (2016) (describing the CPA’s campaign of shareholder activism).
190. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 28 (2016) (“To the
extent that the company engages in political activities, the board should have oversight
responsibility. . . .”).
191. CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE 2019 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE
POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 19, 27 (2019).
192. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING 14 (2d ed. 2015) (“Many
make the case that the level of investor interest and reputational risk make the issue material,
elevating the matter to the board level.”). For discussion of the strange governance
dimensions of “corporate” political speech, see Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens
United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451 (2019).
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activism—receiving attention not only from shareholders, but also proxy
advisory firms, commentators, and the media, thus further focusing boards’
attention on their company’s spending and oversight systems.193 Concern
over excess, misdirected, or polarizing corporate political spending is vivid
even from the agency cost perspective. 194
Despite worries about adverse publicity, agency costs, and political
corruption, there is strong public support for companies to be vocal on
“political” issues raising fundamental ethical concerns. In the summer of
2019, 206 major corporations signed a U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief in
a trio of cases contesting the relevance of LGBTQ rights to civil rights and
anti-discrimination laws.195 In another salient example, many CEOs who
served on President Trump’s business advisory council felt compelled to
resign from their positions after the President refused to denounce the
Charlottesville white supremacist protesters in a timely, forceful fashion.196
In October 2018, several CEOs who had planned to attend a conference in
Saudi Arabia had to make rushed, newsworthy choices about whether to
cancel after the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi was credibly linked to
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.197 According to Andrew Ross
Sorkin in the New York Times, “businesses have faced perhaps their thorniest
conundrum, caught between a global outcry, a vacuum of leadership from
Washington and a country [Saudi Arabia] with a long memory.”198 These
examples illuminate the high stakes surrounding firms’ and CEOs’ political
actions. This is activity which clearly exceeds the “ordinary business” scope
193. See HAAN, supra note 13, at 265 n.7 (stating that proposals on corporate political
spending constituted the largest category of ESG shareholder proposals in the 2016 proxy
season); AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 5 (2019) (stating the same for 2019).
194. See John Coates, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After
Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657 (2012) (analyzing the effect of political
activity on value for shareholders and firms in general); see also Marina A.B. Gama, Gisele
W. Galilea, Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello & Rosilene Marcon, With Other People’s Money:
Campaign Finance as an Agency Problem, 45 J. GEN. MGMT. 40 (2019) (validating concerns
that political campaign donations confer substantial benefits on corporate insiders).
195. Bostock v. Clayton Co., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1760 n.12 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
196. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, C.E.O.s Long Avoided Politics. Trump is Changing the
Calculus, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/business/trum
p-chief-executives-companies.html [https://perma.cc/2MEP-Y6C8] (quoting Jeffrey A.
Sonnenfeld) (noting that “boards were hastily meeting to map strategy,” and “having ad hoc
conference calls.”).
197. See Rory Jones & Summer Said, Wall Street Returns to Saudi Summit, but Khashoggi
Murder Deters Some Executives, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2019) (describing cancellations in both
2018 and 2019).
198. Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Business Executives Become Reluctant Statesmen, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/business/dealbook/saudiarabia-journalist-business-executives.html [https://perma.cc/P73A-TRAY].
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of discretion possessed by executive officers without board discussion and
resolution.
The success that corporations have had in shaping public opinion
through political spending has made it impossible to ignore the influence of
corporations on public policy, law, and government. In the wake of Citizens
United, there is a palpable resurgence of interest in observing the ways that
corporate interests dominate political discourse and, possibly, outcomes.199
If nothing else, corporate political activity since the 2010 Supreme Court
decision in Citizens United v. FEC has made clear that firms have difficult
choices to make about how they will cultivate political influence and power,
choices which cannot legitimately be delegated by the board.
In the immediate aftermath of the 2020 presidential election, the U.S. is
facing an employment and small business crisis of a level rivaling the Great
Recession—hence widespread, national attention to the nature and influence
of corporate political activity is certain to be high.200 Because directors can
easily hold an impromptu meeting remotely, it is legally and tactically
difficult to justify why CEOs would make these salient choices, on their own
or on the firm’s behalf, without obtaining the advice and consent of their
boards.
Corporate law and governance did not traditionally attend to political
action by firms or CEOs. Corporate law presumed that managers spent
corporate funds in politics and philanthropy in the shareholders’ interest.
Hence, from the perspective of agency theory it was masked as
noncontroversial.201 There were few relevant corporate law standards or
cases governing firms’, CEOs’, or boards’ political speech. With corporate
law preoccupied by agency cost concerns, inquiry into corporate politicking
fell to other domains—election law, administrative law, or constitutional
law. Shaped by over-arching concerns about liberty and democracy, these
other bodies of authority gave little focus to the particularistic shape of
corporate-based political activity.202 Legal scholars are still playing catchup to understand the ways in which businesses shape and influence law,

199. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
200. See Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak, Paul Swartz & Martin Reeves, Taking Stock of the
Covid-19 Recession, HAR. BUS. REV. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/taking-stockof-the-covid-19-recession [https://perma.cc/NJ24-7GPC] (“Business leaders have to navigate
shattered expectations, widely disparate outcomes, and continued uncertainty.”).
201. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145 (1953) (approving corporate
charitable donation to Princeton University.)
202. Here again, separate realms thinking encouraged an artificial intellectual divide,
which is still mirrored in the concept of “public law” (e.g., constitutional law, election law,
anti-discrimination law) and “private law” (e.g., property, torts and corporate law).
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politics, and the democratic process.203 As they do so, here again, business
executives are positioned in the crosshairs of emerging awareness and
opinion. The populist, anti-corporate backlash is universally felt, but newly
emergent as a phenomenon that boards and officers are being asked more
openly to address. What this means is that CEO and corporate political
action are just now coming into fuller view as subjects of board governance.
***
The above discussion of corporate ESG and political conduct adds up
to the conclusion that boards’ duties are growing in scope and complexity as
the role of corporations in society grows in scope and complexity.
Monitoring executive activity to limit agency costs is a simplistic version of
directors’ duties in the governance of twenty-first-century firms. It fails even
to capture their full fiduciary or statutory duties. The straw man has been
that executives make purely commercial decisions, constrained by
competitive markets, in order to drive growth—but the straw man is dead.
Business, society, and politics are inextricably linked, as is now universally
apparent.
II.

BEYOND THE MONITORING BOARD: INFORMATION
GOVERNANCE

Against the above backdrop of twentieth-century corporate governance,
we turn to the substance of our information governance model. Information
governance intends the active mobilization of the firm’s data reporting,
analysis, and communication under the board’s stewardship.204 It regards
newly active board committees as a prerequisite to board leadership as
communicative action. The broadest objective of the model is to spur more
mindful value creation and leadership in large corporations, as arising from
more active, informed board deliberation, in collaboration with the C-Suite.
The new paradigm is being driven by expanded shareholders’ and
stakeholders’ demands, new technologies, and newly vigorous board
engagement itself, especially at the committee level.
The practice of board leadership in information governance should
203. For an important account at the international level, see Melissa J. Durkee,
International Lobbying Law, 127 YALE L.J. 1742 (2018).
204. Who will be governing data versus who will be governed by it is emerging at the
cutting edge of law and policy. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Rule by Data: The End of
Markets?, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (2020) (exploring the role massive data purveyors
play in constructing “markets”).
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yield more robust answers to firms’ most vital questions: What is the firm’s
source of competitive advantage? Is the corporate culture and reputation
creating or destroying value? Is the company excelling in consistently
reporting accurate financial results, managing risk, and legal compliance? Is
there preparation for escalating ESG demands? Is the board obtaining the
candid and complete information necessary to answer these questions? Is the
board free to reach throughout the organization to obtain information it
seeks? We posit that by enabling this dialogue at the top of the organization
and following through to get answers, board leadership constitutes
communicative action.
We commence by focusing on how advanced information technologies
have created the predicate for this new model, and exploring briefly how
large businesses, in the twenty-first century, are increasingly dependent upon
rich networks of data and communications in order to succeed. We note the
expanded domains of messaging through which communicative action
occurs (many being new but also taken for granted). Turning to committees,
the audit committee’s work in leading and participating in financial reporting
exemplifies the new hard and soft legal requirements driving intensive
committee practice. Post-Sarbanes Oxley audit committees are expected to
be active leaders in the financial reporting process. Board committee
participation in financial reporting, legal compliance, risk management, and
ESG leadership efforts yields a board properly prepared to vet and contribute
to the CEO’s strategies (and then review and compensate the CEO
accordingly). The final section of Part II traces recent expansions of
informational fiduciary duties, especially Caremark “informational
infrastructure/oversight” duties.205 We conclude by examining some recent
judicial decisions which hint at where an informational orientation to board
governance may take the law.
A. Why the Board?
A trend has emerged favoring a more robust governance of firms. We
believe the heightened expectations for board committees have changed
practice, and hence also raised expectations for boards generally being more
active and informed. But confusion remains.206 The notion that directors
must know their companies very well is at once self-evident and
iconoclastic! Realistically, are public company directors required to expend
205. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). See also
discussion infra Part II.0.
206. See Faith Stevelman and Sarah C. Haan, Board Governance for the Twenty-First
Century, 74 BUS. LAW. 329 (2019).
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substantial time reviewing the firm’s critical reports, SEC filings, and board
materials, attending all (or almost all) board and assigned committee
meetings, and asking probing questions to participate in leading the firm?
Despite the power, status, legal duties, and directors’ substantial
compensation (commonly $300,000 per year), many commentators suggest
that directors cannot realistically be expected to do this.
To the contrary, we believe that there are plenty of highly-qualified
individuals who would gladly accept a position as a public company director
and—especially given the convenience of modern information and
communications technology—rise to the challenge of such an opportunity.
The norm would likely shift to serving on only one public company board at
a time, but this is an easily practicable change. The more ticklish issue is
whether nominating committees will venture out of closed, inner circles, if
necessary, to nominate such candidates for election. The discussion
immediately below further explains why boards (and nominating
committees) should shoulder this responsibility in governance.
Rather than scrutinizing stock price signals to assess the CEO, we
believe the crucial role of the board is to survey, develop, and promulgate
compelling and shared understandings of what the firm is, has been, and will
be, as the predicate for rational collective action. If the CEO’s strategy
departs from the board’s panoramic views, the board must make a distinct
choice whether to take a risk and retain the CEO or seek another. Among
legal commentators, there is unanimity regarding this dimension of the
board’s role: evaluating—and hence properly compensating—the CEO. But
once one accepts that stock prices are insufficient and unstable benchmarks
for evaluating CEOs, how will boards evaluate their CEOs if they are not
deeply and widely informed about their firms? For this reason, we envision
the board as a nexus of communicative action where the best, most relevant
corporate information meets searching, careful discussion, direction, and
decision-making about the firm’s status, prospects, leadership, and potential.
When the board engages in this process of corporate identity formation, its
analysis and decision-making is recapitulated through the many levels of
leadership and action which constitute the firm.207 An active board’s
investment in data gathering, deliberation, and reporting processes as
constitutive of the firm’s status—its “identity”— portends significant value
for the firm.208
207. Accord NACD, URGENT IMPERATIVE, supra note 2, at 12 (writing that the boardmanagement relationship should take the form of “an iterative collective-learning process”).
208. For a consideration of corporate identity in relation to “norms,” see generally Edward
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the SelfGoverning Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001); Edward B. Rock, Saints and
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If one discards the idea of firms as being fundamentally reactive and
hemmed in by competitive markets and instead embraces a view of firms as
strategic, innovative enterprises (reliant especially on human capital), the
shift to this more participatory, information-enriched view of board service
appears right and necessary.209 As the economy increasingly shifts away
from manufacturing, price signals about commodities grow less critical.
More sophisticated communicative action and coordination become central
to leadership in governance. This work is done by natural persons inside the
firm, not by invisible market forces.210 Even in a nexus of contracts world,
someone needed to be coordinating the parts (i.e., contracts) to avoid
duplication and incoherence. Governance is not the responsibility of the
firm’s bankers, lawyers, or other advisers, each of whom approaches
corporate problems and tasks with local priorities and incentives. The CEO’s
resources are best targeted at strategy initiation and execution, as Fama and
Jensen theorized.211
As such, the monitoring-versus-managing
apportionment of responsibility (the board being in the former position)
wasn’t so much wrong as incomplete; “monitoring” requires thicker, firmspecific knowledge. With the focus on external markets, the monitoring
function left out the necessity of boards demanding coordinated, intelligent,
information gathering and reporting—and becoming invested in the results
of this reporting—as a basis for fostering the firm’s competitive advantage.
B.

The Role of New Information Technology

New information and communications technology have radically
expanded the scope and ease of board participation in governance. As late
as the early 1990s, the CEO’s office, or office of the Corporate Secretary,
released board reports on paper, to be delivered by Federal Express.212 It is
nearly inconceivable that the first iPhone was released only in 2007.
Professional practice in law and business has radically accelerated in speed
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997).
209. The SEC is attempting to reform disclosure practices to highlight human capital
value. Modernization of Regulation S—K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358
(proposed Aug. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, and 240).
210. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388
(1937) (describing market forces).
211. See, e.g., FAMA & JENSEN, supra note 28, at 313 (with regard to strategy, boards retain
only rights to “ratify and monitor major policy initiatives”).
212. See generally Farhad Manjoo, Jurassic Web, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2009), https://slate.com
/technology/2009/02/the-unrecognizable-internet-of-1996.html [https://perma.cc/U76R-AT9
R] (describing Americans’ use of email and the internet in the early 1990s, and noting that
“[i]n 1996, just 20 million American adults had access to the Internet”).

2020]

BOARDS IN INFORMATION GOVERNANCE

237

and broadened in focus almost entirely in this relatively brief period.213 Best
board practice looks nothing like “the show up at the boardroom having read
the paper report” world of the past; and post-pandemic remote board and
committee meeting attendance will surely remain common. Leaving aside
quarterly and special board meetings, governance now occurs through a
near-constant stream of emails, including some with complex attached
documents, or posts to a board “dashboard,” supplemented by text messages,
phone calls, and video chats. The revolution in governance depends on new
technologies: smart phones, laptops or tablets, personal computers, and the
software they run.
These technologies have had a revolutionary effect on the costs and
speed—hence possibilities—of board governance. Senior professionals (i.e.,
the cohort of public company directors) have become accustomed to
receiving critical information anytime and anywhere. There is nothing
resembling the old, ordinary working day (even before the COVID-19
pandemic!). As stated above, patterns of governance are accommodating to
new complexities in business enterprise, which has become more virtual and
information-based and less dependent on hard assets and central physical
locations. Problems arising in the pandemic from businesses’ adaption to
“just in time” inventory illustrate this fallout.214 The old construct of
corporate hierarchies is dematerializing. The boundaries of firms, once
essential to Coasean thought, have become diffuse, reshaped into networks,
affiliates, and supply chains.215 Contemporary board governance is not
factory floor meta-oversight, but information governance, literally. Official
corporate reports are complemented—and at times superseded—by
employee or watchdog reporting, which can instantly go viral on social
media. Both fellow employees’ attitudes (which influence recruitment,
productivity and retention, and hence impacts costs) and customers’ attitudes
(which influence profits or losses, of course) can be altered fundamentally
by these informal reporting channels and social media technologies. Board
213. Until around 1990, in order to determine the precedential validity of a case (i.e.,
Shepardize a case), a lawyer needed to visit a library and peruse several hard volumes,
including a “pocket part supplement.” Also, professionals relied on administrative staff to
type their work product.
214. Lizzie O’Leary, The Modern Supply Chain is Snapping, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 19,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/supply-chains-and-coronavirus/6
08329/ [https://perma.cc/U76R-AT9R].
215. As an extreme example, the construction of Boeing’s commercial jets depends on a
supply chain of 5,400 global entities. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T COM.,
BOEING AND EXOSTAR: CYBER SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MGMT., at 2, https://www.nist.gov/system
/files/documents/itl/csd/NIST_USRP-Boeing-Exostar-Case-Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3
XQ-9QZ9].

238

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:1

governance must, and is, adapting accordingly.
C. Governing Corporate Identity and Reputation for Value
Boards are facing extraordinary challenges in stewarding the
communicative resources of their firms. Extemporaneous, potentially
damaging public statements by executives and employees, the media, and
watchdog groups add pressure to boards’ management of the formal,
intentional, and mandatory facets of corporate reporting. The monitoring
board model implied a high degree of reactivity in board action—directors
being responsive to managerial action in shareholders’ defense. But such a
reactive board posture is no longer tenable. Boards will increasingly have to
adapt to governing corporate identity and reputation for value or alternatively
expose their firms to the negative consequences.
This is already evident in boards’ participation in investor relations, and
their responsiveness to activist investors in particular, as described in Part
I.216 Passive boards simply leave firms too vulnerable. The process of
reputational development is inevitable whether boards embrace it or not,
which is why, consistent with their legal authority and fiduciary duties, they
must act. This is why “corporate identity formation” accurately describes an
important part of the board’s information governance.
Management science research confirms that “corporate identity” is a
robust concept.217 Virtually all large corporations have an identity. In some
216. See supra Part I.A.6.
217. Our concept of board participation and oversight of information governance is
relevant to the well-established, strategically significant concept of corporate (or
organizational) identity, and the board’s role in shaping it. The concept is under-analyzed in
academic corporate law, but well developed in management research. For salient treatments
in management research, see, for example, Russell Abratt & Michela Mingione, Corporate
Identity, Strategy and Change, 24 J. BRAND MGMT. 129, 137 (2017) (using “Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory” as a model for managing internal corporate identity change and
exploring its strategic value); Suzana Rodrigues & John Child, The Development of Corporate
Identity: A Political Perspective, 45 J. MGMT. STUD. 885, 885 (2008) (exploring corporate
identity—a “key to understanding modern organizations”—as a system subject to internal
power dynamics among competing managerial elites); Eva Parum, Corporate Governance
and Corporate Identity, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 558 (2006) (analyzing the role of
the corporate board in linking external disclosures and the development of corporate identity
in small and medium size listed firms); T.C. Melewar, Determinants of the Corporate Identity
Construct: a Review of the Literature, 9 J. MKTG. COMMC’NS 195 (2003) (reviewing of
twenty-five years of research on the corporate identity construct and presenting academic and
managerial implications); John M.T. Balmer & Stephen A. Greyser, Managing the Multiple
Identities of the Corporation, 44 CAL. MGMT. REV. 72 (2002); Helen Stuart, Employee
Identification with the Corporate Identity, 32 INT’L STUD. MGMT. & ORG. 28, (2002)
(analyzing corporate identity as a modality of employee solidarity and productivity for the
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firms, it’s clear, stable, and a motivating source of collective action. In
others, it’s a drag on value. As we have stated above, boards have agency in
coordinating, framing, and prioritizing the flows of information and
communications within their firms—actions which may influence corporate
identity.218 Identity formation is a governance function that is instrumental
to maximizing competitive advantage.
Where does the macro-level identity of the corporation show up in the
messaging that becomes part of the experience of the firm’s participants? As
we have noted, older models of corporate governance looked to bottom-line
financial metrics and stock prices as the principal signifiers of the firm’s
status. Alternatively, decades ago, it was more plausible to focus on hard
assets like manufacturing facilities or principal offices or headquarters as
expressions and anchors of corporate identity and status. Modern firms,
which are more likely to be global, asset-light, and highly dependent on
subcontracting, elude these older, abbreviated signifiers for what the firm
“is.” As evident from the SEC’s recent reset to basic business description in
S-K regulations, it’s no longer a simple exercise to define what the firm is,
or what its principal assets and forms of value are, or how they align with a
strategic plan and risk metrics. Conveying this appropriately to internal and
external stakeholders is a challenge that must be governed by the board, not
delegated to lawyers or others. As stock market prices are increasingly
buffeted by macro-economic factors, they are far too limited to serve as
signals of the firm’s status. If corporate boards previously relied on lawyers,
investment bankers, or their senior executives to make judgments, in
defining the firm and its condition, such board-level deference would be
increasingly risky, and irresponsible.
Traditional corporate governance has paid little attention to the
sourcing, curating, and shepherding of information and communications
benefit of the firm); Judy Motion & Shirley Leitch, The Technologies of Corporate Identity,
32 INT’L STUD. MGMT. & ORG. 45 (2002) (providing a novel framework for managing the
pragmatic development of corporate identity and assessing its congruence with organizational
goals). Within the legal literature, see Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups:
Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879 (2012) (analyzing corporate
identity in terms of legal structures, including parents, subsidiaries, and affiliated ventures);
Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1 (2019) (leveraging the
concept of corporate identity to explore the liability boundaries of firms, especially
subsequent to transformational enterprise transactions, including M&A deals). For a recent
discussion of corporate culture as an analog to corporate ‘identity,’ see Donald C. Langevoort,
The Effects of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, and Privateness on Corporate Cultures, 43
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 386 (2020) (stating that in public firms there is an “increasing
acknowledgement that bolstering a healthy corporate culture is part of officers’ and directors’
business judgment responsibilities.”).
218. See supra Part II.0.
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(beyond stock prices) as a critical modality of enterprise and source of firm
value. But an emerging field of organizational behavior focuses precisely
on this subject and these processes in businesses and enterprises of all
kinds.219 This relatively new academic field (which grew out of Media
Studies research) is now firmly incorporated into Organizational Studies,
under the heading of “Communication Constitutes Organization”
(“CCO”).220
Having emerged in North American universities in the 1990s, CCO
research synthesizes insights from transaction-cost economics, management
theory, behavioral science, semiotics, and sociology.221 CCO builds on “the
narrative turn” in modern social science research.222 The core CCO insight
219. For a contemporary analysis of new directions in the field, see François Cooren &
David Seidl, Niklas Luhmann’s Radical Communication Approach and Its Implications for
Research on Organizational Communication, 45 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 479 (2020). CCO
research has generated novel understanding of many fundamental features of organizational
life, including agency (individual action versus path dependence), technology, routines,
strategy formation, and internal organizational conflicts. On CCO and agency, see, for
example, BORRIS H.J.M. BRUMMANS, THE AGENCY OF ORGANIZING: PERSPECTIVES AND CASE
STUDIES (Rutledge ed., 2018) (amassing new research from CCO scholars analyzing how
collective communications practices within organizations set the stage for their members to
claim authority, lead, and effectuate change). On CCO, technology, and computerization, see,
for example, JAMES R. TAYLOR, CAROLE GROLEAU, LORNA HEATON & ELIZABETH VAN
EVERY-TAYLOR, THE COMPUTERIZATION OF WORK: A COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE (Sage
2000) (charting organizational change as a result of evolving technological change). On
communications by (embodied) persons establishing organizational routines, see Alex
Wright, Embodied Organizational Routines: Explicating a Practice Understanding, 28 J.
MGMT. INQUIRY 153 (2017) (seeking to ground CCO discourse in the interactions of living
persons in organizations). On CCO and strategy-formation, see François Cooren, Nicolas
Bencherki, Mathieu Chaput & Consuelo Vasquez, The Communicative Constitution Of
Strategy-Making: Exploring Fleeting Moments Of Strategy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF STRATEGY AS PRACTICE 365 (2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). On CCO and intraorganizational conflicts, see Linda L. Putnam, Gail T. Fairhurst & Scott Banghart,
Contradictions, Dialectics, and Paradoxes in Organizations: A Constitutive Approach, 10
ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 65 (2017) (documenting the complexity of communications among
collegial and competing actors in organizations).
220. An important author in the field is James R. Taylor. See, e.g., James R. Taylor &
Elizabeth J. Van Every, THE EMERGENT ORGANIZATION: COMMUNICATION AS ITS SITE AND
SURFACE (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 2000) (reorienting the definition of “organization”
from the established legal, institutional perspective to one that highlights communicational
practices including dialogue, texts, practical technologies and systems design).
221. For a volume collecting essays written by scholars in these diverse academic
disciplines and perspectives, see BUILDING THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION: THE CONSTITUTIVE
ROLE OF COMMUNICATION (Linda L Putnam & Anne M. Nicotera eds., Routledge 2009)
(restating the accomplishments and challenges of the field and presenting leading new works).
222. This narrative turn is visible in feminist legal theory’s deployment of stories as a
critical method of law reform, for example. It exists in contradistinction to contemporary,
academic economics’ quantitative approach and the conventional use of statistics in other
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is that any productive enterprise requires human collaboration, which arises
from communication—such communication in turn stimulating further
coordination of effort and capital. Shifting away from the study of
quantitative models of inputs and outputs, CCO theorists focus on
information and communication as ideational frameworks which
successively and recursively shape and incentivize the selection,
prioritization, and application of capital inputs, as well as the evaluation of
results.223 Ideas and communication precede and then reinforce deliberate
collective action and judgments about the production of value. In these
respects, the framework of CCO scholarship is deeply relevant to the new
board paradigm set forth herein.
An extraordinary array of texts, symbols, and other modes of
communication shape a company’s core commitments, goals, and
processes—hence, its identity. Cumulatively, these texts drive the next level
of messages circulating inside firms to employees, and then beyond the firm,
to shareholders and others. The most obvious formal, substantive external
messaging—an autobiography of the firm—is the detailed account of its
business, property, principle markets, financial results, trends and risks,
material litigation, and regulatory deficits in the firm’s SEC reports. These
encompass quarterly and annual SEC reports on Forms 10-Q, 10-K, and 8K; Schedules TO and 14d-9; and annual reports to shareholders. As
discussed further below,224 both corporate fiduciary doctrine and the SEC’s
pronouncements have increased the level of presumed board oversight and
candor in the production of these reports.
Corporations are also purposely, voluntarily expanding their narrativity
through their webpages and sustainability (ESG) reports, both online and
otherwise. These are all self-initiated representations of the corporation’s
actions and commitments. The externally directed messaging also impacts
employees, executives, suppliers, and independent contractors dealing with
the firm. Internal messaging encompasses employee and executive codes of
conduct, corporate mission statements, and internal compliance, and risk
social sciences. The “narrative turn” in the social sciences draws on contemporary critical
theory and linguistics. For a brief account of the intellectual history and evolution of the
“narrative turn” in social science, see Matti Hyvärinen, Revisiting the Narrative Turns, 7 LIFE
WRITING 69 (2010). For a research handbook compiling multiple approaches and topical
areas, see QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN ACTION (Tim May ed., Sage 2002).
223. For a description of the process, see Daniel Robichaud, Hélène Giroux & James R.
Taylor, The Metaconversation: The Recursive Property of Language as a Key to Organizing,
29 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 617 (2004) (demonstrating the way that communication reflects
existing knowledge and creates the grounds for new insight, as relates to collaboration in
organizations).
224. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
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management policies. These documents are also critical signifiers of what
the corporation is and intends to become. They reflect past corporate
conduct and shape future conduct of the firm’s constituencies. Where a
corporation’s actions have departed substantially from its public
statements—including disclosures in SEC filings, corporate press releases,
or CEO interviews—companies have faced embarrassment, stakeholder
blowback, boycotts, and potential securities lawsuits. Where a corporation’s
self-described status or conduct has departed from its promises in codes of
conduct, compliance commitments, and CSR/ESG reports, they have faced
employee lawsuits, public shaming, possible boycotts, or loss of goodwill.
These feedback loops tie corporate narrativity to business realities. While
corporate identity is a valuable resource, one to be stewarded by senior
corporate leadership (including boards), it can also backfire if inadequately
attended to.
Again, the domains and interactivity of corporate identity and
reputation have altered fundamentally in the past two decades. Corporate
webpages have become such critical portals of opinion formation and
investor relations that is it startling to recall that they have been in wide usage
for less than three decades. They are also almost entirely untheorized in the
corporate governance literature.
The role of investor relations departments and corporate
communications departments has burgeoned in furtherance of shaping
opinion and coordinating action regarding what the firm does, is, and will
become. Analogously, the law has fundamentally shifted in allowing far
greater access for investors to inspect corporate books and records.225 This
means that board meeting minutes, internal memoranda, reports of
investigations, and other critical board decisional documents have
instrumental weight in influencing shareholder responses. In terms of legal
liability, it is sometimes understood that corporate reports and disclosures
are synthetic, meaning their authorship cannot be parsed between managers,
lawyers, directors, and other experts. But the liability perspective doesn’t
resolve the governance one. Board leadership is critical not only in
evaluating the C-Suite, but also in evaluating other critical advisers who
influence the gathering, reporting, and synthesis of formative corporate
information.
In sum, board leadership lies considerably in focusing, disciplining, and
making critical decisions about the firm’s messaging, in all its textual
225. For a recent case about book and records requests, see Woods v. Sahara Enters.,
Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0153-JTL, 2020 WL 4200131 (Del. Ch. July 22, 2020).
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incarnations. To be sure, boards should not themselves manage all of the
firm’s critical disclosures and communications any more than they manage
all of the firm’s traditional capital assets and commercial affairs. But hard
and soft law and best practices are moving in the direction of enabling and
expecting boards to exert constructive energy in this domain. Overseeing
the candor, completeness, and coherence of the firm’s corporate conduct
codes, compliance policies and other reports, and voluntary and mandatory
disclosures is a crucial dimension of board value creation and information
governance.
D. Audit Committees and Financial Reporting
The audit committee’s leadership in the financial reporting process
exemplifies active board information governance. Four facets of this are
immediately noteworthy. First, the legally mandatory, active oversight by
audit committees of the financial reporting process is incompatible with the
passive model of the monitoring board. The legally mandated role of audit
committee directors is now more formal, proactive, and intensive than
monitoring implies, and the audit committee’s role has independent
significance beyond evaluating the CEO. Second, the quantitative and
narrative financial reports produced under the agency of the audit committee
are essential to the full board’s understanding and evaluation of the firm’s
capacities, broadly. Thirdly, information produced by the audit committee
is synthetic with other committee and full board judgments and functions.
For example, financial data and reports illustrating the firm’s status are
relevant to the board’s advisory role in strategy, which informs the board’s
perspective on the CEO, which influences board compensation decisions and
also ESG governance, such as pay ratio disclosure. Fourth, while audit
committees’ leadership in financial reporting illustrates the apogee of the
board’s information governance, it is only different in degree from what is
becoming the norm for other committees. Outside directors on the
compensation and nominating committees, or in risk and legal compliance
or ESG oversight, also participate in communicative action vital to shaping
their firm’s identity.
The foundations of information governance lie in the 2000s. The
changes wrought by Sarbanes Oxley substantially elevated the prominence
and responsibilities of public company audit committees. Congress intended
its legislation to inspire additional rulemaking to promote accurate,
complete, and clear corporate financial reporting. Hence, Sarbanes Oxley’s
provisions (as incorporated in the ‘34 Act) are only one portion of the new
rules mandating directors’ active leadership in financial reporting.
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Also influential in shaping audit committees’ leadership in financial
reporting are NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements, and especially
companies’ own audit committee charters (which are required to be publicly
available).226 Furthermore, audit committees’ leadership role is bolstered by
PCAOB rules and Statement of Auditing Standards (“SAS”)
pronouncements, including requirements for auditors to discuss material
auditing and accounting matters directly with the audit committee directors.
In sum, there is now a detailed scaffolding of legal rules and regulations, as
well as soft law commitments, supporting audit committee leadership in the
production of materially complete financial statements and reports.
Fiduciary duties complement these rules and regulations in supporting
active audit committee leadership. These include the fiduciary duty of
candor (requiring directors to communicate fully and accurately with one
another and also investors), the duty of care (requiring directors to be fully
informed), and Caremark informational-architecture oversight duties. In
sum, the audit committee does not have the option to play a passive role in
the financial reporting process if it wishes to comply with existing rules and
standards. This is the ground floor of information governance.
Confusion notwithstanding, it is not the outside auditors but rather the
audit committee that leads the financial reporting process. The rules envision
audit committee authority over a reporting team encompassing the external
auditor, the CFO, heads of business units, the corporate controller or chief
accounting officer, and the internal audit department. Because each of these
actors has a distinct function and perspective, the audit committee’s
coordination role is essential to achieving the reporting goal. Underscoring
the audit committee’s leadership, SEC rules mandate that the audit
committee, and not management, is responsible for hiring, firing,
supervising, and structuring the compensation of the outside auditors.227
The audit committee is responsible for scrutinizing the
independence of the registered public accounting firm conducting the audit
and approving any permissible non-audit services.228 For companies listed
on the NYSE, the audit committee must obtain and review a report by the
independent auditor describing its internal quality control procedures.229 An
226. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION
app. A at 30–44 (2010) (outlining audit committee requirements
for public companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ as set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act
and the Sarbanes Oxley Act).
227. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(2)(F) (2019).
228. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h)-(i); Qualifications of
Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(7) (2020).
229. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.07(b)(iii)(A) (2018) [hereinafter
NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL].
ON THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
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analogous requirement also exists in the NASDAQ listing rules.230 As part
of supervising the audit, the audit committee
. . . must be directly responsible for the appointment,
compensation, retention and oversight of the work of any
registered public accounting firm engaged . . . for the purpose of
preparing or issuing an audit report or performing other audit,
review or attest services for the listed issuer, and each such
registered public accounting firm must report directly to the audit
committee.231
Both NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards require that the audit
committee enumerate its responsibilities in a publicly-disclosed charter.232
The charters and these other authorities enumerate a base-line of rigorous
leadership by the audit committee that is high.233 The audit committee is
generally expected to meet in executive session, separately, with the outside
audit firm, the inside auditors, and management. Based on audit best
practices this should occur quarterly, at minimum. These now common
practices exemplify audit committees’ leadership and participation in the
processes that yield the authoritative financial self-portraits of the firm—
ones that influence everything else.
Cumulatively, the rules make apparent that such audit committee
230. For NASDAQ, LISTING RULES, Rule 5605(c)(1)(B) (2019).
231. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(2) (2019).
232. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change Amending Audit Committee
Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,529, 71,530 (Dec. 21, 1999) (noting NYSE Listed Company
Manual § 303.01(B)(1)(c)); Order Approving NASD Proposed Rule Change Amending Audit
Committee Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,523, 71,523 (Dec. 21, 1999) (noting NASD Rule
4310(c)(26)(A)(ii)).
233. The charter of a NYSE company’s audit committee must state the audit committee’s
responsibility to: “meet to review and discuss the listed company’s annual audited financial
statements and quarterly financial statements with management and the independent auditor,
including reviewing the listed company’s specific disclosures under ‘Management’s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.’” NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 229, § 303A.07(b)(iii)(B). The NASDAQ rule is slightly
more open ended, but essentially the same. NASDAQ, LISTING RULES, Rule 5605. The SEC
requires that the audit committee disclose whether it has “reviewed and discussed the audited
financial statements with management.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(3)(i)(A). Thus, the SEC has
imposed a disclosure-based analog to the duty of care in this context. The Business
Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate Governance also flesh out the leadership and intensive
participation expected of audit committees: “The audit committee should meet privately with
each of the internal and outside auditors and management on a regular basis, and in any event
at least quarterly, and communicate with them between meetings as necessary.” BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2010), https://www.businessroundt
able.org/archive/resources/2010-principles-of-corporate-governance1 [https://perma.cc/3CZ
4-SCZY].
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leadership is not administrative, but genuine participation in executive
decision-making over financial reporting. The audit committee members are
expected to inform themselves of the substantive information in the financial
statements and management discussion and analysis (“MD&A”), and why
the data is what it is. A general consensus exists that the audit committee’s
most crucial duties include scrutinizing the numbers, choices of accounting
policies, accounting estimates, and textual disclosures in the MD&A.234 By
inference, this encompasses the audit committee’s determinations about data
which was excludable as being immaterial under Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), SEC rules, and the securities laws. A
number of overlapping rules and pronouncements, including directors’ duty
of care, formalize the audit committee’s obligation to ask these kinds of
probing, material questions on an ongoing basis. Auditor rules reinforce the
audit committee’s duty of inquiry and oversight.235 SEC and PCAOB rules
expressly require the auditor to support the audit committee’s scrutiny not
only of the financial reports generally, but also other critical matters such as
the review of related party transactions.236
234. See, e.g., Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 204, 116 Stat. 745,
773 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l (2020)) (adding section 10A(k) to the
Securities Act of 1934, which requires audit reports to the audit committee to include the
important accounting policies to be used as well as ramifications of alternative treatment and
disclosures pertaining to financial information); 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–07 (2005) (requiring the
same as in Sarbanes Oxley); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 229, § 303A.07
(amended 2013) (explaining that the audit committee’s obligations include, among others,
assisting in board oversight of financial and compliance standards, reviewing financial
statements, and discussing policies related to risk).
235. Accounting industry standards require auditors conducting a review of interim
financial information to report to the audit committee any material modifications required to
bring the financial information in conformance with GAAP, any frauds involving senior
management or resulting in a material misstatement of the financial statements, possible
illegal acts (unless inconsequential), and matters that, in their judgment, represent significant
deficiencies in the design and operation of internal controls. AUDITING STANDARD OF THE PUB.
CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., AS 4105.29-.36 (2017); CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 100, AU §§ 722.29-.36
(AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS 2002), superseded by CODIFICATION OF
STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 122, AU-C §§
930.24-.29 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS 2020) [hereinafter SAS No. 100].
236. Congress itself, in Sarbanes Oxley, enacted rules to mandate auditors’ support for
audit committee leadership. PCAOB rules also document matters that must be discussed
between the audit committee and the outside auditor. Under PCAOB Auditing Standard 1301,
the auditor has a duty to facilitate audit committee oversight. AUDITING STANDARD OF THE
PUB. CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., AS 1301.03 (2017) [hereinafter AUDITING STANDARD 1301].
The PCAOB also requires the audit firm to discuss any “critical audit matters” it has identified
with the audit committee. PUB. CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 2017-001, THE
AUDITOR’S REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS WHEN THE AUDITOR EXPRESSES
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SEC rules provide that the audit committee must oversee the resolution
of substantive disputes over financial reporting methods if they arise,
whether between the external and internal auditors or between the outside
auditor and management.237 PCAOB Auditing Standards and the SAS
expand on the range of reporting matters to be evaluated and discussed
between audit committee directors and the audit firm.238 The latter requires
auditors to present orally or in writing and evaluate critical accounting
matters with the audit committee.239 After mutual discussion, the auditor’s
report becomes incorporated into the Form 10-K filing with the SEC. The
auditor’s report is required to contain a review of any sensitive judgments or
unusual transactions—matters which the rules, again, mandate would have
been discussed with the audit committee.240 Hence, the report constitutes an
enduring, public record of the resolution of matters arrived at in consultation
between the audit committee and the rest of the financial reporting team.
True, nowhere in this network of formal requirements does it expressly
state that “the audit committee directors must read and understand their
firm’s financial statements and results of operations, risks, and business
trends.” But this requirement is presumed everywhere—implicitly in the
federal, self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) charter, and auditing
mandates, including those requiring the audit committee to discuss the
quarterly and annual reports with the other members of the audit team
(including the outside auditor). It arises, too, from the audit committee
directors’ duty of care, which operates at all times in directors’ decisionmaking, oversight, and monitoring actions.241 The express requirements for
the outside audit firm to discuss the accounting methods employed in the
AN UNQUALIFIED OPINION AND RELATED AMENDMENTS TO PCAOB STANDARDS 11–12 (2017).

237. This feature of intensive audit committee involvement must be reflected in the audit
committee charter, as per NYSE and NASDAQ requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(2).
238. Auditing Standard 1301 requires that the auditor provide timely information to the
audit committee to permit the audit committee to scrutinize “[a]ll critical accounting policies
and practices to be used, including . . . [t]he reasons that certain policies and practices are
critical,” and deliver that information sufficiently in advance of the final audit report, and
filing deadline for the financial statements, that the audit committee would be in position to
take appropriate follow up actions. AUDITING STANDARD 1301, supra note 236, ¶¶ .12, .26.
239. The normal practice is for the external auditor to produce a written document for the
audit committee covering all such required communications, and to discuss at length with the
audit committee any issues that merit special attention. SAS NO. 100, supra note 235, §
722.21.
240. AUDITING STANDARD 1301, supra note 236, ¶¶ .12(c)-(d).
241. See Lyman P. Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee’s Ethical and Legal Responsibilities:
The State Law Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 27, 35–36 (2005) (discussing directors’ duty
of care to obtain and act on all material information within the decision-making process and
be reasonably informed in properly monitoring and overseeing the business affairs of a
corporation).
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financial statements, material features of the audit process, and substance of
the auditor’s report with the audit committee presumes that the committee
members understand the financial statements and reports with fluency.
The audit committee’s financial reporting responsibilities—which are
continual (i.e., without break)—result in the creation and re-creation of a
board-led, transparent narrative about the company’s financial condition.242
The committee’s leadership encompasses not only the annual report to
shareholders, but also the annual reports on Form 10-K (including the
MD&A), and the firm’s interim, quarterly financial statements (including
their MD&As). These reports are searchable online on the SEC’s webpage
and customarily posted on the firm’s webpage as well. Hence, they
constitute a very public narrative about the company’s financial position and
projected status. The unavoidable subjectivity in financial reporting helps
explain why audit committee directors’ independence from management is
mandatory and essential, and why the audit committee’s leadership of the
financial reporting process is critical to discerning—indeed, defining—the
firm’s financial status. The SEC rule requiring a majority of the directors
sign the Form 10-K further emphasizes the board’s duty to understand the
substance of the firm’s financial reports.243
Also driving home the idea that the audit committee directors must
obtain a full understanding of their firm’s financial status and reports is the
SEC rule requiring each audit committee to contain a “financial expert,” or
disclose (embarrassingly) that it does not.244 Beyond fiduciary rationales and
securities liability issues, a substantive requirement for the audit committee
to include a financial expert arises from the SRO’s standards. A financial
expert is defined expressly as someone adept at comprehending the
accounting and financial presumptions operating in financial statements and
reports subject to GAAP.245 The financial expert is positioned as a backstop
242. Accord NACD, URGENT IMPERATIVE, supra note 2, at 12 (describing board
engagement as “a continuous process”).
243. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, FORM 10-K, GENERAL INSTRUCTION
D(2)(a) (requiring the Form 10-K report be signed by at least a majority of the board of
directors or persons performing similar functions).
244. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002;
Correction, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,353 (Mar. 31, 2003) (amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229)
(clarifying that the disclosure of whether a company has a financial expert on the audit
committee must be made only in the annual report). In addition, a series of authorities require
that all audit committee members be independent of the company, so they will not be subject
to influence from the CFO or CEO.
245. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert
Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 205, 234 (2013)
(listing the attributes of an audit committee financial experts which includes an understanding
of GAAP and financial statements).
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to raise the level of the full committee’s literacy in GAAP and Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). But the responsibility to engage and
understand the firm’s financial and operating status lies not only with the
financial expert, but with the full audit committee. That is, notably, the SRO
and PCAOB auditor rules prescribing what must be discussed, reviewed, and
authorized do not refer to the financial expert, but to the audit committee in
toto. At the next level, of course, the audit committee has a duty to relay its
understanding of the firm’s financial status to the board in full.
In sum, federal statutes, SEC regulations, SRO listing mandates,
PCAOB standards, and SAS requirements all demand the active leadership
of the audit committee in the issuance of sound financial reports of the firm’s
condition and results of operation, principal risks, and trends. The process
through which these financial reports—narratives about the company’s
financial status—are produced is continual. Given the quarterly nature of
financial reporting, at least the audit committee chair, if not the other
members of the committee, would be in near-constant communication with
the larger financial reporting team about not only the process but also the
substance of what will be disclosed.
Finally, the portrait of intensive audit committee participation in the
production of the annual and quarterly financial statements and reports
specified above assumes normal times. In situations where there was severe
financial stress bearing on the firm’s status as a going concern, or in a
situation where fraud or misstatements were feared, or where other
extraordinary risks or transactions were pending, the audit committee’s work
would expand. The portrait of contemporary audit committee leadership
described above illustrates one crucial facet of the board’s information
governance. The language of “oversight” does not capture this reality, which
lies more in “communicative action.”
E. Boards in Risk Management and Legal Compliance
More intensive board leadership in risk management and legal
compliance is also a new normal. As an outgrowth of the conventional
structure of internal control, dating back to COSO’s formation in 1985,246 it
246. COSO is the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
Usually referred to by reference to its chairman, James C. Treadway, Jr., a former SEC
commissioner, its formal name was “The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting.” Treadway was established in June 1985 and funded by five of the largest private
U.S. accounting organizations. For the evolution of these bodies and concepts, see generally
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud,
Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 267 (2004) (discussing how COSO categorized
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is often the audit committee that also leads oversight of risk management and
legal compliance. Reflecting this convention, the NYSE corporate
governance rules provide that the audit committee should support “board
oversight of . . . [a] listed company’s compliance with legal and regulatory
requirements.”247 Nevertheless, risk oversight governance is not required to
be in the audit committee per se—fewer formal rules govern this area, in
comparison to financial reporting oversight.248
Flexibility in this office also makes sense because of its relevance to the
many facets of information governance, including strategy,249 compensation
choices, CEO retention,250 decisions relevant to tone at the top,251 and ESG
governance.252 Rather than the audit committee, firms variously assign this
administrative and accounting controls under one heading called internal controls, which, with
formal auditing standards, promote achievement of corporate objectives related to operations,
financial reporting, and legal compliance).
247. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 229, § 303A.07(b)(i)(A).
248. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 16 (2016)
(“Unless the full board or one or more other committees do so, the audit committee should
oversee the company’s compliance program, including the company’s code of conduct. The
committee should establish procedures for handling compliance concerns related to potential
violations of law or the company’s code of conduct, including concerns relating to accounting,
internal accounting controls, auditing and securities law issues.”).
249. See Robert S. Kaplan & Anette Mikes, Managing Risks: A New Framework, HARV.
BUS. REV., June 2012, at 50 (“We examine the individual and organizational challenges
inherent in generating open, constructive discussions about managing the risks related to
strategic choices and argue that companies need to anchor these discussions in their strategy
formulation and implementation processes.”).
250. See, e.g., David Yaffee-Bellany, McDonald’s Fires C.E.O Steve Easterbrook after
Relationship with Employee, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/
03/business/mcdonalds-ceo-fired-steve-easterbrook.html
[https://perma.cc/EU7A-2UZR]
(reporting how the board of McDonald’s fired the CEO for demonstrating poor judgment in
engaging in a consensual relationship with an employee); After Deadly Crashes of Marquee
Aircraft, Boeing CEO is Out, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS (Dec. 23, 2019), https://libn.com/2019
/12/23/after-deadly-crashes-of-marquee-aircraft-boeing-ceo-is-out/ [https://perma.cc/Y4B4N6M7] (discussing how Boeing’s company observed a need to change leadership to restore
confidence after two deadly crashes).
251. See Deloitte, Building Tone at the Top: The Role of the CEO, Board and CCO, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/03/21/building-toneat-the-top-the-role-of-the-ceo-board-and-coo-3/ [https://perma.cc/G42J-J7BN] (explaining
how the board plays a critical role in setting the tone of the organization through selection of
the CEO, monitoring, oversight, and approvals).
252. For discussion of the merits of a separate risk committee, see, for example, Matteo
Tonello, Should Your Board Have a Separate Risk Committee?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE, (Feb. 12, 2012) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/02/12/should-yourboard-have-a-separate-risk-committee/ [https://perma.cc/ZKU4-E7SP] (discussing the
benefits and potential issues of having a separate risk committee and what to consider when
deciding to form such committee); PROTIVITI, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY
COMM’N, BOARD RISK OVERSIGHT – A PROGRESS REPORT: WHERE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
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role to another principal board committee, a specified compliance and risk
management committee, or to the full board in its entirety. Nevertheless,
there is public accountability for whatever process is selected. The SEC
requires detailed disclosure of a firm’s board-level risk oversight process.253
Clearly this is intended to elevate the substance of board governance in this
domain. (The SEC, too, practices communicative action!)
In Sarbanes Oxley, Congress made express the obligation of corporate
attorneys to report material legal non-compliance all the way to the board if
necessary to accomplish a satisfactory remedial response.254 Congress’s and
the SEC’s decision to tie hands-on compliance and risk management
officers’ duties (and potentially their personal legal exposure) to their
responsibility to report up to the board (when material irregularities are
uncovered) has eroded directors’ resort to pleading ignorance as a defense.
This is a critical legal shift, one where the “chain of command” structure has
indeed been formalized. Heightening directors’ sensitivity to their own
potential legal exposure (albeit extraordinarily rare) has had a systemic effect
on intensifying board governance practices in this area. From the perspective
of securities class action liability exposure, of course, the board’s knowledge
of undisclosed risk and legal compliance shortfalls, or even reckless failures
to report them, is formative—scienter is the touchstone.255 These law
CURRENTLY STAND IN EXECUTING THEIR RISK OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES 6 (2010),
https://www.coso.org/documents/Board-Risk-Oversight-Survey-COSO-Protiviti_000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9GY6-XDJD] (providing commentary that risk committees play substantial
risk oversight roles, especially in industries of complex nature that require focused expertise).
253. The SEC considers risk oversight a primary responsibility of the board and requires
disclosure of its role in this area. The relevant S-K provisions are Sections 402(c) and 402(n)
of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2009).
254. See Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002)) (listing the rules of professional
responsibility for corporate attorneys). Section 307 of the Act requires the SEC to prescribe
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
SEC, including a rule
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent
thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company
(or the equivalent thereof); and (2) if the counselor officer does not appropriately
respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures
or sanctions with respect to the violation),) requiring the attorney to report the
evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to
another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
(emphasis added).
255. On the issue of scienter as grounds for board liability, see, for example, Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (discussing how a finding of scienter
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reforms have been potent motivators to enhanced board governance of risk
management and legal compliance, and a catalyst to board-driven remedial
action.
In the case of financial firms, the Dodd-Frank Act requires even more
formalized and rigorous financial risk oversight procedures, including,
expressly, board-level oversight.256 Furthermore, outside of financial firms,
heightened requirements for board-level risk management and legal
compliance oversight are present in recent “upscaled” Caremark duty to
monitor holdings.257 Not only legal compliance failures but also,
increasingly, business risk management failures are moving into the ambit
of Caremark’s fiduciary schema governing board vigilance, as discussed
further below.258
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) also function as
an incentive to enhanced board oversight of legal compliance, as was
observed in 1996 in Caremark itself. Under the Guidelines, the executive
with operational responsibility for legal compliance oversight must

need not require a “smoking gun” but must be “cogent and compelling” in light of other
explanations).
256. Dodd-Frank’s mission was to require a separate risk committee for certain nonbank
financial companies and certain bank holding companies. The Board of Governors may
require a publicly traded company with total consolidated assets of less than $10 billion to
establish a risk committee to promote sound risk management practices. See Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(h), 124 Stat.
1376, 1429-1431 (2010) (stating the mandatory and permissive regulatory authority for the
Board of Governors as related to establishing risk committees for publicly traded companies).
For a discussion of enhanced risk management responsibilities of boards at financial
institutions after Dodd-Frank, see generally Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the DoddFrank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55
(2011) (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act’s measures to address enhanced risk management
are weak, therefore requiring reforms that consider the impact of cognitive biases and
structural dynamics on risk governance for more effective risk management regulation).
257. For discussion of enhanced duties and potentially liability under recent duty to
monitor decisions, see, for example, Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power
of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2164-79 (discussing how compliance systems are
meant to provide an ongoing framework for monitoring to alert the board of any red flags
which may require concrete and effective action by the board in fulfilling its duties); see also
Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457
(2010/2011) (explaining how the Caremark duty which compels directors to create systems
for monitoring compliance is a duty of obedience to the law). For further discussion of
Caremark’s expanding influence on board informational duties, see infra Part II.F.
258. See, e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820-24 (Del. 2019) (finding existence
of management-level compliance program on its own, without good faith effort, not enough
for board to avoid liability); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 20170222-JRS, at 42 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (finding board of life sciences experts should have
been on notice of problems with drug trials and addressed flawed reporting).
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expressly have authority to communicate directly with the audit committee
(or other appropriate governing body) overseeing legal compliance.259 Firms
which can demonstrate solid board governance targeted at fostering firmwide legal compliance are likely to obtain lesser penalties if problems do
occur.260 Moreover, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) increasingly requires
upgrades to corporate compliance programs, reaching to the boardroom, as
part of settlements via deferred prosecution or non-prosecution
agreements.261 In egregious cases, the DOJ insists on the imposition of an
outside, board-level monitor to raise the level of firm-wide legal
compliance.262
Recent updates to the SEC’s S-K reporting requirements on risk and
legal proceedings disclosures are also drawing increased attention to board
governance in this domain.263 Expanded transparency is, in turn, fostering
investors’ and other constituencies’ enhanced attention to ESG-related risk
factors, reinforcing a cycle feeding into upgraded board-led governance
efforts.264 Board level vigilance is reinforced through an iterative and
259. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) and 8C2.5(f) (U.S
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (requiring individuals with delegated operational responsibility
to report periodically and directly to governing authority on the effectiveness of the
compliance program).
260. A Department of Justice guidance document addresses the matter. It suggests that
one of the questions prosecutors will ask is what, if any, compliance expertise has been
available to the board. In assessing penalties, they may consider whether the board has held
executive sessions with compliance leaders within the company and may inquire as to what
types of information the board has examined in its exercise of the oversight function. Key
questions will be what types of issues have been reported to the board, and how the board and
management have addressed them. Documentation as to board discussions and decisions will
be necessary to show that the board has been diligent in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/LWT2XVJG].
261. For discussion of the practice of DPAs and NPAs, see, for example, Rachel E.
Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 435 (2014) (explaining
how the use of DPAs and NPAs allows the government to have a more proactive role in
policing and monitoring corporate behavior); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred
Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach To Investigation And
Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (positing the benefits of formalizing and systemizing the
use of DPAs in corporate criminal justice administration).
262. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The
New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007) (discussing how the government often
seeks appointment of monitors who have an expanding scope of power).
263. Modernization of Regulation S—K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358
(proposed Aug. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240).
264. See, e.g., ROSEMARY LALLY & BRANDON WHITEHILL, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS, HOW CORPORATE BOARDS CAN COMBAT SEXUAL HARASSMENT (2018) (providing
recommendations and resources for directors and investors looking to combat sexual
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recursive process in which enhanced disclosure feeds investor pressure and
upscaled standards for board oversight. 265
Accordingly, since the 2000s, most public companies have overhauled
their staffing radically to expand the teams tasked with risk management and
legal compliance.266 This increased hiring to upgrade risk management and
legal compliance in U.S. firms is, of course, a redirection of corporate
resources occurring under the board’s authority, i.e. within its discretion.
Most importantly for information governance, there is a regulatory,
professional, and industry consensus that risk management and legal
compliance are enterprise capabilities, not simply functions. They cannot
be effectuated by corporate managers in the middle layers of the enterprise
on their own. This is where “tone at the top” is board level communicative
action.267 As Caremark itself noted, the scope of operational and reputational
damage, which can be effectuated by rogue actors inside an organization,
mandates instituting rigorous internal controls reaching to the board.268
In order for risk management and legal compliance internal controls to
achieve effective results, the board should oversee the establishment and
effective operation of multiple, direct, independent, but backstopping,
channels of reporting, so they cannot be circumvented by executive officers
having an incentive to suppress red flags. This is entirely compatible with

harassment).
265. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for
Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 653 (2016) (arguing that accounting for
both financial and nonfinancial risk can drive firm and portfolio performance). For ESG risks’
relationship to conventional interpretations of “materiality,” see Ruth Jebe, The Convergence
of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking Sustainability Mainstream, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 645
(2019) (describing the best way to reconceptualize materiality to be in line with society’s
interest in sustainability).
266. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 2135, 2146 (“In the last ten years, the explosive growth of compliance departments
has redefined the corporate landscape, demanding extraordinary resources and upending
established corporate governance hierarchies.”).
267. This emergent reality is inspiring a burgeoning board best practices literature in the
area of risk management and compliance. See, e.g., THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION,
ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE: BOARD OVERSIGHT OF DISRUPTIVE RISKS (2018) (recommending
steps for boards to manage disruptive risks).
268. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Despite the emphasis on stock price monitoring by boards, Gordon notes the emergence of a
“controls monitoring” duty on the board’s part. See GORDON, supra note 37, at 1540
(“Directors, then, will have a particularized monitoring role, which might be called ‘controls
monitoring,’ in addition to ‘performance monitoring.’”). Our treatment of the subject differs
substantially from Gordon’s by focusing on controls monitoring as a steppingstone for actual
board leadership in corporate affairs, to the point of defining the firm’s orientation to a broad
set of financial, operational, legal, and socially relevant matters.
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the progress of and corporate investments in upgraded information
technology. Information governance rejects the presumption of the
“informationally-captured” board, which had no basis in law, and ignored
the relevance and utility of contemporary communications technologies.
From an information governance perspective, an essential insight is that
risk management and legal compliance are not finite tasks or “check the box”
functions which the firm summarily completes and moves on. This facet of
information governance demands reframing as a “capability” of firms—one
executed under the board’s leadership and linked to value creation arising
from the right culture and reputation. Stepping back, it becomes clear that
legal noncompliance is a subset of risk, and risk is a subset of strategy—an
area of governance executed at the highest level.269 To emphasize—given
the scope and complexity of financial and operational risks facing public
companies, and the multiplicity (federal, state, and regulatory) of legal rules
governing firms’ conduct—risk and legal compliance are features of strategy
which, by law and practical necessity, should engage board judgment and
discretion. That is, they constitute a facet of board leadership. How much
risk should the board shoulder in seeking return? How much legal
compliance should the board effectuate before the costs become prohibitive?
Or, how little should the board invest without risking large penalties or
reputational catastrophe? These issues reveal the synthetic quality of
information governance and, relatedly, why it cannot be siloed in functional
units below the board’s purview.
Expanded transparency and stakeholder scrutiny, in combination with
the inherent uncertainty accompanying achieving an optimal equilibrium in
a firm’s risk management and legal compliance responsibilities, mandate
boards’ superintendence of these matters, along with the C-Suite. The
potential salience generated by social media, in combination with the legal
stakes and uncertainties, means there are no shortcuts. Governing risk
management and legal compliance becomes a matter of senior level business
strategy, since reputation and potential financial penalties bear immediately
on corporate wealth.270 Information governance contemplates that each
firm’s board will take a unique tack in adapting and prioritizing risk and legal
269. For a story of an epic legal compliance and risk oversight failure at Goldman Sachs,
see Plaut v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., No. 18-CV-12084, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160255
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2019) (involving alleged fraud and violations of the Exchange Act);
Dennis M. Kelleher, Goldman Sachs and the 1MDB Scandal, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 14, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/14/goldman-sachsand-the-1mdb-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/2JYT-6NJW].
270. For discussion of the strategic dimensions of the governance of legal compliance, see
Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do with It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM.
BUS. L.J. 587, 600 (2010).
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compliance governance. Yet while the intensity and priority will vary firmby-firm, these must be priorities for boards’ attention in every firm.271 Each
firm will have an individual signature—an identity achieved through board
leadership. The firm’s own reporting (both mandatory and discretionary,
including on its web page), media reporting, and social media reporting
telegraph this signature identity to investors, customers, and employees.
This is a crucial facet of the new reality boards face in information
governance.
F. ESG as Part of Information Governance
Boards’ increasing focus on ESG matters fits the information
governance thesis (as we demonstrated in Part I, in regard to the demise of
separate realms thinking). In recent years, we have seen increasing boardlevel attention devoted to sustainability reporting, policies toward ESG
shareholder proposals, and ethical corporate culture initiatives.272 All of
these involve enhanced informational commitments. Many times, they result
in compelling narratives intended to shape corporate actors’ conduct and the
firm’s identity. Where firms have failed to attend to these, they have not
uncommonly paid a reputational price in the stock market, as well as the
market of public opinion.273 At the same time, the invention of the benefit
corporation and the proliferation of benefit corporation statutes across the
nation, underscore not only the public interest in socially responsible
business, but also the increased role in traditional for-profit companies for
boards of directors that take such concerns seriously.274

271. Again, information governance takes a synthetic view of board leadership as
communicative action. This is why risk and legal compliance are matters which come under
the purview of nominating and governance committees, and the full board as well, not just
audit committees.
272. See, e.g., NACD, URGENT IMPERATIVE, supra note 2, at 16 (86% of the S&P 500 now
publishes annual sustainability reports, compared to 20% in 2011); NATALIE COOPER, BOB
LAMM & RANDI VAL MORRISON, DELOITTE, BOARD PRACTICES REPORT 7 (2018) (56% of
directors surveyed anticipate that their companies will increase disclosure related to CSR,
sustainability, and social impact over the next twelve to eighteen months).
273. Edward J. Carberry, Peter-Jan Engelen & Marc Van Essen, Which Firms Get
Punished for Unethical Behavior? Explaining Variation in Stock Market Reactions to
Corporate Misconduct, 28 BUS. ETHICS Q. 119 (2018) (empirically testing the role of the
media and corporate disclosures on stock price reactions to unethical corporate conduct).
274. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly
Held U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618–25 (2017) (discussing some
of the unique attributes of benefit corporations and their relation to board leadership).
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Board Stewardship of Shareholder Proposal Issues

Beginning in 2017, in a series of Staff Legal Bulletins, the SEC’s
Division of Corporation Finance (the “Division”) began encouraging boards
of directors to provide a written, board-level analysis of the excludability of
a shareholder proposal when a corporation requests a No-Action Letter from
the Division.275 Asserting that a company’s effort to exclude a proposal
under the “ordinary business exclusion” can involve “difficult judgment calls
that we believe are matters that the board of directors generally is wellsituated to analyze,” the Division emphasized that a “well-developed
discussion of the board’s analysis” could assist the corporation in
demonstrating to the Division that a proposal is excludable.276 Although the
Division has said that this new, board-level submission is not required to
obtain a No-Action Letter, the Division’s special emphasis on it has created
new obligations for a board considering an exclusion. It shifts oversight of
the underlying policy issue from the C-Suite up to the board and ensures that
board-level consideration occurs (and is memorialized in writing) even for
proposals that the firm seeks to ignore. The Division has stated that it
believes that the board is the “appropriate body with fiduciary duties to
shareholders” to give “due consideration as to whether the policy issue
presented by a proposal is of significance to the company.”277 The Division’s
decision to ask for board analyses thus makes the corporation’s response to
issues raised by shareholder proposals (rather than just the corporation’s
handling of the proposals themselves) a matter of the board’s fiduciary
obligation.
In addition, because shareholder-proponents often pursue the same
reform year after year, the result of the Division’s move will be, at many
companies, a written chronology of the board’s ongoing consideration of the
underlying issue, whether social, political, environmental, or governancerelated. The net effect is to make the board rather than the usual players, the
C-Suite officers, the steward of the underlying substantive issue over a
potentially long-time horizon, and to create a public paper trail of the board’s
treatment of the policy issue over a course of years. This record creates an
important communication about the firm’s commitments. It makes the
275. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I (Nov. 1, 2017); SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14J
(Oct. 23, 2018); and SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14K (Oct. 16, 2019).
276. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14K (Oct. 16, 2019) (“If a request where significance
is at issue does not include a robust analysis substantiating the board’s determination that the
policy issue raised by the proposal is not significant to the company, our analysis and ability
to state a view regarding exclusion may be impacted.”).
277. Id.
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board’s stewardship of the issue not only a fiduciary obligation for the board,
but also an expression of the firm’s purpose, operation, and intentions—its
identity.
2.

“Tone at the Top”

The abuses which led to the Great Recession focused the world’s
attention on corporate culture. As the research of Yale Law professor (and
psychologist) Tom Tyler demonstrates, ethical, pro-compliance corporate
cultures can flourish only where there is a perception of strong “buy-in” from
the board and the firm’s senior-most executives.278 This insight is often
described as the “tone at the top.” It recognizes that information does not
just flow up the reporting chain to a passive board, but also down from an
active and engaged board through all the strata of the organization. In this
picture, the board is not merely a recipient of information about the firm, but
also an author of the firm’s ethical identity. Through a significant immersion
in corporate data and reporting systems, and by overseeing the creation of
ethical, conscientious corporate policies, the directors instantiate the
commitment to accountability that can motivate and unify the firm in moving
forward.279
In “tone at the top,” we can see the outlines of the shift from the agency
cost model of the board to the information governance model. The agency
cost model focused on creating incentives to shape managers’ behavior to
benefit shareholders. Firms could treat “tone at the top” as a shareholder
wealth maximization exercise. Alternatively, boards are increasingly
communicating “tone at the top” as part of instilling a broader “ethical
culture” irrespective of ties to shareholder value. For example, this is
happening through the production and dissemination of a wide range of
authoritative corporate texts directed at employees, investors, customers, and
regulators. Given the enterprise-wide salience of these texts and the
ramifications where such commitments are breached by firms and
employees, they should be subject to board review. The creation of an ethical
278. See, e.g., RODERICK M. KRAMER & TOM R. TYLER, TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS (1996)
(discussing the broad effects of trust on organizational functioning); Tom R. Tyler, Reducing
Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 267 (2014) (arguing for the
importance of values, particularly legitimacy, in minimizing the likelihood of unlawful
corporate behavior).
279. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) (noting the role of board
governance in building productive internal firm culture as a valuable asset); NACD, URGENT
IMPERATIVE, supra note 2, at 12 (“corporate culture” is one of the items on the board agenda
that “really matters”).
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culture is not primarily about calibrating incentives for agents in a narrowly
instrumental sense (although it can demonstrably influence employees’
morale and behavior). Rather, more genuine and durable ethical cultures
arise from information- and communication-based actions by the firm’s
leadership: learning about the firm’s cultures and sub-cultures, synthesizing
an ethical identity across all of the firm’s sub-units, and communicating that
ethical identity effectively, continually, and with consequence.280 This
phenomenon reflects, in part, the increased power of multinational
corporations, and hence their boards. Especially because such firms can now
more effectively influence and elude individual nation-states’ legal
systems,281 they are more susceptible to populist backlash and attendant
organizational disruption when they are seen as bad actors.
G. Boards in Strategy
Our information governance proposal builds on the upsurge in demand
for robust, creative strategic management in U.S. corporations. Whereas the
monitoring board’s contribution to strategy was limiting managerial waste,
information governance presumes higher aspirations for the board. While,
as they currently do, boards would delegate responsibility for initiating and
executing strategy to their CEOs, information governance contemplates a
thicker, more collaborative strategic advisory role for the board.282 The new
paradigm presumes that directors are dedicated to acquiring in-depth, firmspecific knowledge to complement their individual expertise. As described
above, committee duties once categorized as administrative are, in fact,
domains for corporate expertise-building which position directors to
contribute to strategy. Moreover, the current ease of communications
technology, and firms’ enhanced data reporting systems support this
capability.283 Surveys indicate that directors themselves are enthusiastic

280. See also Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems
Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 600 (2018) (analyzing a corporation as a
system, where each element is interconnected such that the entity operates as a unified whole).
281. For discussion of one modality through which this influence is exerted,
internationally, see for example, Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201
(2017).
282. For discussion of board strategic advising in the legal literature, see Jill E. Fisch,
Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, The
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple
Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781 (2003).
283. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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about having an expanded role in strategic advising.284
It is not up to CEOs, legally or technologically, to permit or prevent
boards from engaging robustly in strategic advising.
Nominating
committees should be well aware, by now, of the enterprise risks associated
with imperialistic CEOs. Technology no longer positions CEOs to capture
corporate information in order to subvert boards’ capacity to play an active,
genuine role in strategy. Again, as Melvin Eisenberg wrote in the Cardozo
Law Review back in 1997, boards should insist on multiple overlapping but
independent channels of information reaching them directly without
possibility of CEO bias.285 Boards also have the power to hire independent
advisers, including management consultants, to shed impartial light on
strategic alternatives.286
Hence, information governance envisions directors as truly empowered
in the common project of ensuring the firm’s prosperity. Indeed, information
governance contemplates boards will engage in defining what it means for
the firm to prosper. Rather than focusing on the shortcomings of outside
directors, we see this cohort as uniquely and structurally enabled to provide
CEOs a constructive sounding board in strategy formation. Directors cannot
be fired or otherwise sanctioned by the CEO. Nor are directors, as board
members, structurally situated to compete for financial or other rewards.
Even the structure of shareholder voting, i.e., the tendency to retain board
incumbents, enables directors to speak authentically in deliberations with
little fear of reprisal.287 The simple practice of requiring CEOs to present
their (hopefully) cogent, fact-based strategic plans to now increasingly wellinformed boards stands to make a contribution. It’s likely to discourage CEO
strategies that are too egoistic, rash, thinly conceived, or ill-fitting with the
firm’s competitive position and environment. As peers secure in their
284. See, e.g., NACD, URGENT IMPERATIVE, supra note 2, at 11 (finding in a May 2019
director poll that 86% of directors “fully expect to deepen their engagement with management
on new drivers of growth and risk in the next five years”); VINCENT FIRTH, MAUREEN BUJNO,
BENJAMIN FINZI & KATHY LU, DELOITTE, SEVEN STEPS TO A MORE STRATEGIC BOARD 3
(2019) (“directors want to be more involved in strategy” to “contribute more value” and to
“use their full range of talents”); Chinta Bhagat, Martin Hirt & Conor Kehoe, Tapping the
Strategic Potential of Boards, MCKINSEY Q., Feb. 2013, at 2 (two out of three surveyed
directors would like to spend more time on strategy).
285. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 237 (1997). See also Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law:
Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REGUL. 313, 334
(2007) (discussing excess managerial freedom in corporate law).
286. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2020)).
287. These constitute one reason why reference to Habermas in the terminology of
“communicative action” appears apt.
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positions, board members are free to dig in—to bring both their firm-specific
and their individual knowledge to bear—and to deliberate over their firm’s
future.
Some of the increased demand for board collaboration in strategizing is
being fueled by fears of short-termism, as associated with activist hedge
funds and otherwise.288 Despite record-high stock prices, there is palpable
economic malaise challenging U.S. firms’ stature and prestige.289 Slow
growth, economic insecurity, and rising inequality are creating populist
turmoil, including resentment against large companies.290 Prior to the
pandemic, companies commonly used free cash flow (and tax breaks) to buy
back shares, raising complaints that they were failing to invest in their firms’
longer-term futures, including that of their employees.291 Once the pandemic
hit, the absence of cash reserves triggered bailouts, especially for larger
firms—always a source of controversy. No longer is record-high CEO pay
receiving unqualified endorsement, even in the presence of high stock prices.
The underlying tenets of antitrust policy are also being reconsidered,
reflecting worry that record consolidation has enabled oligopoly to
undermine wages, sustainability, and innovation.292 These legal, social, and
macro-economic pressures are presenting challenges to business strategy
that, at minimum, CEOs should not resolve on their own without board input
and consensus.
Surveys indicate that directors are themselves seeking a larger role in
the strategic planning process. Directors are advocating for a larger role in
strategic planning notwithstanding their greater time commitment and
responsibility in financial reporting and oversight of risk and legal
compliance. Or perhaps directors seek a larger role on account of these
things, since being more deeply informed, by virtue of active committee
service, gives directors greater depth in strategic planning. For many
directors, prestigious strategy work is a “reward” for the heavy lifting of
288. Mark J. Roe & Roy Shapira, The Power of the Narrative in Corporate Lawmaking
(Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 20–21, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3703882 [https://perma.cc/P4UQ-VLT3].
289. See, e.g., Jeanna Smialek, The Fed Sets Out Many Reasons to Worry About the
Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/business/econ
omy/federal-reserve-minutes.html [https://perma.cc/LD27-FCBZ].
290. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, Big Business Pledged Gentler Capitalism. It’s Not
Happening in a Pandemic., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/1
3/business/business-roundtable-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/QY4R-4FBK].
291. See, e.g., Jerry Useem, The Stock-Buyback Swindle, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 2019), http
s://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/08/the-stock-buyback-swindle/592774/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/U2QP-F58M].
292. See generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE
(2019); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 76 YALE L.J. 710 (2017).
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committee work.293
Because this Article is not an encyclopedic account of boards in
information governance, we have omitted a treatment of the compensation
committee’s work. It is apparent, nevertheless, that directors’ participation
in strategy formation should improve their capacity to assess the CEO’s
execution of the strategy, as relevant to CEO compensation and retention
decisions.
As expressed earlier, information flows in information
governance are synthetic.294 The monitoring board relied principally on
external, stock price signals to assess CEO success. Information governance
shifts the focus to illuminate how internal board experience, advising on
financial reporting, risk and legal compliance, and strategy (in addition to
stock prices), enables better board judgments about compensation and
retention.
Business strategy is conventionally associated more with the fields of
management and finance than law. But law is crucial to the board’s authority
in strategy. To review, by statute in every state, boards of directors are
granted preeminent discretionary authority over corporate affairs, to manage
or direct, as they see fit.295 The CEO’s authority is delegated from the
board’s statutory authority and documented in board resolutions vis a vis
non-ordinary affairs. Sales of substantially all assets, a sale or substantial
expansion via a merger, and the declaration of special dividends or share
repurchases are all corporate acts that cannot be commenced other than by
consent of a majority of directors.296 The board, of course, chooses the firm’s
CEO—the primary actor in setting strategy—and may terminate the CEO if
the firm’s strategy is a failure.
To provide room for reasonable adventurousness in strategy, the law
ensures that neither boards nor CEOs are financially liable for business
losses from failed strategies, except in extraordinary circumstances. So long
as the strategy was chosen in good faith, based on all reasonably available
information, the business judgment rule ensures that shareholders cannot
hold the board or CEO liable for attendant business losses.297 This fiduciary
293. See STEWART, supra note 196. See also Rick Hoel, The Role of the Board of
Directors in Strategic Planning, DILIGENT INSIGHTS (Apr. 12, 2019), https://insights.diligent.
com/board-of-directors/role-board-directors-strategic-planning [https://perma.cc/27NM-7C
NS] (“Collectively, [directors] rate long-term strategic planning as the top issue demanding
their attention.”)
294. See supra note 271.
295. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
296. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271.
297. See generally DAVID KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
CORPORATE FIDUCIARY LAW (2018) (tracing the origins and development of the duty of care
and business judgment rule in American corporate law).
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duty of care requirement provides an additional incentive for boards to
ensure they are fully informed in their strategy-oversight role. Financial
conflict-of-interest transactions and egregious shortfalls in directors being
informed can result in personal liability for directors, but only in truly
extraordinary circumstances largely within their control. Liability for
corporate “waste” is virtually nonexistent—pertaining to instances of board
judgment falling outside any creditable strategy.298 Business judgment
deference in litigation is also a pillar of board leadership in information
governance. For these reasons, fear of liability should not factor into boards’
participation in strategy. In sum, the law provides that board authority and
discretion is constitutive of corporate strategy formation, notwithstanding
the freedom and respect afforded CEOs in this domain. The monitoring
model masked full recognition of board authority and discretion in setting
corporate goals and objectives. There was not ambiguity over whether they
existed, they just did not comport with broader features of that agency cost
paradigm.
Nevertheless, interestingly, there is no fiduciary duty mandating boards
to govern strategy or to govern “strategically.”299 Broad, nonspecific
nostrums in the equitable jurisprudence advise directors (and officers) to act
in the best interests of the firm and shareholders, to become informed, and
to avoid financial conflicts. One might presume this gap in fiduciary
doctrine arises from the law’s tendency to attend to the “downside” of
affairs—the avoidance or resolution of conflicts. Yet this is not the case
here: fiduciary duties have an aspirational, “upside” orientation, as well as
one demarcating standards of liability.300 As for board fiduciary duties
touching on “strategy,” the case law simply avoids express mention of the
subject. Conceptual frameworks for strategy operative in the field of
management—through MBA education, consultants, and research—have
not infused the vast case law of board duties
Nor do fiduciary duties or other requirements in corporate law (outside
the M&A context) locate where along the spectrum of shareholder profit
maximization or stakeholder governance a board should set corporate sights.
Both shareholder wealth maximization and stakeholder governance—indeed

298. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 1.41 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
299. This realization is first noted in the legal literature by Nadelle Grossman. See Nadelle
Grossman, The Duty to Think Strategically, 73 LA. L. REV. 449, 479 (2013) (arguing that legal
duties focus only on managing to prevent losses, not on strategically managing to create
gains).
300. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 463–64 (1993) (claiming that the
standards of conduct in corporate law are not merely aspirational, but also have “a real bite”).
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the full spectrum of strategic board discretion—are congruent with existing
fiduciary tenets and the board discretion they validate. Irrespective of claims
to the contrary, the law remains agnostic on this matter, and information
governance supports this agnosticism, and hence expansive discretion in the
board. We argue that enhanced transparency is the ideal monitor of this
fiduciary and corporate discretion, rather than law or legal commentators
dictating some end purpose of business corporations.301
More remarkable than fiduciary law’s silence is the almost complete
failure of legal scholarship to address boards’ role in strategy.302 Most
pointedly, as illustrated in Part I, the “monitoring” board—as it was intended
to focus the board on limiting managerial agency costs—was not the
“strategy” board.303 Legal corporate governance research acknowledged in
passing that boards might fruitfully advise the CEO about strategy, but the
discussion went no further, remaining generic, nonspecific. The silence in
the legal scholarship perhaps reflects the pervasiveness of the presumption
(unsupported by empirical evidence) that non-management directors would
not or could not become deeply informed about corporate affairs, and hence
could not contribute much to a CEOs’ project of strategy formation. The
view was that CEOs would resent and prevent it. Second, there was a
presumption that non-management directors could not obtain the requisite
information to become genuinely useful, a presumption refuted above.
Third, there was a presumption that non-management directors lacked an
incentive to become deeply informed about their firm—a presumption, we
noted, that ignores the prestige from and enjoyment of power in the role, as
well as the now substantial compensation. As stated above, relative director
ignorance about the inside of their firms was accepted as if it were a
necessary tradeoff for independence—an assumption the information
governance model rejects. We believe we have demonstrated that new
technology, new legal requirements, and new expectations for directors’
roles refutes the model of the detached, thinly-informed director.304 In this
301. Such discretion fits neatly with the enabling nature of American corporate law. On
the benefits of such flexibility in law, see, for example, ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (arguing that a legal structure that allows shareholders
and the market to freely monitor management is more efficient than implementing rules that
directly regulate management).
302. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Boards 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS.
LAW. 351, 353 (2019) (conceptualizing a new board model that would have a more active role
in shaping a company’s strategy); GROSSMAN, supra note 299, at 473–75 (claiming that
although directors play an advisory role when determining strategy, managers ultimately
choose a company’s strategic plan).
303. See discussion supra Part I.
304. See, e.g., NACD, URGENT IMPERATIVE, supra note 2, at 12 (proposing that board
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new mindset, the opportunity to influence the identity of a major public
company, including its business strategy, its posture towards risk and the
law, and its ESG profile are, even alone, powerful draws, encouraging
talented professionals to board service.
Indeed, the role of outside directors in strategy formation is a
functionally vital one. Vetting the CEO’s strategic plan, with authentic
candor, is not plausibly an option for an insider or affiliated director. Where
they could be fired by the CEO, as is true for inside directors and advisers,
they cannot afford to bring constructive criticism to bear on the CEO’s
strategic vision. Inside directors, reasonably, would have to say “yes”—
thereby fostering groupthink, as well as greater overconfidence bias in the
CEO.305 Both have been highly destructive for firms. The universally
accepted need for independent directors’ judgment in evaluating a CEO’s
performance ex post is equally germane to vetting a CEO’s strategy ex ante.
But to make a meaningful contribution, directors’ professional
independence—security of livelihood and independence of mind—has to be
complemented by meaningfully deep firm-specific knowledge, as we have
discussed herein.306
By 2020, the field of strategic management has already embraced
reliance on big data, quantitative analysis, and enhanced reportingtechnology software. Big data and information science have ramped up to
such a degree that commentators are already foreseeing a role for machine
learning in corporate governance.307 But what is overlooked too often is that
strategy is also a narrative process.308 Corporate data does not speak for
leaders “position boards as more proactive in providing direction and shaping future
strategy”).
305. See, e.g., Marleen O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1233, 1243–47 (2003) (finding that CEO-dominated boards may not act in
shareholders’ best interests because other directors are not sufficiently independent of the
CEO and do not have “equal peer status” to her); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias
in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate
Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91–93 (1985) (arguing that director nominees are
often agreeable to and compatible with the current board leading to in-group conformity and
a lack of dissent within the board).
306. Once we concede that local stock market prices are incomplete signals about the
quality of a CEO’s strategy, then directors serving on the Compensation Committee must also
be well informed about the terms and parameters of the CEO’s chosen strategy.
307. See, e.g., John Armour & Horst Eidenmüeller, Self-Driving Corporations? 13 (ECGI
Law, Working Paper No. 475/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3442447 [https://perma.cc/QC9N-R6SG].
308. On this score, see, for example, Christopher Fenton & Ann Langley, Strategy as
Practice and the Narrative Turn, 32 ORG. STUD. 1171 (2011) (drawing on the organizational
studies literature on Communication Constitutes Organization to analyze this dimension of
strategy).
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itself. To become meaningful, data demands inferences about causality,
probability, and market competitors’ conduct—all projected into the future.
Taking a narrative view of strategy illustrates how it fits with the
discretionary, conscientious view of the board’s information governance.
Mindful information gathering, deliberating about the results, and asking
probing questions at the board level are part of the narrativity in strategy
formation. They are not self-executing functions, nor is the process suitable
to be performed by one individual. Accordingly, requiring the CEO to
engage the board in a collaborative process of describing, examining, and
narratively constructing the firm’s strategic plan can be extremely valuable
to the firm.
Nor do boards have to reinvent the wheel in developing conceptual
frameworks for strategy. As distinct from strategy execution, which is
inevitably bespoke, strategy formulation builds on two predominant schools
of thought in management science. While impossible to summarize here,
they should be noted because they provide authoritative, widely accepted,
rigorous entrée to serious considerations of strategy by boards. Variations
on these two academic strategy traditions are employed, commonly, by
executives and management consulting firms—hence they should be
conceptually accessible for directors.
One is the so-called “resource-based” view of the firm, arising from the
seminal research of Edith Penrose.309 To discern the sources of a firm’s
competitive advantage in order to capitalize on it, the resource-based view
of the firm demands a searching interrogation of which corporate assets or
resources (tangible or intangible) are “rare, valuable and relatively
inimitable.” The resource-based view of the firm is nearly universally taught
in business schools.310 Its basic framework would be familiar to virtually
every director with an MBA.
The same is true of the second major school of strategic thought, arising
from the research of Harvard Business School’s Michael E. Porter.311
309. See generally EDITH PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1959)
(arguing that a firm’s growth is largely dependent on its available resources); Richard L.
Priem & John E. Butler, Is the Resource-Based “View” a Useful Perspective for Strategic
Management Research?, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20, 23–25 (2001) (summarizing the different
takes on the resource-based view of the firm); Birger Wernerfelt, A Resource-Based View of
the Firm, 5 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 171 (1984) (finding that a firm’s strategic options should be
governed by that firm’s available resources).
310. See, e.g., Norman T. Sheehan, Understanding How Resources and Capabilities Affect
Performance: Actively Applying the Resource-Based View in the Classroom, 30 J. MGMT. ED.
421 (2006).
311. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1985) (explaining how a firm’s “value chain” gives it a competitive
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Porter’s work is as famous among MBAs as Coase’s is among University of
Chicago Law School graduates. Porter is still an active teacher and
researcher at Harvard and is a sought-after consultant. Porterian strategy
adopts a five-part heuristic for analyzing a firm’s competitive status within
its industry and larger competitive environment—hence, its most likely paths
to success. Notably, despite their comprehensive influence on management
science, neither the resource-based view, nor Porter’s five forces analysis,
are particularly quantitative models of strategy (though econometric and
other quantitative metrics are used in applying the theories to case studies,
of course). The point for directors is that they do not need to conduct
regression studies to understand the strategic future of their firms. Nor do
they need to proceed ex nihilo in developing a framework for analyzing their
CEO’s strategic plans. These two widely accepted models offer frameworks
for boards to discuss their CEO’s preferred strategic alternatives.312
This discussion of boards in strategy, and in information governance
overall, suggests that firms might benefit from selecting board candidates
with different backgrounds. Nominating committees might focus less on the
pool of retired and current CEOs and more on mid-career executives who
intend to grow professionally with their firms. Directors who are employed
full-time will serve, ideally, on one board at a time. The greater churn in
executive labor markets, as well as the greater representation of women and
minorities in elite professional networks, suggests there will be no shortage
of highly qualified candidates. Web-based, professional search technology
is available, and likely genuinely to up the ante in board recruitment. Beyond
the substantial compensation, public company board positions confer power,
prestige, and access to elite networks which can later be monetized. Charter
exculpation, indemnification, D&O insurance, the business judgment rule,
the demand requirement, heightened pleading requirements, forum selection
bylaws, and a myriad of other legal and logistical hurdles ensure that
directors acting conscientiously face near zero personal liability exposure.313
edge over other industry firms); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES
FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS (1980) (finding that a firm’s competitive
strategy should be determined by industry analysis, competitor analysis, and strategic
positioning).
312. Of course, there are CEOs who adopt an instinctive, ineffable approach to strategy,
and would avoid board-level discussion of strategy. In such a case, the full board would have
to evaluate whether to tolerate that degree of CEO autonomy. Blind luck, too, is at times
more influential than is planning, but no one would suggest leaving a company’s future up to
luck.
313. See Rene Otto & Wim Weterings, D&O Insurance and Corporate Governance: Is
D&O Insurance Indicative of the Quality of Corporate Governance in a Company?, 24 STAN.
J. L. BUS. & FIN. 105, 108 (2019) (finding that D&O insurance reduces directors’ risk-adverse
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Going forward, to the degree boards require support to obtain relevant
data in the domains of information governance described above,
administrative supports will develop. The Office of the Corporate Secretary
is an underdeveloped institutional resource which could be recast to report
to the board rather than management. A “board ombudsman” or an
“administrative board suite” might also aid in this goal.314
In sum, although corporate governance has underemphasized the role
of boards in strategy formation, developments in information technology,
more intensive director committee requirements, and clear, evolved
frameworks for strategic analysis, now position even outside directors to
make a valuable contribution in this area. Strategy formation is not a gnostic
art; the information governance board is strategically enabled.
H. Boards’ Fiduciary Information Duties
Under Caremark and its progeny, boards must demonstrate a pattern of
genuine inquiry regarding legal compliance and risk management and pay
attention to signs of “red flags.” In a more modern vein, boards must attend
to their firms’ architecture of internal data gathering and reporting and
produce a considered response to the results.315 The evolution of Caremark
duties provides some of the best authority that informational demands on
boards are increasing, and that this path leads to better corporate governance.
Information governance provides a framework to understand this evolution.
It justifies the ongoing legal shift in favor of enhanced Caremark duties by
recognizing the creation of and attendance to informational architecture as a
core role of the board. It connects the board’s active participation in
informational practices to the board’s satisfaction of its fundamental duty of
loyalty.
In a closely followed decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware
behaviors and fears that they will personally have to pay for a liability claim).
314. Proposing the former, see Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate
Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
91, 93, 130–37 (1997) (arguing that a board ombudsperson would gather information, present
it to independent directors, and make recommendations based on the information). Proposing
the latter, see Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors”
and the Case for a Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 52–55 (2017) (claiming that a board
suite, consisting of an office of the board and an independent general counsel to the board,
would close the board’s information gap).
315. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(stating that boards themselves must ensure that reasonable information and reporting systems
exist in the organization to satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed); Stone v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (finding that directors fulfilled their obligation to establish an
information and reporting system and subsequently monitor its operation).
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Supreme Court emphasized that the board could not simply rely on
management’s compliance efforts or discretionary reporting on operational
matters.316 In Barnhill, an ice cream manufacturer failed to remediate an
outbreak of deadly bacteria in one of its manufacturing plants, leading to
three deaths.317 The company’s board had not been informed about “yellow
and red flags” about the bacterial outbreak because it had no informational
architecture that required reporting such flags up to the board and because
the company’s officers had elected to provide the board with limited
information about the growing problem.318 The Delaware Supreme Court
held that the company’s board could violate its Caremark duties by failing
to establish the existence of a system to keep itself informed about the
company’s food safety performance and compliance.319 To discharge its
Caremark duties, the court held that the board had to undertake a good-faith
effort to establish a food safety risk oversight system at the board level and
then participate in the system.320 Relying on this two-prong approach
endorsed by Barnhill, the Delaware Court of Chancery recently rejected a
motion to dismiss a complaint that pled a violation of Caremark duties where
the board of a pharmaceutical company had ignored red flags raised through
information processes focused on its regulatory approvals.321
Starting in the mid- to late 1990s, then, Caremark and its progeny have
expressed the board’s duty of loyalty, in part, in terms of its good faith
execution of informational practices.322 As the Delaware Supreme Court said
in Barnhill, “the board must make a good faith effort—i.e., try—to put in
place a reasonable board-level system of monitoring and reporting.”323 The
word reasonable suggests that as informational best practices evolve, courts
will hold boards responsible for updating and improving those practices at
316. Marchand v. Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-JRS, slip op. at 34–36 (Del. June 18,
2019).
317. Id. at 1.
318. Id. at 5 (“the complaint alleges that Blue Bell’s board had no committee overseeing
food safety, no full board-level process to address food safety issues, and no protocol by which
the board was expected to be advised of food safety reports and developments” and “the board
was not presented with any material information about food safety”).
319. Id. at 32–33.
320. Id. at 30 (“In short, to satisfy their duty of loyalty, directors must make a good faith
effort to implement an oversight system and then monitor it.”); see also In re Clovis Oncology
Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017–0222-JRS, slip op. at 2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (emphasizing
the board’s obligation to monitor an oversight system).
321. In re Clovis, slip op. at 36–43.
322. For a recent synthesis of Caremark and its progeny, see Elizabeth Pollman,
Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2021–25 (2019) (finding
that few cases alleging director-oversight failures survive the motion to dismiss stage).
323. Barnhill, slip op. at 30–31 (emphasis added).
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each firm. What is reasonable will turn not only on the company’s unique
business-regulatory and risk profile, but also on the information technology
and organizational practices that supported (or failed to support) the board’s
collection and analysis of information germane to remediating problems. As
information technology and organizational practices improve, the
expectations for board competency will ratchet up. Exculpation for duty of
care violations (and the business judgment rule) will continue to protect
directors from personal liability for poor judgment in the use of the
information, but the board’s responsibility for robust informational practices
will limit any “blind spot” defense, including in the selection of plainly
inadequate informational systems.324 Boards operating in good faith will
increasingly be held liable for ignoring red flags and failing to attempt to
learn of them.
Given the growing importance of information flows and
communicative action to board governance, we might expect courts to raise
the bar for disclosure-related fiduciary duties and cleansing tools in other
contexts. This includes directors’ disclosure duties to shareholders and their
duty of candor inter se, as well as disclosure practices upon which the
cleansing effect of shareholder votes will turn.325 This also includes making
express the duties of officers to disclose material information to the board.
For example, in recognition of the importance of “reporting up” red flags to
the board, Jennifer O’Hare has proposed a “duty to inform” bylaw that would
require the CEO and CFO to promptly inform the board of information it
needs to manage the firm.326 This is a bylaw which boards could and should
adopt at present, without shareholder involvement.327

324. Accord In re Clovis, slip op. at 34–35 (“as relates to Caremark liability, it is
appropriate to distinguish the board’s oversight of the company’s management of business
risk that is inherent in its business plan from the board’s oversight of the company’s
compliance with positive law—including regulatory mandates”); see also Teamsters Local
443 Health Serv. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, C.A. No. 2019-0816-SG, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,
2020) (following a relatively cautious path in interpreting board oversight duties in relation
AmerisourceBergen’s subsidiary’s legal violations respecting marketing of a cancer drug).
325. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9–12 (Del. 1998) (stating that directors must
disclose to shareholders “accurate and complete” information relevant to the transaction at
hand); see also Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate
Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 230 (2009) (describing
Malone as “t[ying] together” directors’ “duty of honesty to shareholders not only in
communications seeking shareholder action—whether for approval or ratification—but also
‘[w]henever directors communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about the
corporation’s affairs, with or without a request for shareholder action’”).
326. Jennifer O’Hare, Private Ordering and Improving Information Flow to the Board of
Directors: The Duty to Inform Bylaw, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 557, 558 (2019).
327. Id.
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***
The role of boards in information governance is expanding, as
demonstrated above. New demands placed on audit committees exemplify
the board’s increasing investment in information and communication
practices. Over time, fiduciary duty has become increasingly concerned with
the management of information. Federal law, SRO rules, and investor
demands have pushed boards and board committees to expand the scope and
intensity of their attention. Information governance recognizes that boards
play a value-creating role at the command center of firms’ information
architecture. By investing in the firm’s knowledge and communication
systems, the board helps turn collectivity into enterprise, rather than chaos.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the agency cost “monitoring board”
paradigm and separate realms concepts reflect a dated approach to board
governance. Four decades ago, Fama and Jensen divided the governance
world into monitoring and managing, creating a conceptual dichotomy that
influences corporate law to this day. Boards assumed the monitoring role,
while the C-Suite performed the executive function. What got lost in the
elegant monitoring-versus-managing trope is the board’s role in stewardship,
which cannot happen in the absence of a meaningfully credible baseline of
knowledge and shared communications. Stock price signals are thin, often
tardy substitutes for this thicker knowledge about the firm. The COVID-19
pandemic and recent stock market turbulence have only underscored
weaknesses inherent in stock-price-based corporate governance.
Governance changed radically in the 2000s in the aftermath of Sarbanes
Oxley and attendant developments reflecting widespread fears of legal
compliance and risk management failures. The shared belief that governance
failures were also implicated in the 2008 (and beyond) financial crisis also
brought pressure to bear on the field and produced the Dodd-Frank Act and
ensuing SEC regulations. These changes, along with technological and
macroeconomic developments, are still being assimilated by governance
actors, regulators, and researchers today.
What is clear is that a new approach to board governance is taking
shape. Information governance describes the board’s management and
authoritative deployment of knowledge and communication as the basis for
rational collective action in the firm. It embodies an active, rather than a
passive, approach to board governance. It is both a normative improvement
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on the stale monitoring board and one better reflecting corporate governance
law’s cutting edge.
Directors’ participation in financial reporting and risk management and
legal compliance oversight constitute investments in valuable firm-specific
knowledge. This knowledge is a capital asset that compounds in value when
brought to bear on consideration of the CEO’s strategic plans. Recent shocks
to our systems of public health and finance have only heightened the
importance of these informational assets and firms’ systems of information
gathering, synthesis, and strategy formation. The future of corporate
governance is board-level information governance.

